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CHINA'S STRUGGLE
WITH THE DICTATORS

O. M. GREEN

CHINA'S STRUGGLE
WITH THE DICTATORS

Foreword by

H.E. THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR

With 12 Illustrations

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FOREWORD

BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR,
DR. QUO TAI-CHI

I AM glad to write a brief foreword to Mr. Green's book on present-day China and the struggle forced upon her by Japan, as his publisher requests, because I have known him for many years and through many Chinese national vicissitudes. He was editor of the *North China Daily News* in Shanghai throughout the period of nascent Chinese nationalism of the disturbed 'twenties, and in that period of his career, and our acquaintance, he had the name in Chinese circles of being at times a somewhat over-candid friend and inclined to view things in the Far East through rather strong British lenses, though his sincerity and intellectual honesty were above question. So my acquaintance with the author of this present book had personal regard pretty often mixed with difference of view-points. Nevertheless we all regarded the then editor of the *North China Daily News* as a man who, in American parlance, 'knew his stuff.'

Since Mr. Green came home to London he has maintained his contacts with China and has been in daily touch with developments in the West Pacific area. His native mental endowment has saved him from the typical journalist's peril of not seeing the wood for the trees, and he is in essence a qualified contemporary historian of the Far East. I think that shows up time and time again in the course of this book. I feel it even when I disagree most with some of his interpretations.

It has been interesting during these years of contact with him in London after the years of acquaintance in Shanghai to see how as student of contemporary history and close observer of daily events he came to a better understanding of China's fundamental position in the community of nations and confidence in China's nationalism as an integral part of the programme for working out a genuine democratic life for all her citizens. This present book of his has as a notable pervading quality its reasoned tone and its avoidance of undue excitements. He weighs China's enormous domestic difficulties of a recent past, sees her staunchness



and resourcefulness in the present international dilemmas, and thus deduces her manifest destiny as the leader of East Asia into the fruitful ways of democracy and the widest international co-operation. Thus will my country once more justify herself during the remaining decades of the twentieth century as a mother of civilization. That is the conclusion which fair and open minds are sure ultimately to reach, and I regard Mr. Green's book as in that sense a symbol of the really valid modern British point of view on China and the whole Far East. I have mentioned an early sense of his impatience with us, if not bias against us, only to emphasize the triumph of reasonableness in his book. But British and Chinese in their new sense of relationship to each other have graduated from mere forbearance to the beginnings of a really deep understanding that our two races have common aims and common sympathies in the ways of life that are best for all men in common, as well as having many material common interests in commerce and world-strategy. China's service to real world-order, as opposed to the so-called 'new order' of the Dictators, by being the first to withstand mechanized aggression and challenge the stereotype of boiler-plate thinking is recognized by Great Britain now, as it was not ten, or even five, or two, years ago. The great military service of the Chinese armies in hamstringing the Japanese invasion hordes in China, so that they are hampered in their desire for predatory adventure all over the Western Pacific area, is gratefully (I think I may say) recognized ; as is also the vital possibility of combined Anglo-Chinese military strategy. In the better days so soon to come now of reassured democracy and insured peace, the best genius of both countries will undoubtedly find even deeper sources of common purpose and equal co-operation as each of us puts his own house in better order for sound and full democracy.

So I have been glad to write this foreword and wish my friend Green a large audience for his book and look forward to both agreeing and disagreeing with him during many more years of his keeping an observant eye on the Far East.

CHINESE EMBASSY,
49 PORTLAND PLACE, W.1.

Huo Sai-chi

PREFACE

NO attempt is made in this book to write a history of the war in China or of China herself since the Republic was proclaimed in 1911. Its aim is to try to bring out the chief features in the recent development of the Chinese and Japanese peoples, and in their respective characters which made the conflict inevitable.

Japan's invariable excuse for invading China is that she was compelled to protect herself against the violence of anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese. Now in the years 1928-31, the Chinese Nationalists might be described as 'anti' everybody. They had triumphed over the last of the great Tuchuns, Chang Tso-lin, had started a new era as typified by the removal of the capital to Nanking, and were determined to throw off the shackles of the 'unequal treaties,' and to be masters in their own country. In the excitement of those times they were not judicious and they were not always quite fair. So firm a friend of China's as Sir Eric Teichman, for many years Chinese Counsellor in the British Legation in Peking, has written that in respect of Manchuria 'Japan had a case.' Her invasion of China he describes as 'military aggression unalloyed.'

But the point to emphasize is, that the ebullience of Chinese Nationalism would unquestionably have calmed down if given time and fair treatment. Between 1925-27 Great Britain had suffered considerably from a wave of anti-British passion, largely fomented by Soviet agents; but she met it coolly, used no reprisals against it, and it passed, leaving the friendly relations of Great Britain and China unimpaired. It is true that Japan's seizure of Manchuria acted like an electric shock on Nanking to put an end to internal squabbles, to bring the politicians together, and to set them on the path of reform which in

the next six years produced such amazing improvements. But even before the Japanese *coup*, General Chiang Kai-shek's declaration that he would fight no more civil wars, except against Communists ; the steps that were being taken to remodel the unwieldy Nanking Government ; and the setting up of the National Economic Council, with its host of advisers supplied by the League of Nations, all showed that China's practical common sense was reasserting itself.

To prove the falsity of the charge that the Chinese people are naturally anti-foreign would need nothing less than writing a history of foreign and Chinese relations for the last one hundred and fifty years. But the assertion that it is a false charge can confidently be made. Hundreds of foreign travellers have walked all over China and met with nothing but courtesy and kindliness. Even in the worst times of popular excitement, no Chinese, if courteously approached, would fail to show equal courtesy. Here is an amusing illustration. During the summer of 1925 a British sloop was stationed at Swatow, where the anti-British strike and boycott were pretty bad. The strike-leaders were continually trying to get on board the sloop in order to force out the Chinese servants who are employed in every British ship in China seas ; and there were several sharp encounters between them and the crew. When the sloop was eventually recalled to Hongkong, one of her officers (a friend of the author's) thought he would like to have a souvenir of ' my enemies ' as he called them. Armed with a camera, he went ashore to the strike leaders' headquarters, and explained that he was going away and would like to take a farewell photograph of them. They were charmed, entertained him to tea, lined up for the photograph, escorted him to his boat, and begged him to come and see them again if he returned to Swatow.

The Chinese, it cannot be too strongly emphasized, are, from the humblest coolie upwards, essentially cultured and civilized, permeated for at least two thousand six hundred years with a philosophy of life which is bound up in the principles of propriety, manners, and moderation. They have a keen sense of humour, a genius for compromise, and

are generous and hospitable. They have no belief in warfare to settle differences, and would never have attacked Japan if she had let them alone. But that was just what she would not do.

Of the Japanese people, too, as a whole, it may fairly be said that they are peaceable, friendly, and very courteous. The Liberal movement during the decade before the seizure of Manchuria was far more indicative of the real feelings of the Japanese people than the ruthless aggressiveness with which the name 'Japan' has since unhappily come to be associated. But in the Japanese constitution and social structure the seeds of this aggressiveness were inherent, waiting only for circumstances to bring forth a frightful fruit.

Japan is, and always has been, a feudalism (the Meiji Restoration of 1868 merely changing the form, not the reality) dominated by the fighting men, who succeeded in securing for themselves in the Constitution of 1889 a unique position that enables them to wreck, and thus to dictate to, any Government by the simple process of refusing to take part in it. There are, as will be seen, exceptions. But, *en masse*, the Japanese Army has been aptly described as having the mentality of a seventeenth-century daimyo. It viewed with abhorrence the Washington Treaty, Kellogg Pact, and the Naval Treaty of London of 1930, the Liberal movement and the Diet's rising authority, during the 1920's. Especially it watched with dislike and apprehension the growth of Chinese Nationalism and prosperity.

It has been an axiom with the Chinese for many years that 'Japan will never allow us to grow prosperous and well organized.' Events have fully justified them. When the Japanese Army went over the head of the Government in Tokyo and seized Mukden on 18 September, 1931, it had three motives: Foreign conquest, the reassertion of its own authority at home, and to crush China before she became strong enough to be (as the Japanese Generals saw it) a menace to Japan. Having put its hand to the plough the Army did not turn back. The invasion of all China was the natural sequence to the rape of Manchuria. The destruction of Baron Shidehara's conciliatory policy of

1931, led by rapid stages to the totalitarianism of the 'new political structure' of 1940.

Such, in a nutshell, is the essence of China's struggle with the Dictators. The one factor on which the Dictators never reckoned was that the Chinese would stand together and struggle for their ideals to such good purpose.

O. M. G.

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O. M. G.

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CHAPTER I

CHINESE AND JAPANESE

FROM the beginning of their struggle with Japan, Chinese leaders have never ceased to proclaim that they are fighting not only their own battle, but the battle of the West. "There is no European war. There is no Asiatic war. There is a world war," said Dr. Quo Tai-chi, the Chinese Ambassador, speaking at a National Liberal Club lunch last February, "and whether here, where you have hardly started fighting, or in Asia where we have already drained our blood and our resources, it is the same war waged by the same opposing forces." The same theme was incessantly and eloquently preached by Dr. Wellington Koo at those pitiful meetings of the League Assembly, which could never achieve any more than empty appeals to the assembled nations to give all possible assistance to China.

There is certainly now no misunderstanding of the issues between China and Japan. The past three and a half years have been an ugly awakening to the Western democracies, who have seen their interests in the Far East assailed, their rights tramped upon, their nationals insulted, wounded, and killed, their protests ignored or answered with bland mendacity by Japan, who has finally sealed her belief in the doctrine of might over right by signing an alliance with Hitler and Mussolini. There is no question now in anybody's mind that if Japan should succeed in subduing China, it will be as much a closed country to the West as Manchuria is already, or as Japan herself was during the two hundred and fifty years of the Tokugawa Shogunate. It will be lucky for the democracies if their enlightenment has not come too late—words which apply again and again to Western action in the Far East during the past hundred years, but never with greater truth or seriousness than to-day.

It is to be admitted that intervention in 1937 had already become a difficult matter. The United States was in the grip of the isolationists and still aggrieved at Great Britain's failure, as she saw it, to respond to Mr. Stimson's overtures for action over the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Great Britain was already becoming uneasily conscious of the rising menace of Hitlerism. France, as later events have sadly revealed, was in no state to put pressure upon anyone.

But the whole point of the Chinese argument is that the mainspring of Japan's lust for empire and spoliation lies far back in her history; that her present outburst is but the revival of the ambitions of Shogun Hideyoshi in the sixteenth century, the so-called Napoleon of Japan, which, however apparently dormant, had never ceased to be cherished by a leading faction of Japanese; and that it is only necessary to study her treatment of her own people to realize how little she believes in any form of government except that which is concentrated in a small privileged class to whose wishes and welfare all others must be subservient, with no right but that of unquestioning obedience.

If we go back no further in the story of the Sino-Japanese struggle than 1931—the year of Japan's assault on Manchuria and the time when the Western Powers could, and should have, stepped in—it is easy to see how widely not only the true nature of the issue was misunderstood, but the character of the two peoples engaged in it.

It was particularly unfortunate for China that her record in 1931 was not such as to awake much sympathy abroad. No apparent use had been made of the opportunities offered her by the Washington Conference of 1921 and the charter of the Nine-Power Treaty; on the contrary, China had gone down in a welter of civil war and the disappearance of all organized government, while military barons, the famous or infamous Tuchuns, had established themselves in every province, and preyed ruthlessly on the unfortunate people. There were parts of China where taxes had been extracted as much as twenty years ahead, and northern central China came to be known as 'the grey zone,' so often had contending armies marched across and pillaged it.

Then followed the submerging of the whole Nationalist

movement in a wave of Communism, led by Borodin and his fellow-Russians, and the anti-British boycott of 1925-27. There was no mistaking then that Moscow was deliberately aiming at the total destruction of the British position in China, as the heel of her position in all Asia, and found a ready weapon in Young China's grievances and aspirations. These memories were still fresh in 1931. And even after the expulsion of the Russian agents by General Kai-shek, the collapse of the Communist Government at Hankow, the conquest of the last of the old war-lords, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, at Peking, followed by his train being blown up as he fled back to his Manchurian fastness, and the establishment of the Nationalist Government at Nanking, there was no visible sign of improvement.

Paper reforms innumerable poured from the Nanking printing-press, but the crying needs of the Chinese people went without redress. Before they had been in power for a year the Kuomintang—the central organization of the Nationalist movement—were engaged in a new civil war. Another one followed in 1930 ; and yet another, between Nanking and Canton, was on the verge of breaking out when the Manchurian crisis befell. Meanwhile Dr. C. T. Wang, the Chinese Foreign Minister, had proclaimed implacable war on ' the unequal treaties,' the determination of China to recover her sovereign rights, and had scandalized the stately halls of Legation Quarter in Pelung by announcing that, after the end of 1931, China would regard the foreigner's extra-territorial rights as no longer existing. Unilateral tearing up of treaties was a novelty as recently as eleven years ago ; and that China, with her recent record of quarrelsomeness and misgovernment, should take such a step was scarcely calculated to make the diplomats think kindly of her.

On the other hand, it has been freely admitted that Japan ' had a case ' in Manchuria. Her twenty-five years of enjoyment of the former Russian rights and possessions in Southern Manchuria had been wholly devoted to economic development in which she had spent yen 300,000,000. Militarism had only shown itself in a rigid ban against any extension of the civil wars in China into Manchuria,

and the Chinese population had more than doubled itself during the Japanese control, under which the Chinese peasants had found a means of peaceful livelihood denied them in their own country. During the reign of that infamous ruffian Chang Chung-chang in Shantung, during the 1920's, it is estimated that 5,000,000 peasants fled to Manchuria. Considering the shortcomings of the Kuomintang Government at Nanking, in its early years, it was hardly surprising that Japan was not pleased when Chang Hsueh-liang, 'the Young Marshal,' who had succeeded his father, Chang Tso-lin, as Lord of Manchuria, declared his allegiance to the Kuomintang, and flew their flag. The Lytton Report frankly said that, in view of her geographical position, Japan could not be indifferent to the internal conditions of her enormous neighbour. The Kuomintang, in their eagerness for the recovery of China's sovereign rights and the abolition of all foreign concessions in China, were so unwise as to direct their first attack against Japan's position in Manchuria; and, in spite of having been conspicuously worsted in 1929 in their attempts to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway from Russia, committed themselves to a policy of pin-pricks in South Manchuria, possibly questionable on legal grounds, unquestionably injudicious with a haughty, inflammable people such as the Japanese.

Finally, as the world saw the situation at the time, Japan was a Great Power, equipped with a constitutional regime, orthodox budgets, and all the paraphernalia of ballot boxes, which had been thrown open, in 1929, to every adult male in the country. She had, moreover, proved the reality of her civilization by winning two wars in ten years, and possessing the third or fourth strongest navy in the world.

To greater purpose was it that the years since the Washington Conference had witnessed a genuine movement towards liberal thinking in Japan, both in society and government, and a more conciliatory bearing in foreign policy under the far-sighted guidance of Baron Shidehara, as even Chinese writers have admitted. Yet another factor was that many people in Great Britain remembered with kindness the days of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and deeply regretted its dissolution.

What was not so widely recognized, as it should have been, was the immense significance and potentialities of the military *coup* at Mukden, on the night of 18 September, 1931, which was the beginning of the seizure of Manchuria and, as has since been seen, of the complete control of all the machinery of government by the Army. The spirit of Hideyoshi was at work again. Historically the Japanese ruling class was running true to type; and constitutions, ballot boxes and popular rights have been thrown into the dust-bin of derided shibboleths.

Simultaneously, there was in 1931—indeed, it may be said that even at the beginning of the present war the world at large had not awakened to the tremendous changes that had been taking place in China—a total misunderstanding of the true causes of the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, the nature of the revolution, the demand for the abolition of the ‘unequal treaties,’ and the challenge to Japan.

The ferment that worked underneath the revolution against the Manchus, which wrecked President Yuan Shih-kai’s attempt to make himself Emperor, which continued to gather strength through all the superficial disarray of Tuchun warfare, and which is the backbone of China’s indomitable resistance throughout the present war, is too large a subject to be dealt with in this chapter. But unpopular as the Kuomintang Government was in its early days, and scanty as was the proof it gave of practical reform, its abundant lip-service to popular rights, freedom, and democratic government expressed the aspirations of tens of thousands of earnest Chinese. And the more the Nanking Government mended its methods and discarded the political adventurers who had rushed to enrich themselves in 1928, the more evident it became that the menace to these hopes lay in the military caste of Japan, with its seventeenth-century mentality and its implicit hostility to every ideal in which New China believed.

Abundant justification, were it needed, could be found in the events only of the past ten years, for China’s claim to represent democracy in the struggle with totalitarianism. It is beside the point to say that the principles for which

she stands would never have become an operative force without the impact of the Western invasion, and the immense awakening of new ideas due to the missionary schools and colleges and the flood of Chinese students returning from England and America. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same might be said of Japan. But for the arrival of Commodore Perry and 'the black ships' in 1853, followed closely by those of other nations, there might have been no Meiji Restoration, and it might still be a penal offence for a Japanese to leave his country. What is important, is to notice that the democratic instinct has a most respectable ancestry in Chinese thought and custom, and the issues in the struggle between China and Japan cannot be properly understood without some appreciation of the historical differences between their social and governmental structure.

China is a land of innumerable paradoxes, where almost any two characteristics, however apparently mutually destructive, could be claimed with equal truth for her always charming, sometimes exasperating people. Indeed, it would almost seem that there must be some mysterious inversion of the earth currents between East and West, so that the ordinary practices of everyday life work in completely opposite directions on opposite sides of the world. In China men wear gowns, women trousers; a man shakes hands with himself, not with his friend; he puts his saucer on the top of his cup and not underneath it; his writing is from right to left and downwards, and his books begin at the last page and travel back to the first. Even Nature shares in the general reversal of Western standards, grass in China being brown in winter and green in summer.

But the greatest of all paradoxes is seen in the form of government which had been practised for at least two thousand years, that is since the beginning of the Han dynasty. It was at once an absolute monarchy, and in everyday life a well-developed democracy. The Emperor was the Son of Heaven, endowed with divine attributes, and entrusted with the *tien ming*, the mandate of Heaven, to govern the Chinese people, in which function his word was law. But his duties as a ruler were theoretically

mental, not physical. The precept of *Wu Wei*—do nothingness—which was written up over the Dragon Throne, was the expression of the classical conception of his duties. He was expected to think for his people, not to operate on, or for them. If he was a good man and thought well, it was supposed that divine influences flowed from him to the benefiting of all his people. In legendary times certain foods were prescribed for, others denied him, in order to clarify his mental processes. The practical meaning of this doctrine—echoed in modern times by Dr. Sun Yat-sen's favourite aphorism, 'Action is easy, understanding is difficult'—was that if the Emperor was a man of sound sense and good conscience, he naturally kept a strict watch over his Viceroys and subordinates.

But even their governing functions were limited by practice, if not by prescript. Broadly speaking, no more was required of them than to maintain order, collect taxes, and keep a check on each other's doings. The practical tasks of government were performed by the people through their families, village elders, and guilds. Each village was assessed for taxation as a whole, and arranged for itself how much each resident should pay. Minor matters of crime were dealt with by the village elders, and very promptly and efficaciously in order to preserve the 'face' of the community. Litigation was disposed of by arbitrators. There was no landed aristocracy supplying a recognized ruling class, but entry to, and promotion in, official life was the reward of scholarship, and it was quite possible for the son of a humble peasant to rise to be a Viceroy with powers of life and death over fifty million people: indeed, this frequently happened. The classic example is that of the Ploughman Shun, say 2000 B.C., though the date is quite unascertainable, who for his public services was rewarded by the Emperor Yao with the hands of both his daughters in marriage, and succeeded him as Emperor.

The democratic conception is further seen in the office of the Censors, whose duty was to criticize the Emperor openly before the nation for his shortcomings—a duty which they performed with great bravery, though often knowing that death was their certain reward. It was also laid down by

Mencius that the people's right of rebellion was inviolable, first against an unjust magistrate (the usual method was to shut up all shops and cease business, which always brought the offender, fearful of inquiries from above, to his senses), then even against the Emperor himself. When a dynasty became effete, corrupt, and ceased to do its duty by the people (as sooner or later it invariably did), it was held to have exhausted the mandate of Heaven, its divinity was taken from it, a rebellion ensued, and in due course a new ruler fought his way to the top and claimed the mandate. In passing, one may again notice the opposite way in which things work out in China to what they do in the West. Here we elect our Ministers and throw them out at the next election if our choice turns out badly. In China the people accepted the Ministers who imposed themselves upon them, but were equally efficacious in getting rid of failures. In both instances the democratic principle is identical.

Under great Emperors such as the early Manchus K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung, the system worked admirably; and it is interesting to recall that the halcyon peace and prosperity of the little territory of Weihaiwei, during its thirty-two years under British rule, was mainly due to the fact that the British Commissioners, first the late Sir James Lockhart and then the late Sir Reginald Johnston, both profound Chinese scholars, simply adopted in main outline the Chinese classical scheme of government.

The advantage of such a constitution was that, through all the intermittent periods of strife and disorder between one dynasty and the next, the social structure of China remained undisturbed, and the government of the people, though harassed by bandits and soldiers, continued to function. The disadvantage was that it tended to insularity in every village, town, and province. Patriotism was limited to a series of small circles and the sense of national responsibility was non-existent. In the wars of the nineteenth century (in marked contrast with that of to-day) one part of China might be fighting the foreigner, while another was amicably trading with him. But, at least, it will be seen that when the authors of the Revolution proclaimed a republic

they could justly appeal to the thousands of years' instinct for self-government inherent in the Chinese people.

In Japan there is no such tradition and never has been, in spite of the fact that the Japanese borrowed all their political and cultural ideas from China, the fount of all their civilization, to which thousands of Japanese students were hastening to drink in the Augustan age of the T'ang dynasty. There was not even a fixed capital in Japan—the centre of government changing with the residence of the ruler—until the founding of Nara in A.D. 710, in imitation of what the Japanese had learnt in China. But in Japan there was what there never was in China, an hereditary ruling class, the daimyos or heads of clans. Small daimyos would ally themselves under great ones in the perpetual civil wars between the different clans. But, small or great, they all constituted a perpetual aristocracy whose rights no one dreamed of questioning.

The character of the Emperor, too, not only preserved, but aggravated the hardest features of this feudalism. In China the Emperor became divine when he became Emperor, and it was clearly understood that he had definite duties to perform, and could lose his divinity when he failed in them. No such philosophic idea is to be found in the status of the Japanese Emperor. He was, and is, divine by descent from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu. The dangers of this theory are glaringly conspicuous to-day. Being a god, the Emperor could do no wrong; but being, in fact, a man, he might do a great deal. It was therefore obviously to the advantage of the ruling class that he should not be allowed to do anything.

Hence the seven and a half centuries during which a puppet Emperor remained in the background in Kyoto, while all power was wielded by the Shogun. Exactly in the same way now, the Emperor is screened from action and observation by a military clique, who make a great parade of submission to his sacred will but, in fact, do precisely as they please. It would be interesting to see what would happen if the Emperor, to whom the Army theoretically owe unquestioning obedience, gave them a command which did not suit their book. But he has not

done so yet, and it seems improbable that he ever will, though something very like this did happen in January, 1937, when the Emperor commanded General Ugaki, one of the more liberal-minded Japanese leaders, to form a Government. The Army did not like Ugaki, or his mode of thought, and refused to participate in his Government, which he was unable to form. How the soldiers squared their conduct with obedience to the Emperor is best known to them.

The national religion proved an admirable instrument for the furthering of aristocratic interests. Shintoism has two quite distinct forms. It is 'the Religion of Ten Million Gods,' harking back to the animism of a primitive people who see divinities in the wind rustling among trees or the foam of a waterfall. But it is also a political instrument by which the Emperor's divinity is violently impressed on the people, as it has been particularly in recent years for the benefit of those around him, who pretend to execute his divine will.

The changes wrought by the expulsion of the Shoguns and the restoration of the Emperor to his rightful place in 1868 were more apparent than real. The Meiji era was a great age, because the Meiji Emperor was himself a great man and was served by yet greater ones, Kido, Inouye, Okubo, Ito, and several more. All credit is due to the Japanese—in this respect far wiser than contemporary Chinese—for the diligence with which they put themselves to school in order to learn the wisdom of the West, and to free themselves from the bonds of the grossly unfair treaties imposed on their ignorance by Western Powers in the 1850's. But the plain fact is that Japanese feudalism had changed only its name, not its reality.

In fact, it now took on a form which made it, if anything, more oppressive for the masses of the people than before. For while the great daimyos, in return for giving up their fiefs, obtained governorships and other official posts, the lesser daimyos, in order to make a living, gravitated towards commerce, in which they invested the lump sums given them for the surrender of their privileges to the Throne. This was the beginning of the alliance between Japanese 'big

business' and the Army. Practically all the finance, industry, and shipping of Japan is concentrated in a few enormous syndicates; the same system is being repeated in Manchuria and the occupied parts of China; and the syndicates and Army continually play into each other's hands. The revolution 'was not the victorious outcome of a social revolt of city sans-culottes and land-hungry peasants, as in France, but a settlement arrived at by one wing of the feudal class—allied to the wealthiest and city merchants.'¹ So deeply does the feudal instinct go in Japanese nature, that it is plainly visible in the attitude of the clerks of the big mercantile syndicates to their firm, while the political parties are rather groups clustering round a person than a principle.

As for the masses of the population, their duty is still as ever to toil ceaselessly for the benefit of their rulers, thinly disguised as the welfare of the State and the glory of immortal Japan. Volumes have been written in recent years on the pitiful plight of the Japanese peasantry, weighed down with debts they will never pay off, and taxes heavy out of all proportion to their substance; and there is no need to repeat the story here. Since the sixth century reformers have intermittently, and fruitlessly, wrestled with the problem. In modern times the Army's sharpest accusation of the politicians rests on their failure to assist the farmers; but it is noticeable that the Army does not abate by one yen its own demands, which form the heaviest part of the peasant's burden. Agricultural riots are common enough, but, while trade unionism is forbidden in Japan, they have no cohesive or permanent effect, and the people have been too long inured to hardships and drilled in unquestioning self-abnegation for a large-scale rebellion. Such a mass of docile cannon fodder is a dangerous weapon to be wielded by the modern absolutists of Japan.

¹ *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*, by E. Herbert Morgan.

CHAPTER II

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND AFTER

NEXT, perhaps, to the skill and success with which the Chinese, through many defeats and discouragements, are mastering the art of war and, it is hardly too much to say, are gradually wresting the initiative from the Japanese, nothing has so much astonished foreign onlookers as the unity prevailing between all classes and provinces in resistance to the invader. There is an awareness, even among the peasants, of the issues at stake never seen before. Hitherto the Chinese peasant had had neither time nor aptitude for national politics. His patriotism was purely local, and the daily drudgery of extracting from the earth enough to eat tended to make him entirely indifferent as to who ruled over him, provided he was left in peace. All this is now changed. For the first time in history the people of China, as distinct from a court or provincial coterie, feel themselves to be at war as a nation, with a lively apprehension of what awaits them if Japan gets the upper hand. For which, by the way, the Japanese have no one to thank more than themselves.

It would be quite unnecessary for the purpose of this book, and very tedious, to delve back into the ancient history of Chinese and Japanese relations. Even the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 can possibly be disregarded as contributory to the present strife, at least, from Modern China's point of view. If Japan had been content to let China alone, it is very improbable that China would ever have raked up the sorrows of the past century as a reason for assailing Japan. That humiliation belonged to the 'bad old days' of the decadent Manchu Empire, for which none of China's present leaders could be held responsible. Among China's peace desiderata to-day—which are, in brief, that the

Japanese Army must get out of China lock, stock, and barrel—Formosa, lost to Japan by the first war, has never, so far as the present writer can recall, been mentioned. Manchuria is another matter. Yet even in that respect, a very highly placed Chinese said to the writer, about a year before the present conflict: "We might even be willing to accept the situation in Manchuria and let it go, if we could believe that that was the last of Japan's demands. But we know well that if we gave way on Manchuria, it would only be the signal for her to demand something else."

That General Chiang Kai-shek has proved himself a leader, possibly without compare in any nation, and that the Chinese people follow him with almost superstitious reverence, is plain to all the world. But without under-rating the value of his own work in the past twelve or thirteen years, he could not have done what he has done if the material with which he has worked had not been prepared for him by equally eager if less expert hands. And for a proper appreciation of China's struggle against totalitarianism, one must describe some of the factors which have combined to make this conflict so desperate.

The first conspicuous landmarks are the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The former definitely raised Japan to the ranks of the Great Powers; it brought her on to the mainland of Asia as a victor over one of the greatest of the white Powers; and it reawakened those heady dreams that have come down through Japanese history, based on a supposed death-bed prophecy by her first Emperor Jimmu that it was her destiny to conquer and lead mankind. Long before the Germans had invented their arrogant doctrine of a 'Herrenvolk,' it had been a part of the Japanese creed that not only was their Emperor divine, but all Japanese and the islands they inhabit are the progeny of two mythical deities, Izanagi and Izanami. In Korean schools children are taught that only Japanese are of divine origin; all the rest of humanity is descended from apes.

Six years later the overthrow of the Manchus expressed the determination of China to free herself from the semi-

colonial state, in which the weakness of her own Government and the encroachments of others had bound her during the nineteenth century ; while her revolutionary leaders definitely declared for the democratic principle of government.

Both events, on China's side and Japan's, were bound sooner or later to bring the two countries into sharp collision. To Japanese thought, prosperity and organized government among the 400,000,000 of China must mean their own relegation to an inferior position, if not to servitude and extinction. It is an article of belief with the Chinese that Japan will never willingly allow them to become ordered and prosperous, and the whole course of events since 1911 supports them. A very interesting book might be written on the part played by Japanese *agents provocateurs* throughout the Chinese civil wars. But only a Japanese could write it.

The Revolution of 1911 was unique in that, unlike all similar upheavals in the previous two thousand years, it was a revolution and not just a rebellion. Whether it would have been better for China if the Manchu dynasty had gone under to the T'aping Rebellion in the middle 1850's, by which time it was plain that it had all but exhausted the 'mandate of Heaven,' is an interesting speculation. Probably the 'Heavenly Kings,' as the T'aping leaders were called, would not have been able to give China more than another dynasty ; and if she was to take her place in the world, much more than that was needed. In 1877 the Chinese Minister in London, Kuo Sung-t'ao, the most far-sighted thinker of his time, wrote to the Viceroy Li Hung-chang urging him to undertake a more fundamental programme of national reforms than the superficial reform of Army and Navy. But Li replied that that was not the task he had been given and, anyway, he would not be allowed to attempt it.

Conditions in the shape of an organized body of intellectual thought were not yet ripe for it. They were not really ripe in 1911. In 1903 the brilliant scholar and journalist Liang Chi-chi'ao had been pouring out impassioned articles in his magazine, *The Renovated China*, on the need of acquiring the civic and social virtues which had made Western

nations great and progressive¹ (it is flattering to think that he took Great Britain as his ideal), and his views had been eagerly echoed by Young China. But they still had neither the collective force nor the requisite understanding to put their ideas into execution. The projected Republic, though recognized, quickly by America, more tardily by others, failed lamentably, first because Yuan Shih-kai (to whom Dr. Sun Yat-sen resigned the Presidency, all the machinery of government having passed into Yuan's hands on the Manchus' abdication) never had the slightest intention of making a Republic; then because his lieutenants, the Tutchuns, whom he had introduced into key-posts throughout the provinces, had even less understanding than he had of such new-fangled foreign notions, and it needed several years of civil warfare to eliminate them.

But the ideas of the reformers were none the less alive and operative, as was strikingly proved when Yuan tried to make himself Emperor at the end of 1916, and actually performed the time-honoured sacrifices at the Altar of Heaven on the winter solstice.

The first protest came from the young Governor Tsai A-o of the remote southern province of Yunnan. It was taken up by other provinces south of the Yangtze, and the tide of public antagonism to Yuan's intentions swelled so strongly that he was forced to drop them. He died soon afterwards, as much from mortification at the loss of 'face' as any other cause. A very interesting example of what public opinion can do in China when really roused, occurred in 1929, when the Kuomintang had banned the teaching of Confucius's works in schools, closed his temples, and expunged his birthday from the list of national festivals, on the ground of his supposedly heretical teaching. China put up with this. But when the Kuomintang proposed to confiscate the ancestral property of Confucius's descendants in Shantung, there was such an outburst of public indignation that the Kuomintang were obliged to give way and leave Confucius's family in peace.

Meanwhile the Japanese had begun to show their teeth. In August, 1914, they attacked and took the German

¹ *The Chinese Renaissance*, by Dr. Hu Shih.

territory of Kiaochow, with its splendid harbour of Tsingtao in Shantung, ostensibly, as their ultimatum to Germany had put it, 'with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China,' though events were to show that this was another sample of Japan's faculty, so often exhibited in recent years, for interpreting ordinary language to suit herself.

The truth was shown when, in January, 1915, she presented the famous Twenty-one Demands to President Yuan Shih-kai.

These were divided into five groups. The first would have bound China to agree to any arrangement Japan might eventually make with Germany for the disposal of Kiaochow; to promise not to alienate any part of the coast to a third Power; to open additional cities to foreign trade; and to grant railway concessions to Japan.

The second group extended the Japanese leaseholds in South Manchuria, which she had acquired from Russia, to ninety-nine years and would have permitted Japanese to reside, travel, do business, lease and own land, and open mines anywhere in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, where it was also stipulated no official advisers were to be employed without Japan's approval.

Under the third group the great iron-mining and smelting works in Central China, the Hanyehping Co., was to become a joint Sino-Japanese concern, in effect, under Japanese control.

The fourth group would have bound China not to cede or lease any part of her coasts to a third Power.

The fifth, and most obnoxious, group demanded that China should employ Japanese advisers; allow Japanese officers to control her police in stated places; buy from Japan half or more of her requirements in munitions; grant Japan railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley (which was still generally regarded as predominantly the sphere of interest of Japan's ally, Great Britain); grant to Japan rights of religious propaganda and to buy land in the interior for temples, schools, and hospitals; and not to contract foreign loans for development of any sort in Fukien (the mainland province opposite Japan's island colony Formosa) without previously consulting Japan.

The outrageousness of these demands, which read like what a victor might impose on the vanquished, takes one's breath away. It has been pleaded for Japan that she believed Germany would win the war in Europe, and that it was necessary for her to secure herself before the Germans reappeared in the Far East as conquerors. But the Demands are too much of the pattern of Japan's modern schemes of a 'new order in East Asia' for any misunderstanding as to their real intention, namely, to get China completely under her control before Young China had found its feet. It was a declaration of policy which, though occasionally held in abeyance, has been relentlessly pursued ever since.

When an American journalist got hold of the Demands, which had been presented in secrecy, Japan tried to deny them. But the truth could not be hidden. It caused intense indignation in China, which to some extent assisted Yuan in temporizing. But in May, 1915, the Japanese presented a forty-eight hours' ultimatum, and Yuan was forced to give way on most of the Demands, though with modifications. The detestable Group V he managed to get reserved for later consideration.

That the Chinese anger over the Twenty-one Demands did not result in deeds, was probably due to the strong grip over the country which Yuan had acquired. In 1919 there was no Yuan, centralized authority was beginning to crumble, and when the Chinese delegates learnt at the Paris Peace Conference that the British, American, and French Governments had secretly agreed to Japan's retaining the German possessions in Shantung, the tempest fairly burst. Not only did the Chinese withdraw without signing the peace treaty, but a devastating boycott of everything Japanese began in China, and two notoriously pro-Japanese Ministers in Peking were chased from office, lucky to escape with their lives.

The incident is worth noting, because for the first time it revealed the strength of the Chinese student body as a political force, which became more and more marked as the years passed. That Japan did not forget it is shown by the ruthlessness with which, in the present war, she has destroyed universities and colleges wherever her armies

have marched in China. That she did not proceed to violence against the boycott was merely due to the changed conditions of the world (as compared with 1915), due to the Allied victory. Japan's great *coups* are never launched except when others are too much engaged to be able to interfere.

Two years later Japan appeared at the Washington Conference, as she herself described it, 'like a prisoner at the bar.' Under the pressure of public opinion she agreed to negotiate with China for the restoration of the German properties in Shantung (which was duly accomplished some years later), and Group V of the Twenty-one Demands disappeared into thin air—or was supposed to do so by all but Japan. For the moment the Hideyoshi policy had to look as if it had been abandoned.

But for China the Conference was a complete triumph. Her representatives, all young men of the new school, behaved themselves with dignity and distinction, and created an excellent impression. They secured the abolition of the foreign post offices in China; an immediate revision of the Customs tariff imposed on China in the nineteenth century, with the promise of further revision leading to tariff autonomy; the promise of an international commission to examine the abolition of foreigners' extra-territorial rights in China. They also secured the famous (and regrettably fruitless) Nine-Power Treaty, by which the Powers chiefly interested in the Far East pledged themselves 'to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China,' and 'to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.'

Japan was one of those who signed this treaty—with what mental reservations one can only guess. Actually since the seizure of Manchuria her signature has never proved the slightest impediment to her actions and, when reminded of it, she has brushed the protest aside with the contemptuous reply that the Treaty is no longer applicable to modern conditions.

But in the case of the other Powers the Nine-Power

Treaty and the other undertakings given to China were meant as proof that the 'gunboat' policy of the nineteenth century was definitely no more. Great Britain had spontaneously promised to return the leased territory of Weihaiwei to China (though for reasons for which she could scarcely be blamed, the promise was not fulfilled until 1930) and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been dissolved under the pressure of the disfavour with which it was regarded by America and the British Dominions.

It is only fair to say that by many experienced observers the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was, and is, deeply regretted. There is no question but that the sensitive Japanese pride was much wounded. For twenty years the Alliance had proved a point of stability in Far Eastern politics. If we except the Twenty-one Demands, Japan had acted loyally by her partner, who through the Alliance had been able to obtain a respect for her wishes and advice which she certainly has not obtained since it was dissolved. Against all this, it is a question whether any alliance would have restrained the ambitions of the 'seventeenth-century-minded' militarists of to-day.

To the world at large the Washington Conference proclaimed that, in the eyes of its most important representatives, democracy in China was at least arriving, if it had not actually arrived.

CHAPTER III

THE COMMUNIST ERA, NANKING, AND THE LOSS OF MANCHURIA

IT is melancholy to look back on the years that followed the Washington Conference and their tale of splendid opportunities wasted. Apart from the moral benevolence expressed by the Powers at Washington, benefits of the solidest kind had flowed upon China through her entry into the Four Years War on the Allies' side. She had automatically recovered the privileges and possessions of Germany and Austria, to which the Bolshevik Revolution added those of Russia. Payment of the Boxer Indemnity had been suspended, and by Great Britain was eventually renounced. Undreamt-of wealth had poured into China during the war, not only in return for her exports, but in the wages of the many thousands of coolies who went to France and elsewhere to dig trenches. And owing to the abnormal rise in the value of silver the Chinese tael, which before the war was worth about half a crown, soared to a value of nearly half a sovereign. With wise finance there is little doubt that between 1917 and, say, 1922, China could have paid off all her foreign debts and still had something in hand.

But the Peking Government, less and less as it came to be regarded in the country, was still the Government, and in the hands of the old-fashioned profiteers who, so far from having any notion of relieving China of her burden, added both to them and to her complications with Japan by further enormous loans from the latter, which they squandered on festivities and concubines. In the provinces the Tuchuns established themselves as petty kings and piled up enormous armies; while in the south Dr. Sun Yat-sen, having proclaimed a new republic in Canton in 1922, with himself as President, alternately quarrelled with his

coadjutors and squandered money on grandiose schemes of 'punitive expeditions' against Peking.

In these depressing years, however, certain landmarks stand out, pointing the road to the Sino-Japanese War. The most important is the coming of Communism to China, not only because it supplied the Kuomintang with the organization necessary to overthrow the last of the northern Tuchuns, but for the influence it has had in the present war and is likely to have on China's future.

In 1921 Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been forced by local opponents to flee from Canton and, having escaped in a British gunboat to Hongkong, came on to Shanghai. There, in the following year, he met and colloqued with Comrade Joffe, who had been sent by Moscow on a mission to Peking with a view to the renewal of diplomatic relations. Dr. Sun was never a Communist at heart—for that matter it is doubtful whether any Chinese, in his calmer moments, could be a Communist of the Moscow cut—but he was feeling bitter against the Western Powers, which had refused him arms and military advisers after the Four Years War wherewith to attack Peking—and the result of his colloquies with Joffe was a joint declaration that, while it was recognized that conditions in China made Communism unsuitable for her, Russia would nevertheless help Dr. Sun in the work of reconstruction.

In 1923 Dr. Sun, whom another turn in the wheel had brought back to Canton, was feeling still more bitter with the Western Powers, which in November sent a flock of gunboats to Canton to prevent him from seizing the Customs, and he deliberately turned to Russia. In the autumn of 1924 Moscow sent to Canton Michael Borodin, with a bevy of political agents, and Marshal Bluecher, at that time known as Galens (afterwards the creator of Russia's powerful Far Eastern Army which has caused so much alarm in Japan), and several military advisers.

Borodin was one of the most remarkable foreigners who ever came to China. He never learnt to speak Chinese, he never appeared to offer any particular advice at the Nationalist Government councils, which he regularly attended, and where everything had to be translated to

him. Yet his influence over the Party's affairs was practically unbounded. General Chiang Kai-shek, it is interesting to recall, never liked or trusted him, and once tried ineffectually to have him arrested. He seemed to have an uncanny understanding of the Chinese character, and eventually fell from grace in Moscow for the caution he had shown in executing its impatient orders to bring China under Russia's control.

The Chinese Communist Party had been formed at Shanghai in 1921 by some students who had been to Moscow and others who had turned to Russia in disgust with the Versailles Treaty. It was by far the most virile section of the revolutionary movement. Dr. Sun's creation, the Kuomintang, the core of orthodox Nationalism, was, at the time of Borodin's coming, in a hopeless condition, disorganized, dispirited, aimless. Borodin's first efforts were directed to getting the Communist Party recognized by and affiliated to the Kuomintang. It was not long before the tail thus appended was wagging the entire Party.

The famous 'Incident of 30 May 1925,' in Shanghai, played directly into Russia's hands. A number of Chinese students who had got up a demonstration—by all the ironies of Fate directed initially against the Japanese—attacked a police-station, which was in the charge of a British inspector, and were shot down. The Russians saw their opportunity and promptly organized another demonstration of protest at Canton against the British Concession of Shameen, in which more Chinese were shot and some foreigners wounded. All South China was ablaze with fury. A merciless boycott of the British broke out from one end of China to the other, which did not fully subside for over two years.

Meanwhile, with the guidance of Russian instructors, a well-organized army had been built up, the first perhaps that had a properly trained staff of officers, the product of General Chiang Kai-shek's school of cadets at Whampoa, a suburb of Canton. But more important than the Army were the numbers of political agents taught by Borodin. In the inflammable temper of the country it was easy to

persuade the populace that their misfortunes were due to the Tutchuns as agents of the oppressive foreigner. In the autumn of 1926 the Cantonese Army swept through southern China to Hankow, where a new Government was set up, and thence down the Yangtze Valley to Nanking and Shanghai, the armies of such able Generals as Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang melting before them.

But there, for the purposes of this survey, the Russian and Communist successes ended. By a curious paradox the British Defence Force, sent to defend Shanghai in January, 1927, may be said to have saved China from passing under Bolshevik domination, in that it provided an island of refuge where the moderate elements of the Kuomintang, now genuinely alarmed by the grip which the Communists had got on the Party, could rally their forces. They found a leader in General Chiang Kai-shek, who saw clearly that China had reached a critical issue between Nationalism and Moscow-ism. The depth of Moscow's designs upon China was glaringly revealed by papers seized in the Soviet Embassy at Peking, when it was raided in April, 1927, by Marshal Chang Tso-lin. By the end of the following June the Hankow Government had been overthrown. Borodin and his assistants were in retreat for Russia through north-west China and Siberia, and their Chinese followers had scattered in flight in to the voids of Southern China.

The brief two years of militant Russian-led Communism (counting from the '30 May incident' in Shanghai) were a period of unbridled passion, frightful excesses, and destruction of vast property, particularly British. Yet in the long process of things, it may be said to have contributed to China's advancement from the outgrown systems of past centuries to the general awakening of the people. It showed the Kuomintang how to organize themselves, it gave them (under Chiang Kai-shek's control) an efficient army, and it taught them the immense possibilities of skilfully directed propaganda, which are being used with such good effect in the present war.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen saw none of the drama of 1926-27. In March, 1925, he went to Peking—it is generally believed with the idea of coming to a compromise with Chang

Tso-lin—and there he died. The contributions of this strange man to the cause of democratic revolution in China are still a matter of controversy. He had devoted his life to it since, as a young man, burning with indignation at the misgovernment of the Manchus, he abandoned medicine for which he had been trained at Hongkong, to organize revolution. Yet in all probability the Revolution must have come without him. He was away from China when it broke out at Wuchang in October, 1911, and did not arrive back until Christmas. The Presidency immediately conferred on him by the Nationalists, who needed a figure-head, he had to resign to Yuan Shih-kai. He was not a man of constructive ability. His famous *San Min Chu I*, or the 'Three Principles of the People,' is a farrago of some real thought, much that is puerile, and all imbued with anti-foreignism and gross misstatements. Before many years had passed, according to such a dispassionate and well-informed critic as the American writer Nathaniel Peffer, he had outlived his usefulness, and even become a drag on his followers.

Yet when everything has been said to his disadvantage, Dr. Sun Yat-sen was unique. In a turbid age he stands out in a certain majesty. That he could not conceive of the success of any project not originated and directed by himself was at least, and considering his position, a very human failing. There is no doubt that he was inspired by a genuine wish to see China free, prosperous, and happy. To that cause he devoted his life with fearlessness. And in a country which sees no harm in an official's using his office for self-enrichment, provided he does not go too far, it is to Dr Sun's credit that, although he had the handling of millions, he died a poor man, leaving practically no property, but one modest house in the French Concession at Shanghai.

In the end Dr. Sun has proved more useful to his followers in his death than in his life. They gave him a superb tomb on the majestic slopes of Purple Mountain, outside Nanking, and a funeral procession worthy of an Emperor, in which the foreign diplomatic body walked through sweltering heat for four hours. Regularly they read aloud his Political

Will and do obeisance before his picture. They have, indeed, deified him.

And in this one may well discern an ineffaceable instinct of Chinese nature. The beautiful aspect of the old Imperial Constitution was that the Emperor represented a link between the Chinese people and Heaven. In that capacity he ruled them on Heaven's behalf, and annually reported to Heaven how he had discharged his duties. He might not live up to this high ideal, in fact, he seldom did. But the important thing is that the ideal existed as an expression of the Chinese desire for some touch with the unseen. And what the Emperors represented to old China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen seems, consciously or unconsciously, to represent to her modern descendants.

It may appear curious that the Japanese with their hatred of Communism so acute that they will hardly use the word itself, but prefer to speak of 'dangerous thoughts,' should have remained passive while the most forceful elements in China were in the grip of Communism. One simple explanation is that the boycott of Great Britain gave the Japanese merchants a golden opportunity to pick up her trade. Another was that the Nationalist movement did not extend farther north than the Yangtze. Beyond that the old-fashioned Tuchuns still held sway, whom Japan believed that she knew how to manage; while China, as a whole, remained attractively divided. But when, Chang Tso-lin in Peking having declined to embrace the *San Min Chu I*, General Chiang's army from Nanking started on a march to Peking in combination with similar advances by Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi, the 'Model Tuchun,' and Feng Yu-hsiang, the so-called 'Christian General,' Japan sent an army to Tsinanfu, capital of Shantung, and a big railway junction on the line from Nanking to Peking, ostensibly to protect the local Japanese residents, but really to bar General Chiang's way. The result was a sanguinary encounter, in which numbers of Chinese soldiers were killed without a shadow of justification.

But if General Chiang's arrival in Peking was delayed, the armies of Yen and Feng were not; Chang Tso-lin fled to Manchuria, a bomb exploded under his railway car

outside Mukden—it is widely believed that if the Japanese Army in Manchuria did not actually contrive, they certainly connived at the outrage; and public opinion in Japan revolted at the unnecessary expense of the expedition to Tsinanfu, and it was withdrawn. It is a remarkable example of the growth of liberal thought and force of public opinion in Japan during the 1920's, that popular pressure was twice able to put an end to military adventures. The other instance was when the Army found itself obliged to withdraw from Eastern Siberia, which it had attempted to seize after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and the withdrawal of the other Allies from their fruitless attempt to bolster up the White Empire of Admiral Kolchak.

With the overthrow of Chang Tso-lin the Kuomintang removed the capital to Nanking, and proclaimed that China was at last united under Nationalist rule. The Government set up, of 'all the talents,' was entirely composed, excepting for Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, the ex-peasant warrior¹ (who, in fact, never took any part in it), of men trained in foreign colleges and universities, some of them already of international reputation, for instance, Dr. Wang Chung-hui, a barrister of the Middle Temple, and for several years one of the Judges of The Hague Court, and Mr. T. V. Soong, whose financial genius is universally admitted. General Chiang Kai-shek had resigned from office owing

¹ It is indeed quite impossible to imagine this burly Colossus, with his peasant tastes and unconventional habits, fitting in among the supple politicians of Nanking's early days. Feng was at this time a man of fifty-eight. As a youth he had gone through the Peiyang Military Academy, and had first come into prominence when President Yuan Shih-kai sent him to suppress the revolt in Yunnan in 1915. Later he became Military Governor of the province of Honan, married a Christian, Miss Li Teh-chuan, secretary of the Chinese Y.W.C.A. in Peking, and became famous in the 1920's for his extremely efficient army; for the money he extracted from the rich Honanese to spend on public parks and hospitals in Loyang, the provincial capital; and for his Praise-God-Barebones type of Christianity. It was said that he converted his soldiers in droves and baptized them with a syringe. His rule over them was draconian; for a very little heads were lopped off; but they loved him. He dressed as they did and ate exactly the same food. In Nanking he scandalized officials by driving about on a motor lorry to pay ceremonial visits, accompanied by a party of common soldiers, looking himself like any one of them. After the Japanese seizure of Manchuria, Feng was said to have abjured Christianity in protest against the failure of Christian nations to come to China's rescue, and he retired for a while to a Buddhist monastery. He has been heard of once or twice in the present war, but his name is not associated with any outstanding event in it.

to the displeasure of some members at his ruthless treatment of the Hankow Government, which had, at least, scored one notable success for China in recovering the British Concession at Hankow. But the Party could not get on without him, and he came back as Chairman of the State Council and head of the Government.

But the Kuomintang were not wise. Dr. Sun Yat-sen had taught that while all power derived from the peoples, there must always be a governed and a governing class. In the instrument of government formed by the Kuomintang, the foundation was the National Assembly (which did not exist) and a Central Political Council, with five Yuans, or Councils, below it, and the various ministries below that. During the 'period of political tutelage'—the second stage in Dr. Sun's scheme of revolution, designed to lead up to full exercise of political power by the people—the Kuomintang proclaimed themselves the fount of all power, unquestionable and inviolable, and to all appearances eternal.

Even so good a friend of China's as Mr. Lionel Curtis, wrote of the new Government that 'the wit of man has seldom devised a more effective mechanism for fomenting intrigue, hampering decisions, and obscuring responsibility.' In their anxiety to check undue power by individuals, the Kuomintang borrowed largely from the Russian committee system, and Ministers were hampered at every turn by a load of committees by which all their actions had to be approved. To extend their authority in the provinces the Kuomintang also created a network of local committees, the notorious Tangpu, mostly composed of callow youths, who, by their wanton upsetting of long-established customs in the name of reform which they had no wit to apply, and by their utter venality, made themselves even more detested than the Tuchuns. The latter, at least, had not tampered with the 'old custom' of the peasantry. Meanwhile, at headquarters, officials preferred to live in Shanghai, spending on its pleasures the wealth that office brought them, rather than settle down to work in the raw, uncomfortable surroundings of the new capital.

One man who saw clearly the evils of the new regime was General Chiang Kai-shek. A journey to Peking in the

spring of 1929 opened his eyes to what the country thought of the Kuomintang, and on his return to the capital he lectured them in unsparing terms, telling them that they were the most detested body of men in China.

Another episode may be recalled. The Kuomintang had officially abolished the Chinese New Year holidays (which, like Easter, are dated by the moon, and from time immemorial have been the one great annual holiday for the Chinese people) and had substituted the Western calendar. On the first Chinese New Year after the promulgation of this change, General Chiang made a round of the Government offices in Nanking, and found not a soul at work. Again he lectured the Party, asking them how they could expect any obedience to their laws to which they themselves paid so little heed.

Again one recalls how Madame Sun Yat-sen returned from Moscow, whither she had accompanied Borodin, and stormed at the Central Political Council. From this tiny, fragile, usually shrinking creature, denunciation streamed as from a fire-hose. There would never be any true reform in China, she cried, until blood had flowed in streams. It was a true prophecy, though to be fulfilled in a manner of which probably Madame Sun never thought.

Meanwhile China was anything but united. Early in 1929 war broke out with the Kwangsi Generals, then established at Hankow, Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen (now two of the most ardent and ablest leaders against Japan), who refused to accept Nanking's orders, particularly in financial matters. With the help of the German military advisers, whom General Chiang had engaged, Nanking secured a swift victory. More serious was the next year's war with the Northern leaders, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, which dragged on for several weeks. It was decided by the 'Young Marshal' Chang Hsueh-liang, of Manchuria, marching in on the rear of Yen and Feng.

The importance of the event was that it proved the reality of Marshal Chang's acceptance of Kuomintang authority, as further exemplified by his flying their flag over all public buildings in Manchuria. This was one of

the main causes of the seizure of Manchuria in the following year by the Japanese, who had watched with growing distaste the misgovernment of the Kuomintang in China, and had no idea of allowing it to be repeated in their own domain.

Japanese disfavour and suspicions had been further excited by what can only be called the injudicious zeal of Dr. C. T. Wang's foreign policy. All possible allowance must be made for Young China's eagerness to shake off the bonds of the 'unequal treaties,' and to see China complete mistress in her own domains. And to that end a great deal of encouragement had been given by Great Britain. Not only had she tamely surrendered her Concession at Hankow, when it was rushed by the mob set on by Borodin on 3 January, 1927, the surrender being subsequently sealed by the Chen-O'Malley Agreement of 27 February, while an undertaking was given that other British Concessions in China would be similarly restored to China; but at the height of the Communist storm, when passion against Great Britain was at its wildest, the late Sir Austen Chamberlain had had communicated to both the Peking and Hankow Governments, on 27 January, 1927, a categorical undertaking to surrender all the British Concessions and rights in China, including extra-territoriality, to recognize the Chinese modern courts as competent courts, and to make British citizens in China pay the same taxation as Chinese citizens.

At this distance of time many opinions have been revised about Sir Austen Chamberlain's policy. His refusal to permit any action by the British armed forces in China against the ferocious attacks on British persons and property—for while the Defence Force stood on guard round Shanghai, it never fired a shot—was justified by the fact that it baulked the Russians of their pet hope of embroiling us in war with China. The promises contained in the Note of 27 January were obviously no more than the fulfilment of the legitimate claims of any sovereign State. But the wisdom of launching them, with China in her then condition, was more than questionable. Sir Austen's liberality failed entirely to be recognized. The Nationalists merely con-

cluded that they had 'got Great Britain on the run,' and if not Great Britain, why not other Powers? It is difficult not to attribute to the British promises of January, 1927, a large part of the responsibility for the Chinese aggressive foreign policy in the next three years, culminating in the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.

Nanking's first efforts were directed against extra-territoriality. The Commission arranged for at the Washington Conference had visited China in 1926, and its report, though sympathetically written and full of useful suggestions, had had to find that she was not ready for so great a change. Nevertheless, after a series of preliminary moves and Notes to the Powers, which need not be detailed, in December, 1929, Nanking announced by unilateral action the termination of extra-territoriality to take effect on 1 January, 1930. It did not take effect then, because in effect the Powers ignored the declaration. But early in 1931 Great Britain opened negotiations with Nanking for the abolition of the extra-territorial rights of her own citizens, which actually reached the point of an agreement initialled by Dr. Wang, the Foreign Minister, and Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister. But the Manchurian crisis prevented the agreement from being carried into effect.

Meanwhile, in 1929, Nanking had literally come to blows with Russia over the Chinese Eastern Railway, nominally a joint Sino-Russian concern, built by the Russians in the days of their ascendancy in Manchuria before the Russo-Japanese War, to link up the Trans-Siberian line with Vladivostok across northern Manchuria. The joint management had been a cause of friction between the two countries for some years, which was intensified by General Chiang Kai-shek's revolt against Communism in 1927; and in July, 1929, the Nanking Government tried to settle the matter once for all by seizing the railway headquarters in Harbin and expelling the Russian staff. A series of small military engagements followed, all in Russia's favour, but never pressed home further than what should convince Nanking that Russia meant business; and by January, 1930, China had been forced to restore the railway to its old status. The negotiations for a permanent settlement

dragged on for many months, with scant regard on Russia's part for Chinese 'face.'

To attempt to describe in detail the chain of events leading to the Japanese seizure of Manchuria would take many pages and is, in fact, unnecessary. It has already been said that Japan 'had a case,' which can broadly be defined by saying that she had invested enormous sums in Manchuria, and that she simply could not afford to have its prosperity endangered by infection from the Kuomintang's mismanagement of affairs in China. To this general principle was added the accusation that China had refused to implement a number of agreements made with Japan. Mr. K. K. Kawakami, for many years Washington correspondent of the *Hochi Shimbun*, and a by no means illiberal writer, gives in his book, *Manchukuo, Child of Conflict*, a list of twenty-two treaties which China was alleged to have violated. Many of these charges were patently absurd. The most solid grievance was the preparations China was making to build new railways in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, which would have taken business away from the South Manchuria Railway, and which, according to the Japanese, China had pledged herself not to build; and the beginnings of the development of a new port by the Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang, in northern Chihli, designed to capture the trade of the great Japanese port of Dairen. It was also asserted by the Japanese that Chang was building up armies 'to thrust Japan into the sea,' and that he almost went out of his way to be rude to high Japanese officials in Manchuria.

What is not in dispute is that throughout 1930 and 1931 (until the military took charge) Japanese policy towards China under the direction of Baron Shidehara, and with the full support of the Premier, Mr. Hamaguchi, was singularly liberal and conciliatory.

¹ The Chinese Eastern Railway, it may here be mentioned, was eventually sold by Russia to Japan (theoretically to Manchukuo) in March, 1935, after the establishment of Manchuria's so-called independence, for about £6,000,000—it is believed to have cost £40,000,000—and there was a good deal of difficulty in collecting the money. The sale was a flagrant violation of China's rights, who, under the original agreement, should have had the first option of repurchase. But what was the use by 1935 of talking about China's rights in Manchuria? Poor China.

Before he became Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara had mapped out four principles for the guidance of Japan in dealing with China—absolute respect for her sovereign rights and territorial integrity; economic co-operation on equal terms; all China's reasonable desires to be recognized with sympathy and goodwill; patience and indulgence towards the internal difficulties of China, though not to the exclusion of the defence of Japanese rights by lawful means. To these principles no one will deny that Baron Shidehara faithfully adhered both as Foreign Minister and as acting Premier, while Mr. Hamaguchi was lingering on after being struck down by an assassin in November, 1930.

In 1931 two accidents brought matters to a head. In May a series of riots broke out over certain farming rights of Korean farmers at Wangpaoshan in Manchuria, and several Koreans were killed and injured. In retaliation anti-Chinese riots occurred in Korea in which over a hundred Chinese are believed to have been killed and many others wounded. The immediate result in China was another furious boycott of Japanese goods.

The dispute between the two Governments over these wretched quarrels was still unsettled when, on 27 June, a Japanese officer, Captain Nakamura, while travelling on the borders of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, was seized by Chinese soldiers and incontinently shot on the ground that he was a spy. Not impossibly he was, though the wild and remote nature of the region where he met his end made it equally difficult for even the Manchurian Government to exert proper control and to obtain accurate information as to what happened. The Nanking Government did not improve its position by endeavouring at first to deny the whole story.

The death of Nakamura, coupled with the Wangpaoshan affair and the boycott in China, was for the Japanese Army the last straw. It had long watched with growing displeasure the liberal policy pursued by Mr. Hamaguchi and Baron Shidehara. It had been deeply aggrieved by Japan's signing of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, and the position of inferiority thereby assigned to Japan; and it

had been shorn of four divisions of the Army by the policy of entrenchment enforced since the fearful and ruinous earthquake of 1923. Now it appeared to the soldiers that the policy of conciliation towards China was resulting only in one humiliation after another, with every prospect of Japan's being driven out of Manchuria altogether.

So the Army decided to take matters into its own hands. All preparations were made, and on the night of 18 September, 1931—as fateful in the immense, world-wide consequences that have flowed from it as any date in history—some trivial accident on the railway outside Mukden gave the requisite signal for action. The button was pressed, the Japanese military machine moved, Mukden, the capital, was seized together with barracks, arsenal, aerodromes, and all points of importance, while all Chinese troops around Mukden were disarmed. The first step had been taken towards what is now known as the establishment of 'Japan's new order in East Asia,' and in China's life-and-death struggle for freedom.

In this necessarily brief survey of the first years of the Chinese Nationalist Government, no adequate account can be given of the disheartenment, jealousies, intrigues, and general *malaise* that succeeded the wild enthusiasm in which Nanking had been proclaimed the capital. Partly this was due to that ancient cause of so many troubles in China, 'face.' The country had been declared to be united under the Kuomintang; therefore, it was impossible for the Kuomintang to admit frankly that China was very far from united, and to devote themselves humbly to the innumerable evils crying for treatment. Partly it was due to the cumbrousness of the machinery of government which would have been self-obstructive in a single province, let alone when the attempt was made to apply it to a country 5,000,000 square miles in extent, in which some people had not even yet heard of the Revolution, and others thought it was a new kind of Emperor.

The Government certainly did not lack able and earnest men, but their efforts were clogged by Party discords and interminable committee meetings. The financial genius of Mr. T. V. Soong was wasted in raising money for the

campaigns against the Communists of his brother-in-law, General Chiang Kai-shek, instead of being devoted to his great ambitions—balanced budgets, and the funding of China's foreign debts. Freedom of speech and of the Press was ruthlessly curtailed, and to be known as a Communist was tantamount to a death-warrant. Hundreds of young men, and even girls, went to the executioner's strangling-post, whose only crime was the warm-blooded indiscretion of youth. Jealousy of General Chiang, fed upon perpetual stories of his intentions to make himself a dictator, and of the so-called 'Soong dynasty'—composed of General Chiang, who had married Miss Mayling Soong, Mr. T. V. Soong, the eldest Soong sister, an extraordinarily able woman, and her husband, Dr. H. H. Kung, a lineal descendant of Confucius, and now Prime Minister and Minister of Finance—led to the setting-up of a rival Government in Canton, with which Nanking was on the verge of going to war when the Japanese seized Manchuria.

In all this medley of strife and self-seeking 'peace, retrenchment and reform,' and the orderly processes of Dr. Sun's intended 'period of political tutelage' seemed very far to seek. Superficially there was nothing to differentiate Nationalist China from any of the periods of confusion which had always succeeded the collapse of an Imperial dynasty—except fine speeches and professions of noble intent in which Chinese are as adept as politicians of any other race.

Yet beneath the surface of 'life's enormous disarray' a new life was undoubtedly stirring, manifesting itself, it is true, in many unpleasant ebullitions, as is the way of infants, but nevertheless inspired by a strength and purpose, still unformed and ill-directed, but capable of tremendous influences and determination. What those influences were will be described later. For proof of their reality one need only point to the astonishing unity and perseverance of China in the present war.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN FROM ONE EXTREME TO THE OTHER

DURING the past eighteen or twenty years Japan has swung from one political and social extreme to the other, with a violence which in itself is enough to show how superficial and unstable were the changes wrought by the Meiji Restoration.

Down to, roughly, the time of the Washington Conference the administration might be described as a mild despotism wielded by an aristocratic minority. Its tenure of office was, as always, dependent not on a majority in the Diet, but on the will of the Emperor. It kept the Diet as far as possible in ignorance of what it was doing, but was not unsusceptible to the feelings of the people's representatives. The Army, on the whole, worked amicably enough with the Government and did not too greatly abuse its peculiar power and privileges.

After the Washington Conference, and especially after the earthquake of 1 September, 1923, a truly remarkable tide of Liberalism set in. Between the end of the Four Years War and the seizure of Manchuria two commoners, Mr. Hara and Mr. Hamaguchi, had come to the top in parliamentary life after the Western mode and had become premier. Mr. Hamaguchi, too, was succeeded by two stalwart champions of civil rights, first Mr. Wakatsuki, then Mr. Inukai. The Diet began to exercise a real influence on policy. A translation of Karl Marx sold hundreds of thousands of copies, not that Japan had any thought of turning Communist, but merely because intellectual Japanese were interested in what he and other political teachers had to say and were still free to gratify their interests.

It is significant that in these years the Emperor's tradi-

tional divinity receded more and more into the background. He himself appeared frequently in public, and the tendency at least among the educated class was to think of him as an exalted but still ordinary human being. As remarked by that close and well-informed observer of Japanese life, Captain M. D. Kennedy, author of *The Changing Fabric of Japan* and *The Problem of Japan*, Japan was going through a transformation which might well prove as momentous as the Meiji Restoration. It did, indeed, though in a very different way.

All this promising fabric of liberal life crashed on the night of 18 September, 1931. The Army's *coup d'état*, as expressed in the seizure of Mukden, had three motives. The soldiers were afraid for their own position to which the new tendencies in Japanese thought were implicitly hostile; they were afraid of the destruction of their dreams of empire; and they hated the westernizing modes of Japanese taste and Baron Shidehara's conciliatory attitude to Young China which, to the military mind, involved the humiliation of Japan and the corruption of her ancient virtues. Once the Army had taken the step there was no turning back. With every month its grip on the Government machinery grew tighter and more arbitrary. Every fresh adventure anticipated another adventure, every restriction of public liberty led inevitably to yet more restriction. Professor G. C. Allen, a true friend of Japan if ever she had one, describes in his book, *Japan the Hungry Guest*, the free and animated atmosphere with which he was surrounded during his three years from 1922-25 as a professor at Nagoya University. He returned in 1936 to find all trace of Liberalism trodden underfoot. Press and platform spouted the most blatant Jingoism. And when Professor Allen called with an introduction on an Osaka manufacturer in search of certain economic information, the Japanese was quite ready to give it him, but said that he must first ascertain whether the Army would approve. All the life of a dictatorship, whether personal or exercised by a group, is a continual *descensus Averno*. If anything the group form is the worst. An individual may, though rarely, have some twinges of conscience.

The group (as Sydney Smith said of a company) 'has neither body to kick nor soul to be damned.' And as we see in Japan to-day, it moves irresistibly towards domination by its worst elements.

Quite apart from the actual crimes against international justice and humanity committed by the men who misrule Japan to-day, what so deeply stirs the indignation of Japan's friends is the wicked wrong that they have done their countrymen in the eyes of the world.

One looks back on former delightful days spent in Japan ; the unsurpassed craftsmen of Kyoto, who will allow you to sit as long as you please to watch their deft fingers producing treasures of cloisonné, lacquer, and damascene, and seem sufficiently rewarded by your interest and admiration, even if you leave without making a purchase ; the sun-baked peasants toiling ceaselessly in their trim tiny fields, in which the appearance of a single weed would be a disgrace to the whole family ; the charming courtesy with which country people will open up the front of their tiny houses and invite the foreign wayfarer to rest and refresh himself with a cup of tea ; Japanese hospitality generally, and how it cannot rest until it has repaid a favour four-fold ; many kind, scholarly, and courteous Japanese gentlemen one has known ; the ineffable beauty of Japanese scenery, its mountains, pine-woods, lakes, and waterfalls, and the pearly atmosphere of the Inland Sea ; the orderliness of a Japanese holiday crowd flocking to some beauty spot, not to rush up and down on switchbacks and wiggle-woggles, but just to sit and drink in the loveliness of the view and, when turning homeward, never leaving a single bit of waste paper to mar its amenities. It is surely symptomatic of the true nature of Japan, and something to bear in mind in these angry days, that among the 'Ten Million Gods' of Shintoism there is not one of an unkindly nature. They are truly the Eumenides, 'the kindly ones,' not so-called 'in shuddering propitiation,' but because they are thought of as such. And when a Japanese buys a new field, he will hold a little religious service to the *deus loci* and do sacrifices to him, not in any sense to appease a possibly malignant sprite, but with the courtesy of one

gentleman to another, of a new-comer in the district hastening to pay his respects to the oldest inhabitant.

In contrast, what is the picture now instantly conjured up in the minds of civilized peoples by the word 'Japan,' but of some insatiable monster, ruthless, rapacious, and forsworn? That is the degradation to which her rulers have brought her, and there seems no cure but by their being somehow beaten into subjection, though in the process a million innocent people must share their sufferings.

Among the many factors which contribute to the present condition of Japan, it must not be forgotten that she has real grievances against the West, most of which the West ignores, or has totally forgotten. As has often been remarked, it is a tragedy both for China and Japan that the West first presented itself to them, in modern times, in forms of violence, and that the first lesson taught by West to East was that might is right.¹ It was a unique misfortune for Japan that for two hundred and fifty years of the Tokugawa Shogunate—from the early seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century—she was rigidly shut out from all contact with the world. When one thinks of the tremendous events that were then happening, the struggle for constitutional government in England, the flowering of the Reformation, the French Revolution, the growth of the United States, the industrial revolution and Europe's search for colonies, of all of which Japan had neither part nor knowledge, we can see the origin of many modern evils. Moreover, throughout this period while Japan had only herself by which to judge herself, her canons of etiquette and self-repression grew more and more rigid. It is not surprising that in the intercourse between Japanese and foreigners there seems to be a veil which neither party can transcend. It is only what might be expected from the coagulation of icy inhibitions with which the Japanese had encrusted themselves during those two centuries and a half, hardly less towards each other than towards foreigners.

¹ Careful exception must be made of the great Jesuit astronomers who frequented the Court of the Emperor K'ang Hsi, and of the immediate followers of St. Francis Xavier, who made their way to Japan. The phrase 'modern times' connotes the last one hundred years or so in the case of China, under ninety in that of Japan.

It must be frankly confessed that the Western treaty-makers took the fullest advantage of Japan's ignorance. The imposition of extra-territoriality was justifiable in the then state of Japan as a necessary means of self-protection, though there is, unfortunately, no doubt that some of the early foreign residents abused their privileges. But the point at which the Customs tariff was fixed was a legitimate grievance, and the arbitrary exchange imposed between gold and silver, very much to the foreigner's advantage, was distinctly sharp practice. These shackles Japan got rid of by her own patience and assiduity, but she has not forgotten them.

The grievances of modern times are even harder to bear because they impinge so largely on Japanese pride—the refusal of the Paris Conference to accept Japan's proposal that the principle of racial equality should be incorporated in the League Covenant; the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which seemed to Japan a wholly uncalled-for rebuff; and worst of all, the American Immigration Exclusion Act of 1923, aimed almost in so many words (and certainly so in fact) at Japan.

The barrier against Japanese immigrants in America and the British Dominions is a very sore subject with the Japanese. That central and southern Japan are densely populated is undeniable. The average density here is around five hundred and fifty to the square mile, and over a third of the peasantry cultivate less than one and a quarter acres per family. On the other hand in Hokkaido, the northern island, the density of population drops to under eighty per square mile. For several years the Government has been using various inducements to the peasants to migrate to Hokkaido, but they do not like it because of its cold winters and its remoteness from the home of their ancestors.

Similarly, in respect of the other great grievance, that in the past decade tariffs have been intolerably raised against Japanese goods, it cannot but be observed that down to the outbreak of her war with China her export trade and the value of her shipping were rising rapidly in spite of the tariffs.

At bottom, all the Japanese grievances can be rolled into one sentence, that there appears to be a deliberate attempt on the part of the West to put Japan in an inferior place among the nations. To the Japanese pride this is insupportable, and to no class more so than to the Army. Unhappily, the latter have chosen a way of proving their equality with the rest of the world which makes it quite impossible, in their prevailing temper, to meet them in calm discussion for a better ordering of their relations with others. Unless we are willing to swallow holus-bolus Japan's 'new order for East Asia,' without even knowing what it is—for the Japanese Government, though repeatedly pressed for it, have refused all enlightenment on the point—it seems that we can never be on amicable terms with her.

The wave of Liberalism and modernity that passed over Japan during the 1920's was partly natural, partly accidental. After the Four Years War there was a remarkable movement of American enterprise towards the Far East and a corresponding inflow of American fashions among the younger Japanese, many of whom had studied in American colleges. These influences became more pronounced after the earthquake of 1923, when the success of the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo (which was nothing but a huge ferro-concrete box) in standing up to the earth's upheaval led to a rage for ferro-concrete buildings, rearing themselves seven and eight stories high.

The cinema mightily affected fashion. Public dance-halls sprang up everywhere, affording an easy and cheap relaxation for young people, for whom the stately classical dances of the *geisha*¹ were somewhat tedious, and always too expensive. The *moga* and *mobo* (Japanese contractions for 'modern girl' and 'modern boy'), in their westernized clothing, were the commonplace of every gathering. Western games, particularly baseball, were taken up eagerly and, perhaps most remarkable of all, Japan discovered a

¹ It may be worth mentioning that the professional *geisha* of Japan is by no means the equivocal young personage that *Romance* and *Madame Butterfly* have depicted her, but an extremely hard-working and highly trained and educated girl. Her dancing may be described as slowly evolving and very elaborate mime, some of which is so ancient that even Japanese cannot always be sure of the meaning of its symbolism.

passion for Western music. Such great artists as Kreisler, Haifetz, the late Godowsky, and Moisevitch were imported and played night after night to audiences of thousands.

Meanwhile the war had brought undreamt-of wealth to Japan, giving birth to the *narikin* class, the *nouveaux riches*, who invested some of their wealth in making Parliament a more efficient instrument for the furtherance of their interests. The Washington Disarmament Conference, which cut Japan's expenditure on naval construction from over yen 270,000,000 a year to about yen 88,000,000, further stimulated the appetite of the moneyed classes for official economy, which the earthquake indeed rendered imperative. The London Conference of 1930 cut down the bill still further. Japan usually plans her expenditure on armaments on a five- or six-year basis, and the agreement reached in London reduced her expenditure on naval construction for the years 1931-37 from an expected yen 850,000,000 to yen 350,000,000. Economy also extended to the Army which was reduced by four divisions between 1927-29. General Ugaki, afterwards the able Governor of Korea, was War Minister during these reductions, the recollection of which was one of the causes of the Army's refusal to accept him as Premier in January, 1938.

But contrast these figures with the six-year rearmament plan announced by the War Office and Navy Office at the beginning of 1940, which calls for an expenditure of yen 5,413,878,000 for the Army and yen 5,403,486,000 for the Navy. This enormous expenditure, too, is additional to the Budget for 1940 of yen 10,360,000,000, of which 64 per cent is for military expenditure.

The transience, however, of economy and of freedom of life and thought was soon to be shown. Mention has already been made of the displeasure with which the Army regarded jazz, dance-halls, cinemas, and the antics of *moga* and *mobo*, and the Government's home and foreign policy alike, as the corruption of Japan's ancient spirit and the defiling of her honour. The outcome of that displeasure is the fettered and dragooned Japan that we see to-day. But there were others, too, who were similarly excited to passion with immediate and bloody results.

The dark side of Japanese life is the floating mass of political hangers-on and desperadoes who, in the name of patriotism, are always ready for any deed of violence. They are the descendants of the *ronin* (literally 'wave men' or free lances, who in former days hired themselves out to any leader), and the riff-raff of the *samurai*, who had been unable or unwilling to find regular work when the daimyos disappeared at the Meiji Restoration. These ruffians form the raw material of the secret societies with which Japan is infested. Technically such societies are illegal, but their leaders are frequently men in high position, and even Ministers of State have made use of them (Captain Kennedy tells us in *The Changing Fabric of Japan*) for the breaking of strikes and smashing up of labour disturbances. The same author estimates that there were no fewer than thirty secret societies operating in Japan during the 1920's. The best known is the Black Dragon, originally founded during the war with Russia.

Political assassination and the beating-up of political opponents by means of hired gangsters was a recognized part of Japanese life before Nazis and Fascists had learnt the use of castor oil, knuckle-dusters, and killing by concentration-camp torture. Sometimes the assassination is arranged by a secret society. There is the strongest suspicion, for instance, that the liberal-minded and lovable Saburi, designated by Baron Shidehara to be Minister in China in 1930, who was supposed to have committed suicide, was in fact murdered by order of the Black Dragon. The assassin of Mr. Hara, the Premier in 1921, was an hysterical youth, who apparently acted independently, though he was certainly worked upon by the denunciations of reactionaries against Mr. Hara's 'insult to Japan' in accepting President Harding's invitation to the Washington Conference.

One feature, however, is common in all Japanese political murders, and that is the impossibility of getting adequate punishment for the murderer. When the cause of patriotism is invoked the Japanese appear to lose all sense of proportion, or, if they have any misgivings, are afraid to speak out. The very few exceptions, one or two newspaper editors and members of the Diet, have paid for their temerity by being waylaid and thrashed almost to death.

Tomeo Sagoya, who struck down Mr. Hamaguchi, the Premier, for having caused the London Naval Treaty of 1930 to be signed, was merely imprisoned, and was set free last November in honour of the two thousand six hundredth anniversary of the Empire. Mr. Morgan Young, in *Imperial Japan*, records that a 'patriotic' member of the Diet conceived it his duty to hire an assassin to murder the then Premier Admiral Saito. The ruffian spent the money without doing the deed, and then tried to blackmail the politician. But the latter, confident that patriotic motives would sufficiently cover him, denounced the blackmailer to the police; whereupon the blackmailer pleaded that he had been 'patriotically' moved to endeavour to obtain money for the purpose of using it in the development of Manchuria. Both parties left the court without a stain on their character.

One of the foulest murders of modern times was that of Mr. Inukai, the Premier, and Baron Dan, a well-known financier, in May, 1932, by a group of young members of the Blood Brotherhood Society, who were only deterred from several other murders by timely action by the police. When fully a year later the assassins were brought to trial, one of the judges actually had to retire from the hearing of the case on the prisoners' complaint that he had insulted them. Not one of the murderers was sentenced to more than a term of imprisonment.

Instances of this perversion of justice could be quoted without number. Contrast them with the treatment of suspected Communists. Between the years 1928 and 1932 some thousands of young men were arrested for harbouring 'dangerous thoughts,' otherwise for being Communists. Many were kept for a year and a half, some even for three years, in prison before being brought to trial, by which time most of them were on the verge of madness from the treatment they had received. This, of course, did not prevent further severe sentences from being passed on them.

One famous incident of the closing years before the Manchurian crisis must be recalled, and that is the so-called 'Tanaka Memorial,' which was supposed to have been presented to the Emperor in July, 1927. General Baron

Tanaka was Premier in 1928-29. He posed as the bluff, hearty soldier, and was responsible for sending the expedition to Shantung to block General Chiang Kai-shek's march upon Marshal Chang Tso-lin in Peking. It cost Japan yen 100,000,000 without achieving anything except to cause bad blood and give the Chinese another black mark to score up against Japan. He fell from office in 1929 owing to the scandal caused by financial corruption among some of his Ministers.

It is unlikely that Baron Tanaka actually wrote the memorial; probably he had not the wit to do so. But, in the light of after events, we can be pretty sure that it emanated from high quarters. It dwelt eloquently on the need of Japanese Imperial expansion and proceeded to explain how this was to be achieved first by occupying Manchuria and then, by progressive stages, gaining complete domination of China, to which the control of all Asia would follow in due sequence. The Japanese Government repudiated the Memorial as a forgery, which, in the sense already indicated, it may have been. But it was doubly important, first as an indication of the strong antipathy existing towards the liberal tendencies of the time; secondly, because it so exactly anticipated both in aims and the technique by which they were to be realized all the aggressive encroachments on China's property which the Japanese Army has since perpetrated.

The one thing for which the memorial did not allow was that China would be roused to her magnificent resistance which in the past three and a half years has landed the Japanese empire-builders in an inextricable bog, and bids fair to bring their schemes to ruin.

But from this necessarily brief survey of conditions in Japan prior to 1931, it should be clear that those whose business it was to watch the Far East closely ought to have been under no illusions as to the enormous and far-reaching significance of the clash on the night of 18 September, for it meant the disappearance of all liberal thought, the extinction of every reasonable influence, and the handing over of Japan bound to do the will of the least instructed dictatorship in the world for many years to come.

CHAPTER V

FROM MUKDEN TO MARCO POLO BRIDGE

THE story of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and the setting up of the erstwhile 'baby Emperor' Hsuan Tung on the throne of his Manchu ancestors (where his position is much like that of the children who many years ago used to be given a sovereign to carry in their pockets—it was theirs, but they must not spend it) is too generally known to need retelling, nor is it necessary for this book. But certain features in it should be mentioned.

The fumbling procrastination and final failure of the League of Nations to check Japan ought only to have disappointed those who had never realized the inborn seeds of self-destruction that lurked in its imposing-looking body. The one ingredient indispensable to its success was absent, namely, the spirit of goodwill among its members. That the very reverse was the sentiment uppermost among them was shown by the obvious mutual distrust in which they built up huge tariff walls against each other and did their best to obstruct each other's freedom of movement and business by the infliction of passports, visas, and monetary exchange restrictions. In short, the League was no more than a political expedient from which every country felt as free to withdraw as from any other kind of treaty when it became irksome. But it is obvious that the League's failure in respect of Manchuria was the death-knell of all hopes founded upon it as an instrument for enforcing peace.

It is, nevertheless, extraordinary that the Great Powers most interested in the Far East, and moreover pledged to watchfulness over it by the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty, did not bestir themselves to enforce its pledges.

Article VII of the Treaty reads : ' The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which, *in the opinion*

of any one of them, involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned.' The words '*in the opinion of any one of them*' are italicized because, as will be seen, America had strongly urged that a meeting of the signatories of the Treaty ought to be held, which, if the Article means anything, should surely have been enough. But the British Government could not be persuaded to agree. This is not a case of being wise after the event, because in the first three or four months after the seizure of Mukden the events in Manchuria, following on each other with almost bewildering rapidity, showed convincingly both that the Tokyo Government had lost all control of the situation, and that the Japanese Army were out for something very much bigger than to force China to rectify a few alleged violations of treaties. At the outset there were those who thought that the Japanese had seized Mukden merely to have a bargaining counter in subsequent negotiations with China. This fallacy was quickly exposed.

In his book, *The Far Eastern Crisis*, Mr. Stimson, the then American Secretary of State, gives us a most illuminating record of the progress of his own thoughts in these first months of the crisis. At the outset he decided to act with great caution.

'The Japanese Government,' he says, 'had for ten years given an exceptional record of good citizenship in the life of the international world. Shidehara was still in office. We knew he had been labouring hard for moderation against the pressure of the Army leaders. It seemed clear to us that no steps should be taken which would make his task more difficult.'

And from Mr. Stimson's diary he quotes this entry on 23 September :

'My problem is to let the Japanese know that we are watching them, and at the same time do it in a way which will help Shidehara, who is on the right side, and not play into the hands of the agitators.'

But Baron Shidehara's task was not merely difficult, it was impossible. The Army simply flouted him at every turn. He assured the Powers that no more troops would be sent

to Manchuria. But troops were poured in from Korea by thousands. He declared that military action should be limited to the zone of the South Manchuria Railway. But by early in October the Japanese commander in Manchuria, General Honjo, announced that his Government would no longer recognize Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, the ruler of Manchuria, and would not cease its activities until the Young Marshal and his Government had been expelled from the country. Following up this announcement on 8 October Japanese aeroplanes, without warning, bombed the unarmed town of Chinchow, in south-west Manchuria, whither the Chinese Government had withdrawn, killing and wounding a large number of its inhabitants.

‘On its face,’ says Mr. Stimson, ‘this was an indefensible act of aggression. Our protests to Tokyo brought expressions of regret which seemed quite inadequate.’

At the end of October, in further falsification of Baron Shidehara’s promises, the Japanese commanders launched an expedition into Heilungkiang and took Tsitsihar. This is hundreds of miles north of any sphere of Japanese interest, in fact, deep into the Russian sphere. There was a stalwart Chinese General in Heilungkiang named Ma Chan-shan, who put up a pretty stiff resistance for three days to the invaders. But, as Mr. Stimson truly observes :

‘By no flight of imagination could these operations be connected with the protection of Japanese nationals and property in South Manchuria.’

At the end of November the attack on Chinchow, the fragment of territory still in Chinese hands, was resumed. Protests from the League and from America to Tokyo succeeded in getting operations suspended. But by 11 December the Government to which Baron Shidehara belonged had fallen, Jingoism in Japan was rampant, the attack was resumed, and Chinchow also fell to the Japanese. It is to be recalled that as early as 19 October Mr. Stimson had written in his diary, after recording the reports he had received of the violent influences at work in Tokyo :

‘In other words, the Japanese Government which we have been dealing with is no longer in control.’

On 7 January, 1932, Mr. Stimson, after consulting the British and French Ambassadors, addressed identical notes to China and Japan involving the Pact of Paris as the basis for a policy of non-recognition of changes effected by force in Manchuria. In this he did not receive from London the support he expected but rather, as it seemed to him, a rebuff. Nevertheless, in February, when violent fighting had broken out round Shanghai, Mr. Stimson was so thoroughly alarmed that four times he rang up Sir John (now Lord) Simon, the Foreign Secretary, on the transatlantic telephone to press the urgency of calling a meeting of signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty. But he could not persuade Sir John to share his views.

That the British Foreign Office did not apparently realize the significance of the course of events as Mr. Stimson did and that they proved so reluctant to act, is all the more strange in that their policy in the Far East—based upon Sir Austen Chamberlain's declaration in January, 1927, for the abandonment of all special British rights and privileges in China—was essentially one of benevolence and good-fellowship to the Chinese. Indeed, in the spring of 1931, negotiations were begun with Nanking for the abolition of British extra-territoriality in China, and an agreement had been initialled between Sir Miles Lampson and Dr. C. T. Wang, when the Manchurian crisis put an end to the negotiations. Furthermore, the most subtle dialectician could not by any process of argument have obscured the fact that from 18 September onwards the Japanese Army were flagrantly violating their first pledge under the Nine-Power Treaty 'to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.' Charges of this violation, whenever raised in the past ten years, have been met by the bland assertion of the Japanese Government that the Treaty 'is no longer applicable to conditions in the Far East'—or, in plain words, to the path of conquest in China to which Japan has committed herself.

The above narrative has been told in some detail for the sake of the revealing light it sheds on present conditions in the Far East.

First and foremost it shows the terrifying power of the

Japanese military dictatorship, derived from the Constitution which enables the Army and Navy to ham-string any Government by withdrawing or refusing to nominate their Ministers, and supported by the ancient, almost superstitious, reverence in Japan for the soldier's trade and by the heady intemperance of certain classes of the Japanese people. If the Shidehara policy, with the backing of ten years' growth of liberal thought, could not stand against the Army, there need be no surprise that the soldiers have had no difficulty in brushing aside the faint representation of reasonableness which from time to time has been raised in later years.

In the second place, the course of events in Manchuria, only from the seizure of Mukden down to the occupation of Chinchow, is the completest justification in microcosm (reinforced by everything that has since occurred) for the Chinese contention that they are fighting not only for their freedom, but for the elementary principles of justice and decency as understood by civilized peoples, against a ruthless, soulless tyranny which is equally indifferent to any assurances given by the putative Government in Tokyo, the honour of Japan as involved in treaties to which she has put her name, and her reputation as a warrior for fair fighting.

And, thirdly, the Manchurian crisis is important for the unfortunate effect it has had upon British and American relations in respect of the present war in China. Apologists of the Foreign Office assert that Mr. Stimson never intended to take any positive action. One possible answer to that is that there is no telling, because the Nine-Power signatories never met. If Great Britain had agreed to Mr. Stimson's unquestionable eagerness for a meeting, it is at least possible that action would have resulted.

But, in any case, it would have prevented the impression afterwards universal in America that 'we wanted to stop the Japanese in 1931 and the British wouldn't go along with us.' Whether that impression is right or wrong, its existence is undeniable. It has lain at the root of the impossibility since 1937 of contriving joint, as opposed to merely parallel, action in China's behalf between Great Britain and America.

In the bitter story of Manchuria one bright light shines out with heartening radiance, namely, the discovery that Chinese soldiers would fight and could fight with effect where their feelings were aroused, and they knew what they were fighting for.

The seizure of Mukden provoked a furious renewal of the boycott of Japan. It was naturally most pronounced at Shanghai, where Japanese trade and Japanese residents are most conspicuous and Chinese public feeling most compact and voluble. A Chinese boycott is a very terrible thing, not only for the nation boycotted, but possibly even more so for Chinese merchants caught in possession of 'enemy goods,' who are liable to have their wares confiscated, their shops wrecked, and themselves be led through the streets with insulting placards on their backs, or be exposed in bamboo cages to public opprobrium. But it should be remembered that China was a weak nation and the boycott her only means of taking the offensive.

The Japanese colony at Shanghai certainly cannot have found life comfortable. Yet, in spite of the heat of the Chinese temper, there had been extremely little personal violence, though some property was destroyed and the Chinese courts were, not altogether surprisingly, slow in giving redress, until 18 and 20 January. On those days there were clashes outside a Chinese factory, just outside the foreign area of Shanghai, in which two Japanese were killed and three wounded, and one Chinese was killed.

The Japanese demands for apology, punishments, and compensation were eventually accepted by the Mayor of Greater Shanghai (as the Chinese territory surrounding the Foreign Settlements is called) at 4 p.m. on 28 January. But at eleven o'clock that night the local Japanese commander, Admiral Shiosawa, sent to the Mayor to tell him that he had decided to send troops to protect the Japanese in Chapei. Simultaneously he called on the Mayor to withdraw all Chinese troops in the district. The Mayor received the message at 11.15, and the Japanese advance began at 11.45. Chapei is a northern suburb of the Foreign Settlements adjoining Hongkew, which, in turn, links up with Yangtzepoo alongside the Whangpoo River, on which

Shanghai stands. These districts are divided from the rest of Shanghai by the Soochow Creek, an important waterway.

Chapei is Chinese territory ; Hongkew and Yangtzepoo are part of the International Settlement. Throughout the fighting the Japanese used Hongkew and Yangtzepoo as a military base from which to attack the Chinese, although, in view of their international status, they had no earthly right to do so.

The Japanese force numbered some 2000 marines and sailors, with armoured cars and artillery. Opposed to them were the famous 19th Route Army, possibly 30,000 men. The disparity in numbers was more than offset in most opinions—certainly in those of the Japanese—by the immense superiority of the latter in drill, training, and equipment. No doubt Admiral Shiosawa expected as easy a triumph as the Army had scored at Mukden. Yet it cost the Japanese five weeks' hard fighting with very severe losses, and they had to bring 60,000 troops and two senior generals one after another from Japan before they could force the Chinese to retire. Even then the Chinese fell back in good order to prepared positions about twelve miles west of Shanghai.

The 19th Route Army bore the brunt of the fighting, but half-way through the battle were reinforced with two divisions from the 5th Route Army. In the civil wars of 1930 these two armies had actually been fighting against each other. The readiness with which they now made common cause against Japan, added to the unsurpassable heroism with which these men, supported by little or no artillery, stood up to the overwhelming metal of the attack, ought to have taught the Japanese Generals something. But paradoxical as it may seem, no one understands the Chinese less than the Japanese, and of the new forces working in China they appear to understand nothing at all.

The worst of Japan's losses was the loss of 'face.' That she knew it was shown by the savagery of the attack. Thrown back in his first attack, Admiral Shiosawa sent for aeroplanes from the aircraft-carrier in the river, which dropped high explosive and incendiary bombs all over

Chapei. Before morning the whole suburb, with a population of fully 250,000, was one mass of flames. Thousands of helpless Chinese perished in the fire; tens of thousands were thrown out of work or beggared, and the loss of property was officially—one may believe without exaggeration—estimated at \$1,500,000,000. 'It was an act of inexcusable cruelty,' writes Mr. Stimson, 'and has stained the Japanese record at Shanghai for all time.' The Shanghai Consular Body protested strongly, and for a day or two the bombers were called off. But as the Chinese defence remained impenetrable Japanese ruthlessness increased. It aroused the horror of all the civilized world and swung all sympathy to China's side.

After the Chinese withdrawal on 3 March the British and French Ministers intervened, and a settlement was arranged by which the country round Shanghai was demilitarized. The bulk of the Japanese troops were withdrawn in May, though a substantial garrison was left in Hongkew. There is no doubt that the Japanese were anxious to be done with Shanghai, which, for them, was a sideshow compared with the important work of riveting their hold on Manchuria.

But a sinister occurrence in Tokyo showed how vicious were the forces of reaction. Within a few days of the announcement of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops a group of young officers broke into the house of the aged Premier, Mr. Inukai, who was believed to have invoked the Emperor's assistance for the Shanghai settlement, and shot him down.

One other phase of the occupation of Manchuria must be recalled, as throwing light on the extensiveness of Japanese ambitions. That is the Japanese invasion of Jehol, the province which is niched in between north-east China, eastern Inner Mongolia, and south-western Manchuria. In the early phases of the Manchurian episode, there had been some contention that Manchuria was not really part of China because it had not been brought into the Empire until the setting-up of the Manchu dynasty in the seventeenth century—an argument about as reasonable as to say that the lands of an heiress do not become a part of the estate

of the family into which she marries. But about Jehol there could never be any discussion. It was indubitably China, and when the Japanese in 1933 decided to add it to the rest of their booty in Manchuria they were simply committing an act of barefaced brigandage.

The terrain of Jehol and the bitter cold in which the invasion took place ought to have helped the defence greatly. But in fact there was none. The Governor of Jehol decamped with great speed, the passes were not manned, and the Japanese overran the province almost unopposed. At the Great Wall the Chinese did make a brave and determined stand, but they were eventually overwhelmed, and the Japanese advanced to Tungchow within twelve miles of Peking.

In April the undeclared war was ostensibly ended by the so-called Tangku Truce. Its exact terms have never been published, but its chief feature was the establishment of a demilitarized zone in East Hopei (the province formerly called Chihli in which Peking stands), a triangular area about the size of a large English county, between the Great Wall and the sea. The Japanese consented to draw off their army north of the Wall, but took for themselves the right to fly their aeroplanes over Hopei to see that the Chinese faithfully observed the stipulated demilitarization.

And now began a series of encroachments and acts of aggression which showed unmistakably what had been marked down as the next Japanese acquisition. The five northern provinces of China, Shansi, Hopei, Shantung, Charhar, and Suiyuan (the last two being part of Inner Mongolia) are rich in natural wealth, coal, iron, and salt, and in the production of cotton and hides, all things that the Japanese desire. From Japan's point of view, too, it was necessary to form a zone of protection for Manchuria from infiltration of the Russians who had been in complete control of Outer Mongolia since 1922 or thereabouts. When the Japanese made their assault on Manchuria the Russians had no forces of any value in the Far East. They were eventually squeezed out of the northern half of Manchuria which had been left to them after the Russo-Japanese War, and eventually sealed their expulsion by selling their last

possession, the Chinese Eastern Railway, to Japan (nominally to Manchukuo) in March, 1935. But before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 Marshal Blucher had built up a very powerful, largely self-supporting army in the Far East which has given Japan many bad dreams. They meant to have these five northern provinces.

For two years an uneasy quiet prevailed while the Japanese concentrated on the painful task of rounding up the Chinese irregulars in Manchuria—a task not yet completed and which continues to be a considerable drain on Japan both in men and money. But early in 1935 they invaded Charhar on the pretext of putting down the irregulars and pursued them over the Great Wall into the demilitarized zone.

As usual, a case was faked up, making the Chinese somehow responsible, and fresh demands were presented. The result was the so-called Ho-Umetsu agreement between General Ho Yin-ching, Chinese Governor in Peking, and the Japanese General Umetsu. In fact General Ho has always maintained that he never did more than acknowledge receipt of the Japanese terms, which the Japanese claimed as his acquiescence. At any rate the Japanese got what they demanded, namely the cashiering of various officials obnoxious to them, the dissolution of certain Chinese political organizations, particularly one known as the Blue Shirts, and the removal of a division of troops of the Central Government.

From this time, too, Charhar gradually passed into their possession.


In the following autumn they made another move, the product of the fertile brain of Major-General Doihara, who had been the centre of every Japanese device against China since the seizure of Mukden.

This remarkable man is frequently called in the London Press 'The Lawrence of Manchuria,' an appellation far too complimentary to him, as he has none of that love and sympathy for the Chinese which, as between Lawrence and Arabs, were a conspicuous part of the great Englishman's successes. Doihara was born in 1883 and did brilliantly at the Japanese Military Academy, where he specialized in



THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA

Chinese troops advancing to the attack in the cover of the Wall. For 2100 years the Great Wall has been the symbol of China's resistance to invaders. Frequently they have got in, but always in the end China and the Great Wall have triumphed over their enemies.



THE CANTON-HANKOW RAILWAY

The completion of which shortly before the war made it possible to travel the whole way from London to Hongkong by rail. Twice the Japanese who hold each end of the line have tried hard to seize the whole of it and each time have been signally defeated.

Chinese. He began his career in China in 1918 where he intrigued with the old pro-Japanese Anfu Party in Peking, who were expelled by the students in the anti-Japanese outburst of 1919 after the Versailles Treaty.

In 1919 Doihara was made chief of the Japanese Special Service Bureau at Mukden, from which time it was commonly said that, wherever there was trouble, there was Doihara at the centre. He played an important part in the seizure of Manchuria, but was outwitted by General Ma Chan-shan, the defender of Tsitsihar, who pretended to stand in with the Japanese and got away with a large sum of their money. For this Doihara was recalled to Tokyo. In 1937 he was given command of a division in Shansi and got badly mauled; and again in the fighting in Central China in June, 1938, he pushed too far ahead, was surrounded, and only rescued with difficulty.

Doihara is a likeable man when he pleases, with a great taste for society. As a soldier he is not a success. As a political intriguer he is resourceful, daring, and unscrupulous. It is not improbable that he would never have made war on China in 1937 if the decision had rested with him. He was always a Mr. By-Ends, preferring to gain his purpose by guile rather than force.

Doihara's scheme was that the five northern provinces should be severed altogether from the Central Government and should be formed into an autonomous State under Japan's protection. It was actually claimed for this audacious proposal that all the Chinese of the five provinces earnestly desired it. In fact they speedily gave public proof that nothing could possibly be further from their wishes. Thus strengthened by public indignation, General Chiang Kai-shek—who was doing everything possible to avoid war with Japan while he built up his army—was able to arrange a compromise. A new administration was formed in Peking known as the Hopei-Charhar Council, under General Sung Cheh-yuan, formerly Governor of Charhar, with considerable local powers, but always subject to Nanking. Doihara had to own himself beaten and left Peking exclaiming angrily, and with unconscious truth: "I never shall understand the Chinese."

Doihara had, however, scored one point which for the furtherance of confusion-making in North China proved most useful to the Japanese. A Chinese creature named Yin Ju-keng, who had a Japanese wife, was induced to declare the autonomy of East Hopei, where he proclaimed some figment of government with himself as president. Nanking ordered him to be arrested, but the Japanese said that he was under their protection; and occupied some points on the railway to prove it.

It was through East Hopei that the orgy of smuggling ensued in the summer of 1936 and early 1937, which was perhaps the meanest of all the tricks adopted by the Japanese to undermine the Chinese Government and cripple its finances. It began with the export of silver. This had been forbidden by the Chinese Government in order to save its reserves, which were being drained away owing to the high price of silver then ruling in America; and this naturally led to a flood of imports, cotton goods, sugar, kerosene oil, silk, and rayon in payment for the silver.

This, politely called 'special trade'¹ (to allude to it as smuggling to a Japanese official was regarded by him as a deadly insult), was openly and unashamedly protected by the Japanese Army. Junks and even steamers came over from Dairen and discharged their cargoes on the beach near Shanhaikuan for all to see. The Customs revenue cruisers tried to interfere, but were chased away by the Japanese. The smugglers were mostly Koreans (Japanese subjects, of course) armed with cudgels, which they did not hesitate to use on the Chinese Customs men. Trains out of East Hopei were so loaded with articles of the 'special trade' that frequently there was none too much room for passengers.

Japanese officers when appealed to to stop the scandal replied loftily that this was a trade matter which should be referred to the consul, who, of course, was powerless.

¹ Mr. Frank Oliver, for many years Reuter's correspondent in Peking, in his excellent book on the first year of the fighting, quotes the indignation of a Japanese spokesman when asked why Japanese always call the war an 'incident.' Swelling with anger the Japanese replied: 'Foreigners who don't know China cannot understand. This is "special undeclared war."' This delightful phrase gives the title to Mr. Oliver's book.

Questions were asked in the House of Commons, and protests made in Tokyo. But the reply was that, if there was any smuggling, it was merely the result of China's high tariffs, but that as East Hopei had introduced its own tariffs, there really was no smuggling at all. The liberal regime of Baron Shidehara was by this time a forgotten nightmare.

How much China lost by the smuggling cannot be computed. Sir Robert Calder Marshall, Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai, in a cable to the London Press on 21 May, 1936, said that the estimated loss for only the previous month was \$8,000,000. First and last a loss of £2,000,000 to China is probably a conservative estimate.

In the end the smugglers over-reached themselves and glutted the East Hopei market, while the Customs authorities managed to institute some partial check on the trains going southwards out of Hopei.

But matters were moving fast towards the climax of open war. Already the Japanese Army were behaving as if they were masters of Peking. The Boxer Protocol gave the foreign diplomats the right to station troops in their Legations and, when they deemed it necessary, to control the railway to Tientsin. For many years, in most Legations, this right had become so much a mere form as almost to have dropped into desuetude. Not so with the Japanese. Long before the war they had stationed 7000 troops in North China, dotting them about at important positions on the railways as well as in Tientsin and Peking. Their presumption in dictating to General Sung Cheh-yuan, head of the Hopei-Charhar Council, who seems to have done his utmost to keep up his end on the Central Government's behalf, was past all endurance. The arrogance of the common soldiers was inconceivable by those who have not witnessed it. Mr. Oliver, in the book just mentioned, says that he personally saw a Japanese soldier 'literally fling a Frenchwoman into the gutter because she wished to walk on the pavement. She gathered herself together and got back on to the pavement where she had every right to be, only to be met by a lunge of the bayonet, which stopped within an inch or two of her body.'

If this was the Japanese behaviour to foreigners, one may easily imagine what it was to Chinese. On any or no pretext Japanese aeroplanes flew menacingly low over Peking, while armoured cars rattled through its streets. And on the pretext of military exercise, Japanese troops manœuvred about the country and staged sham battles on it as if it had been the fields about Tokyo.

It was in the course of one of these sham battles on the night of 7 July, 1937, that the clash occurred with Chinese troops in barracks near Marco Polo Bridge, a little south-west of Peking.

But how strange that for a sham battle the Japanese troops should on this occasion have been served with ball cartridge !

CHAPTER VI

1931-37—THE RENAISSANCE OF CHINA

IT was Japan's invariable contention at Geneva—it is so still in defiance of all facts to the contrary—that China had had no organized Government and had remained chaotic and disordered since the Revolution of 1911. Even if this were true, it was no justification for the seizure of Manchuria and Jehol. Other Powers, with larger property in China than Japan's, had not found it necessary to use such violent means.

It is true as shown in a previous chapter that the Central Government's authority in 1931 was still much challenged and that its constitution needed considerable pruning and pulling together. Canton remained in peevish opposition under the leadership of the late Hu Han-min. A former secretary of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Hu might be called the 'Sea-Green Incorruptible' of the Revolution. He was the sort of man that most of us have had the misfortune to meet on committees. Small, pallid, and acidulated, with a high forehead and hard passionless eyes, he was a terrific worker, to do him justice, clean-handed, and immutably sure that his version and his only was the correct one of Kuomintang doctrine and Dr. Sun's will. He accused General Chiang Kai-shek of trying to make himself a dictator. Chiang, who is nothing if not practical, having found, as most people did, that Hu was impossible to work with, had him arrested in the spring of 1931 and confined in a country house near Nanking. It caused a great scandal in Nanking, but undoubtedly it helped to clear the way for reforms in the Government's constitution, making it less self-obstructive and more flexible. Hu was eventually allowed to escape to Canton whence, after Canton had become unified with

Nanking in 1936, he retired to Hongkong and continued to fulminate against Nanking and all its ways even after the war had begun. He was visited there not long before his death by a certain high British dignitary, who lectured him roundly on the impropriety of his behaviour, while better men than he were sweating to make the country prosperous. Hu's amazement was so great that for once he could say nothing.

The other sore in the country was the Communists. They must be dealt with more fully in another chapter. Here it need only be said that after the expulsion of the Russians from Hankow in 1927 they had formed a rebel state in southern Kiangsi and had gradually extended their power up to the middle Yangtze, over territory containing some 80,000,000 people, and that it took General Chiang four years of ruinously expensive campaigning to dislodge them.

Yet even in 1931 there were signs that the Government was becoming more efficient, more sure of itself. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria and especially the fighting at Shanghai dealt a shock to all politicians that brought them to their senses and led to a renaissance that would have been remarkable anywhere. In China, with the natural difficulties inherent in her huge bulk and particularly so soon after the upheaval of the previous decade, it seemed like a miracle.

The first sign of recovery was when in May, 1931, General Chiang Kai-shek publicly renounced the doctrine of unification by force. Excepting with the Communists, he declared that he would fight no more civil wars. He would concentrate on the development of those parts over which Nanking had undisputed sway. If others wished 'to pursue particularist tendencies,' let them do so. He would trust to time, and the magnetism of prosperity in Nanking's provinces to draw them into the orbit of the Central Government.

Simultaneously an organization called the National Economic Council was created to which the League of Nations lent a number of advisers, presided over by Mr. T. V. Soong.

The ability of this remarkable man is a commonplace to all acquainted with the Far East. 'T. V.,' as he was universally called, was born in 1891, the son of a sailor who went to San Francisco, became converted to Christianity, and returned to marry another convert and to found a publishing house, primarily to issue the Scriptures, which became very prosperous. 'T. V.' went to Harvard, then served in a New York bank for some time, and came home to China to become Minister of Finance in Canton in 1925, an office which he continued to hold in Nanking until after his return from the World Economic Conference in London in 1933. He was then succeeded by his brother-in-law, Dr. H. H. Kung, and proceeded to concentrate all his energies on the National Economic Council. He is also Chairman of the Bank of China.

'T. V.' is a tall, powerfully built man, ardently devoted to riding, an untiring worker, with a talent for getting the last ounce out of his subordinates. He is prone to be temperamental and has been known to retire to his bed in sheer despair of getting the reforms he desired accomplished; whence, however, he returns to the charge with renewed energy. He does not suffer fools gladly. In a country where business discussions may linger leisurely through the whole afternoon over innumerable cups of tea, it was amazing to find that with 'T. V.' a decision could be given in a quarter of an hour. This rapidity of action was disconcerting to the conventional Chinese and, added to the fact that shyness tended sometimes to make 'T. V.' seem abrupt, it did not add to his popularity. With all, 'T. V.' is a fine character, an ardent patriot, and to all those who know him well, singularly lovable.

The National Economic Council undoubtedly did splendid work. Its greatest achievements were in the building of roads and railways and river conservancy. In most of China a road is hardly more than a wheelbarrow track. By July, 1937, some 50,000 miles of highway had been constructed chiefly in central and south China. Many of them were still only beaten earth, but motor-buses trundled along them packed with Chinese, and the amazing assortment of bundles and crates of livestock without which no

Chinese peasant seems able to move a yard, letting the light of new ideas into all sorts of dusty corners.

Railways had fallen into terrible disrepair in the civil wars. Now road-beds and rails were repaired, new rolling stock bought, a new line was built connecting the Shanghai-Hangchow railway with the Canton-Hankow line; and the Lung-hai railway, which runs all across China from the sea-coast in northern Kiangsu, was extended throughout Sianfu in Shensi right up into Inner Mongolia.

Most conspicuous of all was the completion of the Canton-Hankow line. This railway, of a total length of about seven hundred miles, was begun in 1904 from both ends, but owing largely to the Revolution a gap of two hundred and seventy miles in the middle through the difficult mountainous country in southern Hunan had never been finished. Now with the aid of the British Boxer Indemnity (returned to China in 1930) the gap was filled and it became literally possible to travel the whole way by train from Kowloon (the mainland territory of Hongkong) through China, Manchuria, Siberia, Russia, Poland, Germany, Belgium, France, by train ferry across the Channel and so to London. The Yangtze had to be crossed by boat at Hankow, but there were plans for building a bridge, which were only stopped by the war. The tragedy of it!

Conservancy of the Hwai River, which runs for some three hundred miles to the north of and very roughly parallel with the Yangtze, was another very promising undertaking. As this river has no outlet but a chain of lakes in north Kiangsu, it floods its banks every summer over a wide stretch of what should be very fertile country. The scheme was to link up the Hwai with the old outlet to the sea used by the Yellow River south of the Shantung promontory, and a good deal of progress had been made when war stopped it all. What is to happen in the Hwai valley, and possibly farther south in that of the Yangtze, is a big and fearful problem now. For since the Chinese cut the banks of the Yellow River in the summer of 1938 to hold back the Japanese advance on Hankow, the water of this mighty and distressing stream tends to forget its former channel and rolls southward towards the Hwai. 'China's

Sorrow' was China's salvation in 1938. But the dangers of leaving a river which varies from a hundred yards wide in winter to half a mile in summer when the snows melt in Kansu, to wander at will over the plains of Central China, is not the least of the misfortunes caused by the Japanese War.

Other good work done by the National Economic Council was a marked improvement in the cultivation of silk, tea, and cotton. Chinese peasants are nothing if not conservative—what peasants are not?—and no more than a beginning had been made in this direction. But enough had been done to give great hopes of future success.

In respect of finances, although the prolonged war with the Communists prevented Mr. Soong from balancing his Budget, the fact that a Budget was regularly produced showing all incomings and outgoings was a decided step in the right direction. In 1929 Mr. Soong had announced a scheme for bringing up to date the arrears of payments on certain foreign loans secured on the Salt Gabelle; and this was followed by a compromise on the arrears on railway loans, by which the bondholders agreed to waive part of their claims and accepted a scheme of annually rising payments which would eventually have brought them the full amount.

It should here be mentioned to China's great credit that even to the end of the first year of the war, she was paying faithfully on these and other loans. Then having lost practically all the revenues on which they are secured, she was forced to default. But when one considers how many nations have been defaulters for years past, with very little excuse at all, China's merit in paying from her slender resources through a whole year of invasion deserves full praise. Even now it is understood that the Chinese Government is regularly putting aside a proportion of such customs and salt revenues as it still receives against ultimate resumption of payment on the foreign loans secured on them.

The greatest triumph of these years of renaissance, and a signal proof of China's rising prestige abroad was the decision on November 3, 1935, to 'go off' silver and adopt a managed currency. As already mentioned in connection

with the Japanese-protected smuggling through East Hopen, the high price then being paid for silver in America was emptying China's reserves at an alarming rate. Efforts to check the outflow by an export tax were unavailing, and some more drastic measure was urgently needed. In the summer of 1936 Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, the British Treasury's expert, had arrived in the Far East (where the Japanese, by the way, gave him a very cold reception) on a mission to see how Great Britain's trade with China might be improved. That he actually advised the Chinese Government to adopt a managed currency is improbable. He certainly gave the scheme his approval, and the British Government lent it invaluable help by being the first to instruct the British banks in China to hand over their reserves of bullion to the Chinese Government and to accept its paper notes.

Japan was furious. Less than two years before she had issued through her famous 'Foreign Office spokesman,' Mr. Eiji Amau, what is commonly known as her 'Monroe Doctrine for China.' Divested of verbiage, this declared that Japan claimed the right to be consulted in regard to all China's foreign dealings. Foreign Powers were told that Japan would oppose any attempt 'to act in concert in regard to China—no matter whether the nominal object is to help China financially or technically.' Foreign traders were told that they might trade with China in such things as Japan might approve, but she 'must oppose the attempts being made of late by Powers to supply military planes to China, to aid China in the establishment of aerodromes, to supply military organs and advisers, and to give political loans to China.'

This declaration brought some inquiries at the Japanese Foreign Office. But it must be thought that the Western Governments allowed themselves to be satisfied very easily with the evasive explanations given of what was in fact an assertion of dictatorship over China. This dictatorship China had openly flouted by taking a step of the highest importance in respect of her finances; and she had been openly aided and abetted by Great Britain, who thus, after long years of *fainéance*, was plainly making a direct

bid to reassert her classically predominant interests in China.

For the moment, however, Japan took no direct action against the managed currency, except that she refused to allow any silver to be withdrawn from the north. But she certainly did not forget this proof of China's determination to take her own line in her own affairs. Matters were not improved by the loan subsequently arranged between China and certain British mercantile houses for railway construction in the south.

Two events of very great moment must be recalled as an indication of the rising tide of popular Chinese feeling against Japan and as hastening the Japanese Army's decision that China must be crushed before she grew any stronger. It is to be remembered that in the years after Mukden General Chiang Kai-shek was doing his utmost to avoid an open breach in spite of the Japanese Army's intolerable behaviour in the north, while he strove to build up China's resources for the conflict which he knew to be inevitable. "Give me only ten years," he is reported to have said. But that was exactly what Japan would not give him, nor, as it soon became clear, his own countrymen either.

In June, 1936, the so-called South-west Political Council of which Canton was the seat of government, raised the standard of revolt. At the head of it were the two Kwangsi Generals, Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen, who had already been at war with Nanking in 1929.

Both of them are still young men, Pai only forty-seven, Li about fifty, and both men of exceptional ability. Pai is generally spoken of as the ablest commander in the present war; it was he who planned the heavy defeat inflicted on the Japanese in their attempt to capture Changsha in the autumn of 1939. Li was the victor in the famous battle of Taierchuang in May, 1938, when two Japanese divisions were hemmed in and cut to pieces.

Pai and Li have also proved very able administrators in their native province of Kwangsi. What the Communists have done to improve the peasants' condition in the north on socialistic lines, the Kwangsi Generals have largely repeated in their southern demesne on patriarchal lines.

The peasants of Kwangsi are, so to speak, told to 'open their mouths and shut their eyes and see what the fairies will send them.' But they have had no reason to be dissatisfied with their particular fairies, and Kwangsi has the reputation for being well governed and prosperous. Certainly the Kwangsi soldiers, hardy mountaineers, follow their Generals with enthusiasm.

In the abortive rebellion of June, 1936, motives were, as usual, mixed. As usual, too, financial controversies entered into them, and at the time both Pai and Li were suspicious of General Chiang. But the rallying cry of the moment was to coerce Nanking into resisting the Japanese, and in the light of later events this cry is seen to have had far more meaning than was then credited. The rebellion was suppressed without difficulty, as Chiang Kai-shek was in a position to overawe it with an overwhelming display of force. The South-west Political Council was broken up; Chen Chi-tang, its head, retired to Hongkong, the other recalcitrant Generals were allowed to simmer down again in their native fastness of Kwangsi, and Canton finally passed under the Central Government's authority. But the importance of the movement, which Japan at least did not underestimate, was its expression of the increasing insistence of the Chinese people that the arrogant islanders should no more be tolerated.

The second incident is the kidnapping of General Chiang Kai-shek at Sianfu in December, 1936. Only the broad outlines of this dramatic event need be recalled. Since the Communists had been expelled from Kiangsi in 1934, they had made their way to Shensi and there had set up a new State. The Young Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who had been in Europe since his expulsion from Manchuria but had returned in 1933, had been sent by General Chiang to take command of his old troops (who were expelled with him from Manchuria and had since been loafing leaderlessly about the north) and to give the Communists the *coup de grace*.

But the Communists and the ex-Manchurian troops had a common bond of sympathy. They hated the Japanese. Instead of fighting, they fraternized. General Chiang flew

to Sianfu, capital of Shensi, and, to cut a long story short, was made a prisoner by the Young Marshal, who was acting both for his Manchurian troops and for the Communists. The latter, it should be noted, had for nearly a year past been entreating General Chiang to drop his vendetta against themselves and to make common cause against Japan. And this was to be the price now of his release.

Exactly what happened during the thirteen days of General Chiang's captivity we shall probably never know. We have his diary of these days, but he naturally did not know what was passing among his captors, and throws very little light on the terms offered to him. It reveals General Chiang as a brave, hard-shell, obstinate man, with a high sense of self-respect, possibly the most trying prisoner that a well-meaning Young Marshal ever had to put up with.

General Chiang's point, to which he stuck immovably, was that if he yielded against his convictions, his name would be irretrievably blackened, but that if he was killed adhering to them, he would be remembered as a man of honour and probity. On this theme he lectured Chang Hsueh-liang (not omitting much acid comment on the impropriety of Chang's conduct) until the unfortunate Young Marshal crept away like a beaten dog, silenced and contrite. It is to be remembered that all this time General Chiang was in considerable pain, having hurt his back by a fall when trying to escape on the night of his being seized, and in very great danger, not from the Communists, but from the Young Marshal's Manchurian troops, who wanted to get back home and were in no mood to listen to lectures on the duty of a gentleman.

Madame Chiang Kai-shek bravely flew to Sianfu to stand by her husband, and the negotiations continued. At the cost of seeming irreverent, one cannot but suspect that in the end she said to the Young Marshal: "You let him go, and I'll see that he does the right thing later on." At any rate, on December 25 Chiang was put into an aeroplane and flown back to Nanking, followed by the Young Marshal, who publicly owned himself to be 'naturally rustic, surly, and unpolished,' and asked to be suitably punished for his

crime. On December 31 a military court sentenced him to five years' deprivation of civil rights, and on January 4 he was pardoned.

The whole episode suggested a ridiculous anticlimax. But China has her own way of arranging awkward impasses with due regard to the 'face' of all parties. The war on the Communists was not resumed; the statement of policy issued by the Kuomintang Congress in the following spring dwelt on resistance to Japan as the Party's first aim. The Communists were understood to have promised certain modifications of their creed—which, in fact, had already been effected by time and the influence of Chinese taste—and there were strong reports of munitions being sent them from Nanking. For practical purposes, as the war has abundantly proved, Communists and Central Government had buried the hatchet. China was united in a common purpose.

The last ten months before the clash at Marco Polo Bridge are particularly instructive as showing not only China's rising spirit of independence and refusal to be bullied, but the deep impression that that spirit was beginning to make on reasonable minds in Japan, particularly the business classes.

In September, 1936, Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Premier, proposed negotiations for the settlement of all differences between China and Japan. As a basis of discussion he made five proposals: that Nanking should suppress all anti-Japanese agitation in China; that it should suppress unlawful activities by Korean revolutionaries; that it should agree to open up air lines between China and Japan; that it should revise China's import tariffs; and that it should employ Japanese advisers in the reorganization of the country.

To this the Chinese Government replied that anti-Japanese feeling in China would disappear quickly enough when Japan abandoned her aggressive attitude; that China had no love for foreigners acting illegally in her territory, but that the Japanese Government should equally suppress 'unlawful activities committed under its protection by Koreans, Formosans, and other subjects of Japan';

that it was impossible to talk of civil air lines while Japanese military planes were illegally flying over North China ; that tariff revision was China's private affair (and here came a sharp reminder of the Japanese protected smuggling in East Hopei) ; and that, as regards foreign advisers, the Chinese Government engaged such as it required from any source, the question of their nationality did not arise.

It is not improbable that Mr. Hirota, by no means an illiberal man, had framed his demands as the least that he could persuade the Army to accept in the hope of ending the increasingly grave tension in North China. But the days of China's submissive obedience to any demand had passed.

In November, while the negotiations were dragging on, a large force of Manchukuo and Mongol troops with Japanese tanks and aeroplanes advanced from Charhar and attempted to invade the next province Suiyuan. They were completely out-generalled and repulsed by General Fu Tso-yi, Governor of Suiyuan, who got behind the invaders and captured the large market town of Pailingmiao, causing much natural rejoicing in China. The Central Government immediately seized the opportunity to break off the negotiations, saying that it was impossible to continue them while Chinese territory was being thus violated.

Let us pass on to the spring of 1937. By that time the Japanese Press were publishing copious articles calling attention to the changed conditions in China and the necessity for a corresponding change in Japan's attitude if negotiations for a settlement of differences were to stand any chance of success.

An important delegation of Japanese business men came to Shanghai to discuss improvement of Sino-Japanese trade with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. They were told plainly that it was useless to talk of improving trade until their military men had improved their manners. The Japanese had to go home empty-handed.

In April Mr. Kawagoe, the Ambassador, was recalled to Tokyo to report on the new conditions in China. He remained in Japan for two months. What he said we do not know, but one cannot but suspect that he took the same

view of things as the Press and the disappointed business men ; for, on his way back to China in June, he gave an interview in which he was reported to have said that he was instructed to renew the negotiations on terms of friendship and reciprocity. Only a fortnight before the outbreak of war *The Times* reported from Tokyo that Mr. Hirota's policy was 'patiently to await a change in the Chinese attitude, neither pressing Japan's claims nor abandoning her advantages.' It seemed almost like the benevolent times of Baron Shidehara.

There is little doubt that the Japanese Army must have noted these tendencies for further conviction that, if it did not strike soon, it would be too late.

So, as one looks back on those truly epoch-making years from 1931-37, one does indeed discern the birth of a new China. It was not yet a democratically governed China ; it is not now. All power was in the hands of an oligarchy, and in the circumstances of China, shaken by the overthrow of the Manchus and the ensuing years of chaos, no other government was feasible. Several attempts were made to write a constitution, all as futile as the parliament which had met and wrangled in the days of Yuan Shih-kai. In passing, one wonders whether China will ever have a written constitution ; whether she will not rather evolve one of her own by the process of trial and error as England has done.

But the point to emphasize is not only that the oligarchical Government in Nanking had improved itself out of all comparison with what it had been in its first years, continually growing in wisdom, prestige, and authority, but that it had behind it a people already awakened and united as the Chinese had never been before. Chinese writers frankly admit that Japan has done more in the past three years to make China a united country than she could have done for herself in fifty. That, no doubt, is true. But it is equally true that even Japanese aggression could not have produced the amazing unity, the sense of nationality, and common purpose which have enabled China to survive the miseries of these years and still to be fighting on, more confident of victory than ever, if the elements of this bright

spirit of resistance had not already come to life among her people.

One has only to think what would have happened if Japan had invaded North China in the last days of the Manchu dynasty as she did in 1937. First the Court would have run away to Sianfu. Then some luckless Viceroy or Grand Councillor would have been sent to negotiate. Japan would probably have moderated her demands a little, but would have got most of what she wanted. Some anguished memorials would have been addressed to the Throne by remote Provincial Governors. Possibly some brave Censor might have rebuked the Throne for its shortcomings which had brought such disgrace upon the sons of Han—and would have received the silken cord for his temerity. But the people of China ten miles away from the road taken by the Japanese would have remained either in ignorance of what had happened or philosophically indifferent to it.

It was not so in 1937. Even if General Chiang had wished to temporize still further, to play for more time in which to strengthen his army, public opinion would never have allowed it. An eloquent expression of the general feeling was the national subscription got up to present Chiang with a squadron of aeroplanes on his fiftieth birthday in 1936. Every thinking Chinese must have known in July, 1937, what the odds were against China, with no navy worth the name, and with armies still most inadequately equipped. But it was none the less felt that, if China gave in then, her hopes of freedom and independence were destroyed for ever.

In the years from 1931-37 China may be said to have found her senses. In those that have followed she has found her soul.

CHAPTER VII

CHINESE STUDENTS AND THE RENAISSANCE

WHEN Lord Willingdon went to China in 1926 to report to the British Government on how the Boxer Indemnity still due to Great Britain might be laid out with mutual advantage to both countries, there is a story that he suggested to President Hsu Shih-chang the founding of colleges, and that the President fervently ejaculated : " For Heaven's sake, no more students ! "

Looking back on those stormy days, one may be forgiven for not having recognized that a thing so violent and hysterical as the student body then appeared to be from one end of China to the other could have concealed within it so much of the springs of subsequent progress. Yet we shall miss a great part of the significance of China's fight for her liberties if we underrate the preparatory influence of the student movement, and it is hardly an exaggeration to think that even General Chiang Kai-shek could not have done what he has for China without that preparation.

During the 1920's the students certainly did all they could to deserve the bad things said of them. The great majority appeared to be utterly lawless and insubordinate. Scarcely a week passed without its report of mobs of callow youths chasing unpopular teachers from their classrooms, sometimes wounding them badly ; of their camping on railways to stop trains, calling for general strikes and boycotts, invading the capital, and wrecking public buildings. When the first students went to America in 1872, the mandarin sent from Peking to inspect them reported that they were becoming denationalized, and the Government fetched them home in a hurry. This apprehension certainly seemed to be fulfilled in the 1920's.

There were many reasons for it. The times were lawless, when government had disintegrated, and power had passed into the worst hands ; and the students, claiming to speak for the public, not unnaturally became violent, too. Furthermore, the system of education was completely unorganized, while the demand for Western training was almost to be called a craze. The few who could afford it went to England and America ; large numbers went to Japan, and it is curious to recall that among these were usually found the most contumacious and undisciplined ; and still, as the best universities and colleges in China were not numerous enough to provide for all who wanted a degree, hundreds of mushroom colleges sprang up with high-sounding titles, but no qualifications to deserve them. Many of them consisted of no more than thirty or forty youths who clubbed together to hire a teacher or two, and gave themselves degrees on the strength of most perfunctory studies.

Yet another reason of a very profound nature for the prevailing unrest among Chinese youth was the temporary disappearance of all ethical training due to the injudicious haste with which the Empress Dowager and her advisers, in 1905, had thrown overboard the Chinese classics, which through the national examinations had been the passport to public life, and substituted Western learning.

The effect upon the young generation of this sudden divorce from the elaborate ethical training in which the Chinese classics are steeped, while nothing was supplied in its place, was disastrous. As the late Professor Giles once said, a Chinese of the old school might not always do what was right, but he always knew what was right. Now he knew no longer, he had no moral grounding, he floated uncontrollably in an atmosphere of catchwords and turbulence, with no basis of principle to give him stability.

This was a state of affairs which could not last in a country like China. Whether the Chinese are a religious people or not is a much controverted question. But there is no doubt that a background of moral principle in life is as much a necessity to them as a head to a family and a link between all the families of the State and Heaven.

Confucius, who always maintained that he was not an originator, but only a purveyor of the wisdom of the ancients, in his minute teachings of propriety and the making of a *chun-tzu*, the true gentleman, catered for and cultivated this instinct. He did not create it, it was there already, and hence his eternal appeal to the Chinese people.

In the late 'twenties the Kuomintang, in a rage of iconoclasm against everything of the past, was shutting up Confucius's temples, erasing his birthday from the calendar of national festivities, banning his teachings. In the early 'thirties, they were reinstating him in every particular.


Again and again in the past two thousand five hundred years Confucius has been temporarily eclipsed by some passing fashion at court of Buddhism or Taoism. But always Confucius has returned to his own. Mr. William Paton, in that absorbing little book, *Christianity in the Eastern Conflicts*, the fruit of a tour of inquiry through the Far East in 1936-37, shows how in China 'young men are not so sure as they were that "science and Socialism will save the State"—a great slogan not so long ago,' and that everywhere they are seeking for an ethical, indeed a spiritual, basis for the life of the nation. It is interesting to recall that, just as the intermittent revivals of the Mosaic law among the Jews under such kings as Uzziah and Hezekiah were always the signal for national renaissance and prosperity, so it has been in China when Confucius has come to his own after transient eclipse.

One other feature may be remarked in the Chinese student movement, which was bound in the long run to improve its manners. The 'old school tie' spirit is nowhere more persistent than in China. Once a student, always a student. Politicians and diplomatists, bankers and business men, doctors, engineers, and professors never forget that they were students once, and retain their community of feeling with their younger brethren. Such an association, increasing year by year as fresh accretions of students grow up and pass into the world, cannot but develop into a mighty force. It may, for a while, be misdirected as it was in the 1920's, when everything was



CHINESE GIRL SOLDIERS

Some thousands of Chinese girls are actually in the Army fighting the Japanese. The one on the left is a well known member of the Communist guerrillas; the one on the right is a student.



GENERAL LI TSUNG-JEN

The Kwangsi leader, one of China's ablest Generals, author of the sanguinary defeat inflicted on the Japanese at Taierchuang in May, 1938.

misdirected, but in the end the better elements in it cannot fail to assert themselves, as indeed China has already proved in the past few years.

Even in the 1920's the student body could boast some extremely distinguished men and more than one notable accomplishment. It was the students who, in 1906, started the campaign against opium, which might have succeeded in stamping out the drug from China but for the Revolution and subsequent years of chaos. It was the students who, in 1919, aroused all China against the Allies' surrender to Japan of the ex-German possessions, and definitely stood out as the leaders of public opinion. And it was the students who first began to organize the miserably paid and overworked labourers in the mills of Shanghai, Tientsin, and Hankow, so that they might insist on better treatment. If the results were not at first encouraging, at least the motive deserves some praise.

Among the students, too, were numbered such men as the lovable and, alas, departed Dr. V. K. Ting, one of the most brilliant men Glasgow ever produced; Dr. Wu Lien-teh, the Cambridge scientist, who discovered the cause of the dread pneumonic plague; Dr. Wang Chung-hui, that humorous and most human little lawyer, product of Yale and the Middle Temple, codifier of China's laws, for several years one of the Judges at The Hague International Court, and owner of an iron will under his whimsical, unassuming manner; Dr. Hu Shih, the 'Sage of modern China,' who seems to have read and remembered everything ever written, without detriment to his common sense and natural charm, he is now Ambassador in Washington; 'T. V.' Soong of Harvard, already portrayed; Dr. Alfred Sze, for many years perhaps China's ablest representative abroad, applying the principles of humanity and simplicity to diplomatic intercourse with the success that often waits on novel methods; and, indeed, many more whom it seems invidious to omit, but that there is not room for them all.

If, with so much individual talent available, more was not achieved, the only answer is that China is a country of 5,000,000 square miles with a population of over

400,000,000, for the most part entirely illiterate, weighted with the conservatism of thousands of years; and that since the death of Yuan Shih-kai all the machinery of organized government had been very thoroughly smashed. China, in 1928, might not unfairly be compared to England at the end of the Wars of the Roses, with the added difficulty of being twenty-five times bigger and surrounded by a world a century ahead of her in mechanical civilization. With admittedly an enormous amount still to be done when Japan fell upon her, the wonder was that she had already done so much to set her house in order.

And in this accomplishment two tremendous innovations stand to the credit of the students alone, both of them moreover bearing directly on the life of the common people and, by the mental activities which they stimulated, contributing perhaps more than any other influence to the national awakening. These are the *pei hua* revolution, also called the Literary Renaissance; and the Thousand Characters Movement.

It should be understood that classical Chinese, in which all polite literature had been written for thousands of years, is an extremely ornate and difficult language, which it takes a long time to master and which, moreover, could not be spoken or verbally understood. That it held its own so long, in spite of attention frequently drawn to its manifold disadvantages, was due partly to its supplying a medium of communication among the many different dialects of the country, partly to the conservatism of many generations of literary Spenlows, for whom it was a case of 'Touch our writing and down comes the country.'

In complete contrast stands a mass of folk-lore, songs, and stories, the great dramas of the Mongol dynasty (when all the best plays were written), and innumerable novels, all written in the *pei hua*, the common spoken language of the people, based on the various dialects of mandarin, and sufficiently understood to form a *vade mecum* through most of China.¹

¹ Not, by the way, in Shanghai. The writer well remembers going out to dinner to meet a friend from Peking who spoke Pekingese, the most beautiful of all China's dialects, as easily as English. He arrived nearly an hour late, having been unable to make his rickshaw coolie understand where to go

Dr. Hu Shih has described in the lectures he gave at Chicago University in 1933 (published afterwards in America in book form, *The Chinese Renaissance*), how, while still at Columbia University, he began to meditate on the impossibility of progress in China while her classics remained a closed book to nine-tenths of her people; how a critical study of the folk-lore and great novels and dramas of the past convinced him that every period of literary inspiration, from the T'ang dynasty onwards, had always revealed itself through the *pei hua*; and how he decided that the classical style had had for far too long its day, and that the common tongue must henceforth be the vehicle of all literature.

Exactly in the same way Boccaccio had revolted against the faded Latin of fourteenth-century Italian society and had turned to the vigorous language of the people. Dr. Hu Shih set out his ideas in a magazine, *The Youth*, edited by his friend, Dr. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Dean of the College of Letters in Peking University; and they caught on like wild-fire. The old-fashioned scholars were shocked to the core. Professor Tawney, I think it is, has asked us to consider the emotions of an Oxford don on hearing that it was proposed to rewrite Shakespeare in the language of Cockaigne. But the champions of the old style could give no convincing reason for their faith, while adherents to the *pei hua* revolution multiplied themselves by thousands.

In the same way the modern generation of Chinese artists have rebelled against the 'ivory tower' school of painters, eternally producing beautiful paint poems of cloudy mountains, streams, and fairy pavilions, and have plumped for an art that reflects the everyday life of modern times. Some of the work of these young men is extraordinarily vigorous and taking. They have also turned their ideas to good account in the war by going about the villages and decorating them with war posters and cartoons.

But while Chinese publishing houses poured forth *pei*

and having got completely lost, until he was lucky enough to find someone who spoke both Pekingese and the Shanghai dialect. This would never have happened in Szechuan or Yunnan, still less in a northern province. But the Shanghai dialect is unique especially in ugliness. Twenty-five miles from the city no one understands it.

hua translations of the classics and of foreign novels, philosophy, and educational works, it still remained that far too few people could read them. Every Chinese parent is as eager that his sons shall have some education as a Scottish mother is that a son of hers shall 'wag his pow in a pu'pit.' But for most of them grinding poverty and the imperious need of wringing a bare living from the reluctant earth make this ideal impossible of attainment. Hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants pass all their lives, rising at dawn, working till nightfall, when they go to bed because artificial light is too expensive, and so depart as letter-less as they came.

During the Four Years War a young Chinese student of Yale, named James Yen, descendant of a long line of scholars in Western China, went with the American forces to France to take charge of some of the Chinese Labour Corps. The idea came to him of occupying their spare time by teaching them to read and write (in passing, it throws a vivid light on Chinese character that the coolies responded as eagerly as, later on, their fellows did at home). Thus was born the Thousand Characters Movement. James Yen restricted his teaching to a thousand essential Chinese characters. He hired a hall in Boulogne where the characters were thrown on a screen by magic lantern and duly explained. By this means a class of five hundred can be taught, but for classes of not more than thirty the characters are drawn on large pieces of paper.

So eager were the coolies to learn, that on his return to China after the war Yen resolved to devote himself to what came to be known as the Mass Education Movement. His list of characters was revised and increased to one thousand two hundred. Subsequently, for the benefit of more advanced pupils, a *People's Pocket Dictionary* of four thousand characters was published, by which practically anything in the *pei hua* can be read. But with only the one thousand two hundred it is actually possible for a peasant to learn to read and write and do simple sums enough for his needs by one hour's schooling a day for four months at a cost of six or seven shillings.

Within eighteen months of the Mass Education campaign

being launched—this was done at Chefoo in March, 1923, with the usual vast processions of students and street lectures—branches had been formed in thirty-two cities; and within four years 5,000,000 pupils and over 100,000 teachers, great numbers of whom gave their services free, were enrolled in the movement. Floating schools also were formed for the Chinese (about a third of the population) who live entirely in boats.

James Yen, however, did not stop at book education. With that part of his scheme well launched he set himself to the more difficult job of teaching the farmers how to improve their output of chickens, grain, and vegetables. One can easily imagine the farmers' reactions. "You teach us to read and write, which is what you understand," they would say, "and leave us to manage our fields, which is what we understand." But Yen persevered. He settled in a district called Tingsien, containing some 400,000 people not far south of Peking, where he obtained an acre and a half of ground for his experiments.

He impressed the farmers, first of all, by inventing an improvement to the irrigation pump they were using (at a guess, the pattern was the same as that used in the Chou dynasty; most of the common implements of rural China were perfected, say, 1000 years B.C., and have continued to give satisfaction ever since), which pumped twice the amount of water in a given time as the old pump with half the labour. And when his chickens, eggs, and crops appeared, raised by scientific methods, the farmers were 'fair amazed.' By common consent his acre and a half was increased to seventeen acres.

Popular lectures and demonstrations were given, and in time Yen was able to form a class of farmer pupils who, in the winter months when the cold of North China stops work in the fields, went round the country to spread the new learning. Great care was taken to teach methods that would be within the peasants' reach, since they cannot afford costly manures. James Yen got a generous grant of half a million dollars from American friends to which Chinese in America contributed a large sum. But from no Chinese official source would he take a penny, for fear of

being associated with any faction. Not the least surprising part of his enterprise is that he actually founded an agricultural magazine, *The Farmer*, in Tingsien. When one reflects that a Chinese peasant who could reckon year in year out on a steady income for himself and family of thirty-six pounds would be considered well-to-do, it may be imagined that there is not much to spend on current literature. Yet *The Farmer* contrived to be self-supporting.

The 'Tingsien experiment' became famous. Visitors from all parts came to see how it was worked, and similar undertakings sprang up in other provinces. To watch a Tingsien lecturer entering a new village was great fun. He would begin by marching up and down the main street with a banner and banging a drum. Having attracted a crowd—the difficulty in China is not to attract one—he would set up a little platform, mount upon it, and proceed to launch into a story, let us say, of how there were two farmers and how one was wise and rich, the other poor and foolish. At the right moment he would produce two chickens, the one fat and well-liking, the other thin and scrawny; or a couple of eggs, one large and plump, the other the conventional 'market egg' of China.

'Now which would you sooner have?' he would ask. And when the crowd gave no doubt of its preference: 'Then you must do so-and-so, and you will have as many chickens and eggs like mine as you please,' he would reply, and then the instruction began.

One wonders sadly what has become of Tingsien and all its promising imitators, for the Japanese have repeatedly marched across its fields, and whoever else may underrate the students' influence the Japanese military never have. They do not allow liberty of thought in their own students, so why should they do so among those of China? Apart from the special desire they probably have for vengeance on the students for the anti-Japanese boycotts of which they have been the centre, they rightly discern in them the source of ideals and ambitions most dangerous to their own dreams of aggrandizement.

Wherever the Japanese soldiers have gone in China they have made a dead set at every seat of learning. They did

so at Mukden, in 1931, when they seized the North-Eastern University, the only institution of higher education in Manchuria, and used it for barracks. In the first month of the present war, after occupying Tientsin, they systematically burnt the magnificent Nankai University to the ground. Before Christmas, 1937, they had destroyed over a hundred universities, colleges, and other educational establishments, according to reliable reports received by the Universities' China Committee in London.

But although their buildings have been gutted, the spirit of the students and their teachers has survived invincible. It is estimated that at least sixty million Chinese have been driven from their ruined homes in central and east China by the Japanese to find new homes in the west and south-west. Hundreds of thousands have died on the way. But among the survivors are many hundreds of students, girls as well as men, and professors who have tramped across China, a thousand miles or even more, to start new colleges in Szechuan and Yunnan. They have had to make shift with the most primitive accommodation, sometimes in caves, sometimes in disused stables, sometimes even in matsheds. Books were scarce, scientific apparatus still scantier. Food and lodging were of the barest order, a few cents a day being the average cost of a student's meals. But the Chinese are only too well accustomed to privations and have an unsurpassed genius for improvising and for 'making do' with the most meagre materials, and somehow the learning went on. Oxford University set the example, and other British universities have helped the Chinese students with books and apparatus; and though they are still terribly short of equipment they are in better state than when they set out on their brave adventure three years ago.

General Chiang has been criticized for refusing to allow the students to join the Army, on the ground that China will have far greater use for their brains after the war. It is a question on which there may be many points of view. Actually the students, both men and girls, have been helping considerably in the management of country clinics and hospitals, in starting the innumerable cottage industries

which are an important part of the development of South-west China, in first-aid posts behind the fighting line, and in political propaganda among the country folk to which the Government rightly attaches great weight. This propaganda, by the way, is of a most interesting kind, consisting not only of public speeches and posters, but of little plays enacted in village streets, all of course pointing the moral of resistance to the Japanese and faith in the new China that will come.

Those who have read Dr. Lin Yu-tang's exquisite Chinese novel, *Moment in Peking*, will remember the spirit of exaltation with which Mulan (surely one of the most adorable heroines in fiction) is taken as she joins in the march westwards of the millions of refugees :

‘Mulan, drawing near them, was seized with a new and strange emotion. She had a sense of her nation such as she had never had so vividly before, of a people united by a common loyalty and, though fleeing from a common enemy, still a people whose patience and strength were like the Great Wall, and as enduring. Amidst the stark privations and sufferings of the refugees, she had not heard one speak against the Government for the policy of resistance to Japan. All these people, she saw, preferred war to slavery, even though it was a war that had destroyed their homes, killed their relatives, and left them nothing but the barest personal belongings, their rice-bowls and their chopsticks. Such was the triumph of the human spirit. There was no catastrophe so great that the spirit could not rise above it and, out of its very magnitude, transform it into something great and glorious.’

CHAPTER VIII

THE EMANCIPATION OF CHINESE WOMEN

NO account of Chinese students would be complete without reference to the extraordinary manner in which Chinese girls have come to the front in the past twenty years. Liberty and Western education, moreover, which at one time appeared to be having unhappy effects on the young men, have acted with almost unvaried success upon the girls, revealing in them graces and character of which few had suspected them. The author remembers a missionary teacher's description of the transformation effected in Chinese girls by education.

'I never cease to be amazed at it,' she said. 'A new girl comes to us at the beginning of a term, dull and lumpish, awkward and shy, plain and ungraceful. In a few months we are rubbing our eyes at the change that has come upon her. She is bright, alert, full of intelligence, charming in manner, graceful in movement, and as often as not has become extremely pretty, certainly most taking. It is like a fairy changeling, except that the changelings in fairy stories were usually of the opposite kind.'

Dr. Lin Yu-tang's heroine, Mulan, mentioned in the last chapter, is the perfect type of the new Chinese girl. Another charming example is Pearl Buck's heroine in *East Wind, West Wind*, brought up according to old-fashioned etiquette, under which it was considered almost unpardonably audacious for a girl to peep through the screens at the men having their dinner, but in the end marrying a Western-trained doctor and becoming the ideal helpmate for him. These types are by no means idealized. As readers of the two books mentioned will agree, they have no resemblance to Dickens's stained-glass-window angels of the impossible Agnes Wickfield mould, but are thoroughly human girls ; and China is full of them. It is unnecessary to dwell on the

limitless influence which, as mothers of the coming generation, such girls can have on the nation's future.

One thing to be borne in mind is that China has never practised purdah as India does. The back-room seclusion of Chinese girls until recent years was the result of accident and the growth of custom, not of any religious or cultural tradition. Indeed in this latter respect the advantage was, or ought to have been, rather on the side of the Chinese woman than otherwise. The earliest known state of Chinese society was a matriarchate, the head of the tribe was a woman. To her was entrusted the care of the two most important possessions : seed, that is to say the family's food ; and silk, which in those far-off days was its money. Water was regarded as a female element, and only women were supposed to possess the virtue which made it possible to bring rain. Even when ancestor-worship took the place of worship of a ' Holy Place,' which was the first object of veneration for primitive Chinese tribes, it was a female ancestor that received the homage. The Yang and Yin, male and female principles, run through all Chinese philosophy intertwined in equal proportions ; and many of the appurtenances of marriage are symbols of the theory that marriage is an equal partnership.

Confucius seems to have had a poor opinion of women, after the manner of many philosophers. ' They are difficult creatures,' he said. ' Keep them at a distance and they are resentful ; treat them kindly and they become familiar.' He also said that, ' if my son divorces his wife, she ceases to be the mother of her son as surely as she ceases to be my son's wife.'

But against this one may set the invariable custom that a man's first wife is always the first lady in his household, entitled to share with him after death in ancestor-worship ; and if she is childless and her husband takes another wife or concubine, the son of the latter becomes the son of the first lady.¹

In the turbulent times of the Chou dynasty and the

¹ The deception practised by Rachel, with the assistance of her maid-servant, in order to remove the reproach of her childlessness (before the birth of Joseph and Benjamin) suggests that the same principle may have been recognized by the early Hebrews.

Warring Kingdoms, roughly from the twelfth to the third century B.C., muscular strength became the most important possession and women's position deteriorated. But under the Hans, who ruled for two centuries on each side of Christ, and under whom Chinese society became stabilized, women were decidedly prominent. The Empress Lu, wife of Kao Chu, the first Han Emperor, was a most despotic person: 'whom she would she set up and whom she would she put down.' Later in the dynasty women were admitted to public office and several of them attained high position.

One most distinguished woman was the Lady Pan Ch'ao. Widowed at the age of fifteen, she devoted herself to study, and became Court Historiographer in succession to her brother, who had fallen from grace. She then completed his work, *The Book of Han*, which contains the history of twelve Han Emperors.

Lady Pan Ch'ao was appointed Mistress of Poetry, Eloquence, and History. She also wrote a book on etiquette, *Lessons for the Female Sex*, which was very popular. Some of its precepts rather remind one of the quotation in *Mrs. Markham's History of France*, from an old French manual on the same subject: 'Ladies may wipe their lips on the table-cloth, but not their noses.'

Of the masterful woman, Empresses and near Empresses, like the infamous Madame Ko, foster-mother of the last Ming Emperor, a woman of equal fascination and ruthlessness, it is unnecessary to speak. The extraordinary personality of the 'Old Buddha,' the famous Empress-Dowager, who ruled China despotically for forty years till her death in 1908, is a familiar memory at least to all middle-aged people. Most Oriental countries have produced similar women who reigned 'from behind the curtain.' In China, however, it was not necessary in olden times for a woman to be born in the purple in order to gain distinction. The mighty encyclopædia compiled by order of the Emperor K'ang Hsi in 1727 recorded twenty-eight thousand women each of whom was outstanding under one of the fourteen categories of womanhood. The T'ang dynasty produced eight hundred women writers, and the Ch'ing, or Manchu, over a thousand.

Still for many centuries before the Revolution, beginning from the Sung dynasty (roughly contemporaneous with the Normans in England), women had had an entirely subordinate place in Chinese life, due partly to the spread of Buddhism, partly to the teachings of the later Confucian scholars, the Neo-Confucians. Unless a family were well-to-do, all its resources were devoted to the advancement of the sons. It was a toss-up whether the daughters received any education. There were no schools or colleges for them. The women of a family were kept altogether in the background. If a Chinese invited you to his house, he never thought of introducing you to his wife, nor would she act as hostess at his parties. When the writer went to China in 1907, even in cosmopolitan Shanghai, Chinese ladies were rarely seen in public, except in the theatre or when driving out in a tightly shut carriage. The only women one saw moving about freely were serving women or sing-song girls going from tea-house to tea-house in rickshaws with their amahs.

When a girl married she probably never even saw her bridegroom till the wedding ; if she did it was by stealth. Her marriage was arranged by professional match-makers and she had no say in it. After marriage she lived in the house of her husband's family (it was not the custom for Chinese sons of well-to-do families to leave the parental roof-tree when marrying) ; and there the little bride was hardly better than a slave to her mother-in-law. If, however, she bore a son her position became decidedly better. If her husband predeceased her, it was against all rules of propriety that she should marry again. A husband could divorce his wife at pleasure, but she could not divorce him. Her chief defence against capricious divorce was that the husband was required to disgorge the dowry he had got with her.

Initially, the betterment of Chinese girls is due to the missionaries, who naturally saw no reason when opening their schools why a girl should not as much be educated as a boy. And, in passing, the debt that modern China owes to the missionaries can hardly be estimated. Apart from the colleges and hospitals which they have actually founded

there is scarcely one that does not owe its inception to missionary influence consciously or unconsciously felt. Certainly the first step in the emancipation of Chinese girls was taken when the missionaries persuaded parents to send their daughters to their schools.

As time went on this tendency was strengthened by the number of foreign-trained students returning to China with new ideas acquired in the West. Some Chinese girls, too, began to go abroad. One of the most distinguished of these is Miss Tseng Pao-sun, granddaughter of the Viceroy Tseng Kuo-fan, who is commonly spoken of in China as the greatest Chinese of the past two hundred years. Miss Tseng completed her education at Blackheath High School and Westfield College in England, and returned to China to devote her life and her fortune to the cause of women. She founded Ifeng College for girls at Changsha, capital of Hunan, which might well be called the Girton of China. It has gone through some stormy times in the civil wars, particularly in the attack on Changsha by Communists in 1930, when a British gunboat helped to get the girls away to safety. But Ifeng has managed to survive its tribulations, and its prestige is deservedly high.

By the time of the Revolution in 1911 there was already a pronounced 'woman's movement.' As might be expected, some of its members, in the excitement of overthrowing the Emperors, went too far. In Canton they formed an Amazon Corps to fight against Peking, proclaimed the throwing off of parental restraints, and declared for free love and companionate marriage. All of which, of course, shocked their elders immeasurably.

Such extravagances, however, come and go, leaving no permanent scar behind them. The important thing was the steady development of the idea that girls were entitled to education and to a life of their own. The students' outburst against the Versailles Treaty, already described, gave a great, if indirect, impetus to the advancement of women. Besides schools and colleges founded for them, co-education became general in Chinese universities, the idea being borrowed from America to which by far the greatest number of Chinese students have been going for the past fifty years.

The change in the whole public attitude towards women was well expressed to the writer by an elderly merchant from an extremely conservative district. 'When I was young,' he said, 'nobody thought of schools for girls; they weren't considered necessary. Now everyone is asking for them, and girls' schools are springing up everywhere.'

It is somewhat significant that among the multitudinous new laws which poured from Nanking in the first years of the Nationalist Government, two of the few that did not prove sterile affected the rights of women.

The first, promulgated in 1929, gave to a daughter equal rights with her brothers in the division of their parents' estate. Within a few weeks of this law's coming into force a girl at Tsinanfu, in Shantung, had successfully asserted her rights under the law.

The second innovation gave to a wife for the first time the right to divorce her husband on various grounds which, broadly, correspond with those of the English divorce laws. I have no record of a wife suing for divorce, which, in fact, is rather contrary to Chinese taste. But what may be considered an extension of this law involved a very famous personage in China, Miss Butterfly Wu, China's leading film star.¹ Miss Wu had been betrothed by her parents to a man she did not wish to marry, and in China an engagement is considered almost as binding as a marriage. Miss Wu brought an action to uphold her right to break the engagement, and won it. She afterwards married the man of her choice in the Anglican Cathedral of Shanghai, when special police had to be put on duty to control the vast crowds of Chinese who assembled to see her drive to and from church.

It may be added that the re-marriage of a widow is no longer regarded as immoral.

In other directions, however, legislation was less fortunate, notably as regards women workers in factories. Industrialization is still comparatively novel in China, and has given rise to all the evils that accompanied it in England a century ago. The plight of all factory workers, who include

¹ Before the war China was building up a very promising native cinema, which made a number of films, adaptations of Chinese plays.

a high proportion of women, was an open scandal before the war. Payment was on starvation level, hours cruelly long, and conditions of work even in the best factories intolerable. In 1932 the Government produced a factory law that was full of good intentions, perhaps too full. The standard that it aimed at was far too high in relation to the prevailing state of affairs in the mills for hope of realization. In this respect the war cloud may prove to have had a silver lining for the workers, by enabling an entirely fresh start to be made. The fundamental aim of the Left Wing is a better life for peasants and labourers ; and among all the leading men of China a conscience has been awakened towards these patient millions which should bear fruit in better conditions for them after the war.

On the question of slave girls it is perhaps better not to touch. In this one runs against one of the most ancient and intractable customs of China. I believe it would be fair to say that the vast majority of Chinese slave girls are far from badly used, and they certainly never have caused that demoralization among their owners that slavery did among the white slave-owners. On the other hand, new China is quick to see that the moral feeling of the world is against slavery. The best way of abolishing it is to secure a better living for the masses. Parents compelled to sell their daughters because they could not feed them in times of flood and famine have always been the most prolific source of slavery.

Chinese girls have taken kindly to dancing, to Western styles of doing their hair, and to Western dresses. But *naturam expellas*—even modern China has not overcome the horror with which a girl who shows her neck and arms is regarded. Hence the westernized evening frocks are made with long sleeves and high collars.

Athletics have also greatly attracted Chinese girls, particularly net-ball, lawn tennis, running, and swimming. These tastes are by no means confined to the big Treaty ports. In 1932 an Olympic Games meeting was held at Hangchow, to which two thousand young men and girls came to compete from all the provinces of China. The point to notice is that each of the large number of girl

competitors was the pick of still larger numbers doing the same sort of things in her native province.

The use that Chinese girls are making of their new opportunities is shown by the numbers of them to be found in every kind of occupation. Probably, as in other countries, the majority train as hospital nurses or teachers. But there were women on the Central Political Council, the highest Government organ, and many girls in the Government departments at Nanking before the war.

One of these, a Miss Liu Man-chin, in the years 1928-29, undertook a mission for the Government which would have done credit to any man. At that time the Dalai Lama of Tibet was out of temper with Nanking, and Miss Liu undertook to go to Lhasa and soothe him down. It was a horrific journey of fully two thousand miles each way through the most difficult country, beset moreover by bandits. Yet, accompanied only by a few servants, Miss Liu successfully made the journey, persuaded the Dalai Lama into the desired agreement, and returned in triumph.

Quite a number of girls become doctors or lawyers. A celebrated instance of the latter is Miss Soumay Cheng, who was trained in Paris. She became known in the Chinese courts as a most redoubtable advocate. The litigant who had her on his side was generally regarded as having won his case before it began. Miss Cheng was President of the Nantao District Court, in Shanghai's southern suburb, in 1930. There was even a bank in Shanghai managed entirely by women.

Of course, the most famous of all modern Chinese women for her own qualities as well as her position, is Madame Chiang Kai-shek. She and her two sisters are as remarkable a trio as the world can show, all extremely handsome and endowed with first-class brains and character.

Ai-ling Soong, the eldest, married Dr. H. H. Kung, the Premier, who came to England as China's representative at the Coronation of King George VI. She is witty, an excellent talker, a fine manager, equally popular in foreign and Chinese society, a born hostess with an equal flair for politics and light conversation. With her handsome face and dignified carriage, one can easily visualize her at the head of one of the great *salons* of the eighteenth century.

Ching-ling Soong, who married Dr. Sun Yat-sen, is the very antithesis of her elder sister, tiny and fragile, one might say 'a dainty rogue in porcelain,' only that the word 'rogue' would be too inapplicable to her steady self-effacement. Yet she can be capable of great passion, as in the episode previously described of her lecturing the Kuomintang at Nanking on their misdeeds. She has always devoted herself to the cause of the under-dog. When last heard of she was living in the simplest style, in a tiny house in Hongkong with one maidservant, giving all her time to collecting money and comforts for wounded Chinese soldiers. There are those who would not hesitate to call her the greatest of all three sisters.

May-ling, the youngest, was at the time of her marriage to General Chiang, in 1927, one of the most beautiful girls I have ever seen. I shall never forget the first time I met her when I was calling on Madame Kung. She came into the room from visiting friends, dressed in a very becoming black and silver frock of Chinese cut, with silver fox fur hanging loosely over her shoulders. Without effort or trace of pretentiousness she seemed to fill the room with charm and sparkle. It is said—possibly one of 'Good old Ben's' efforts, though it may well be true—that when she was at Wellesley in America, Hollywood tried to get her for the films. But she preferred to go back and use her brains and abilities in China as, indeed, she has done. Incidentally, she distinguished herself greatly during her school days at Summit, New Jersey, and afterwards at college, where she was the first student from the Far East to win the Wellesley and Durant scholarships.

She married General Chiang in 1927 and has ever since been his constant companion and counsellor, acting for him as interpreter in interviews with foreigners and accompanying him in his aeroplane over thousands of miles of China. Her bravery was sufficiently shown in that flight to Sianfu during her husband's captivity. Her energy during the war in every kind of work, from the reorganization of the soldiers' medical treatment—which was terribly deficient in early days of the fighting—to the founding of cottage industries for the refugees in South-west China, has been

astonishing ; while her writings and broadcasts have done much to put China's case before the world, especially in America. Madame Chiang is nearly forty-four, but she looks much younger, and indeed shows little outward trace of her arduous life. Her influence upon General Chiang in humanizing, and rubbing off the rough corners of his rather dour character has been extremely happy.

Like all her family Madame Chiang is a Christian, and not long after her marriage she converted her husband to Christianity, which, like everything that he does, he takes very seriously. It is a remarkable fact and, if nothing else, a proof of the natural tolerance of the Chinese, that so many men in the Government, or in high position, are Christians—General Chiang, Dr. Kung, Mr. T. V. Soong, Dr. C. T. Wang, and many more of their subordinates.

At the beginning of the war Madame Chiang was Secretary-General of the Chinese Air Force, but she gave this up after the Government retreated to Hankow on the fall of Nanking. It is usually believed that the Russian aviators who came to Hankow as instructors made difficulties about having a woman over them. She has found plenty of work, perhaps more suitable for her, tending many of the wounded with her own hands, visiting the battle lines on comfort missions, inspiring other workers, acting as her husband's amanuensis.

What part may be reserved for Madame Chiang in China after the war, one can only guess. It is said that she finds it difficult to get over her prejudice against the Communists. She does not forgive them for the kidnapping of her husband. If this is really the case, it may lead to undesirable friction just when China most needs unity for the work of reconstruction. And there can be little doubt that in that work the demands of the Left Wing will count for a good deal.

Even during the war there have been some awkward passages between the Left Wing and the old-fashioned Kuomintang (both, by the way, are absolutely agreed on the point of resistance to Japan ; it is only over the method to be employed that they have jangled). But General Chiang has managed to hold the balance very skilfully between them. And the great, rather touching, most

impressive feature of the Chiang-May-ling marriage is the perfect partnership it has realized. If this were merely a question of domestic happiness, and it assuredly is that as well, considerations of taste might forbid one from dwelling on it. But they are both public personages, with the strongest sense of public duty ; and in this respect their community of purpose, mutual understanding, and almost hourly exchange of ideas have already worked for good in China, and should do so more and more.

Speculation on the future of Madame Chiang is only the most conspicuous instance of the speculation that the future of all Chinese women excites. Their emancipation in the past quarter of a century has led them in the war through many hard and testing experiences. More than forty thousand Chinese women have undergone military training and have actually fought in battle, many being killed or wounded. A considerable number are out with the guerrillas who harass the Japanese so exhaustingly. Many more are working in first-aid posts and military hospitals. Others assist in shepherding the hordes of refugees to new homes in the west ; in salvaging orphaned children from the defenceless villages so cruelly bombed by the Japanese aeroplanes ; in managing little country clinics among the new-comers in the west ; in superintending the foundation of cottage industries in western China ; in travelling about in occupied as well as unoccupied China, giving entertainments in song and drama, spreading the Mass Education Movement, and always preaching the meaning of patriotism and the supreme need of never yielding to Japan.

It goes without saying that women who have gone through such experiences can never be quite the same again. Realities such as they never dreamt of in the sheltered Government departments of the past, or even in the more exciting spheres of medicine or the law, will have awakened in them demands for China and for their children which will have to be satisfied.

Already, before the war, the amazing development in the status of Chinese women had begun to arouse misgivings among some of their leaders. Was the process of emancipation to be extended to all the masses of Chinese women ?

What then was to become of their homes and of family life, so sacred by all Chinese tradition? Are all the old virtues and standards to be discarded for Western modes? Is divorce really the cure for ill-fated marriages? Would it not be better in the general interest that a few marriages should remain ill-fated but undissolved, rather than rush to the promiscuous associations and easy dissolutions which divorce laws facilitate and lax thinking encourage in some countries?

Such questions were being earnestly canvassed before the war by leading feminists such as Miss Pao-sen Tseng, Mrs. Wu Lien-teh (wife of the Cambridge scientist mentioned in the preceding chapter), Mrs. Jen Hun-chun, better known in China by her maiden name of Miss Sophia Chen. And all alike seem to conclude that the only solution lies in a thorough knowledge and careful preservation of the old culture and civilization of China.

That conviction one can see at work in all modern China. Already many instances might be quoted to show how the Chinese are selecting from Western practices those things which accord best with their taste and canons—from the reviving preference for Chinese rather than foreign-style clothes to the harmonizing of Russian-taught Communism with the immemorial instincts of China. It is particularly significant that a great scholar like Dr. Hu Shih, with all the classics of his own country and the West at his finger-tips, inspired the *pei hua* revolution, not to overthrow the classics, but to make them available to every reader in the land.

The development of this critical sense, which seeks to combine all that is best in the culture of old China with what it borrows from the instruction of the West, is one of the most eloquent proofs of the real awakening of the Chinese. And one may be confident that nowhere will it be better exemplified than among her women.

The spirit of the Lady Pan Ch'ao, who wrote her manual on behaviour for the female sex nineteen centuries ago, is strong in all of them; and the terrible experience of the war years will only have intensified that desire for the sweet harmonious things of life which the best literature and art inspire. Perhaps if Confucius could return to China after the war he might be a little less acid in his views of her women.

CHAPTER IX

THE GENERALISSIMO

IT is strange to think that the same age should have produced such men as Hitler and Mussolini on the one side, and on the other the late Kemal Ataturk and the late General Metaxas, and General Chiang Kai-shek.

To present 'the Generalissimo,' as he is always called, in this manner is to classify him with the Dictators. It would be idle to pretend that he is anything else. After years of struggling with opponents, some open, some capable only of sordid intrigue, he has attained to a position of absolutely unquestioned authority. That 'the Generalissimo says so' is sufficient for his countrymen, whose faith in him amounts almost to superstition.

Yet even the bitterest of his former enemies would admit that Chiang's dictatorship is of a very special order. Where other dictators degenerate into tyrants, compelled to rush from excess to excess in order to retain their position, Chiang's nature has only broadened and sweetened as he became more absolute. His marriage and his conversion to Christianity have had a great influence on his character. But even these influences could not have produced the man of high resolution, far-sightedness, and magnetic power that General Chiang is now, if the ingredients had not already been present in his nature. I remember asking a certain diplomatist (a man of extremely detached views, who never erred in over-emphasis) what he thought of General Chiang. "A great patriot," he answered, with positive fervour. It would be possible to argue that Chiang is only a dictator for the necessity of fighting against dictatorship, first Communism, then the Kuomintang, now the ambitions of military Japan. One thing is certain. Chiang to-day is not only the leader of China. He is China.

What the Japanese think of him is shown by the fact that after Prince Konoye, the Prime Minister, had declared in January, 1938, that Japan would no longer recognize nor have any dealings with him, they have since been obliged to eat their words. On several occasions Japanese Ministers and Foreign Office spokesmen have announced that, 'if General Chiang will repent,' it will be quite easy for him to have peace with Japan. During the weeks before these lines were being written, it is well known that the Japanese were privately angling for peace with Chungking. The shameful treaty which they induced Wang Ching-wei, head of their puppet Government in Nanking, to sign with them on November 30, 1940, in return for the empty honour of recognizing him as President of the Republic of China, seems to indicate that they have given up hope of squaring Chiang. But there is not the slightest doubt that if he showed any inclination to be cajoled into a compromise they would throw over Wang to-morrow.

The Japanese appreciation of what Chiang means to China is also shown by the fervour with which they try through their spies to hunt him down and destroy him. It is widely believed, and quite possible, that they thought he was travelling with Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, the British Ambassador, when their aeroplanes made a murderous attack on the latter's car between Nanking and Shanghai in August, 1937.

In the summer after that General Chiang had a particularly narrow escape. He had spent the night at a little village in Honan during a tour of the battle area and left about 7 a.m. Within an hour Japanese aeroplanes arrived and bombed the whole village to a heap of rubble. He is said to be more cautious nowadays in exposing himself to danger from the Japanese. But amongst his own countrymen he moves about freely and without ceremony or ostentation of any kind.

In appearance General Chiang is of medium height and slenderly built, with lofty forehead, long nose, and large liquid eyes, and exquisitely shaped hands. Dressed in a long pale mauve silk gown (before the war he preferred civilian dress), with the inevitable fan, he would be taken

for the ordinary Chinese gentleman chiefly interested in books and birds and flowers. But one cannot talk to him for five minutes without being impressed by his personality. He is naturally taciturn, and has a way of shooting out a question rather like a military command, ruminating for a while, and then shooting out another. His visitor quickly learns to reply with equal brevity and directness. Like many great men he never seems to be hurried or particularly busy, though, in fact, the work he gets through in the day-time would appal most men. His coolness is almost super-human. In China's darkest hours he has never lost his serenity and confidence. It is an extraordinary fact—which incidentally throws a flood of light on Chinese character—that in the war council which he summoned after the fall of Hankow in October, 1938, three-quarters of the time was spent in discussing the philosophic aspects and moral principles involved in continuing resistance to the Japanese, which, as a thing in itself, was taken for granted by all present.

The weak point in Chiang's nature is obstinacy, as shown by the years of futile warfare that he waged on the Communists, though it is fair to say that in those years (1931-36) the Communists were not in a state of mind with which even the Chinese talent for compromise would have had much hope of success.

The best points in his character are his ability to see the one essential thing to be done and to stick to it; and his faithfulness in carrying out a promise. He does not make many, but once he has given his word he is indefatigable in keeping it, whatever the inconvenience to himself.

General Chiang Kai-shek¹ was born at the village of Fenghwa, near Ningpo, at the mouth of the Yangtze in 1886. His family had been associated with the local salt industry for many generations, but he very early declared that he would be a soldier. By his own account he gave his mother, who had been left a widow while Chiang was

¹ In mandarin the name is written Chiang Chieh-shih. 'Kai-shek' is the Cantonese pronunciation. In Canton he first became well known, and it would be absurd not to use the form of his name by which he has become world famous.

in his teens, much trouble. But this may be only the self-deprecatory convention that every Chinese would use in speaking of his relations with his parents. He went through the leading military academy at Paotingfu, a hundred miles south of Peking, and from there to the Tokyo Military Staff College. It was while he was in Japan that he became acquainted with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and joined the T'ung Men Hui, the revolutionary party, which was the nucleus of the Kuomintang. He returned to China to fight in the Revolution of 1911, and the so-called Second Revolution against Yuan Shih-kai in 1913, which ended in the Nationalists' discomfiture and the flight abroad of all their principal leaders.

Thenceforward Chiang Kai-shek was closely associated with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whom he accompanied into exile. The following seven years of penury and retreat were among the most formative in Chiang's life, since they gave him plentiful opportunity to observe, and profit by, the incoherence of the revolutionaries and their incorrigible tendency to dissipate their energy in grandiose, impracticable schemes. In 1920 he seems to have got disgusted with the whole movement, for he gave up soldiering and tried his hand at exchange broking, though with little success.

But in 1922 Dr. Sun set up a new Republic in Canton, styling himself Generalissimo, and Chiang Kai-shek became his chief of staff, went to Moscow for some months to study military science, and returned to found and direct his famous academy for officers at Whampoa, a suburb of Canton. The Whampoa cadets were exceedingly smart, well trained, something altogether new in the officer class of China. There is no doubt that Chiang was an able soldier. He had the reputation at one time of never having lost a battle, though it certainly took him four years' hard campaigning to best the Communists. On the other hand, the ease and speed wherewith he crushed the formidable revolt of the Kwangsi Generals at Wuchang in the spring of 1929 revealed him as a fine strategist.

The interesting feature of the final years of Russian Communist ascendancy over Chinese Nationalism (1926-27) was the growth of Chiang's distaste for the Communist

association. As previously mentioned, he had a violent quarrel with Borodin early in 1926, and, with the aid of his Whampoa cadets, he did expel some of Borodin's Russian assistants. The quarrel was patched up, but Chiang's mistrust of the Russian association was more and more shared by all the level-headed Nationalists.

This feeling became one of absolute horror when, on the flight of the Northern troops from Nanking, the Red Army, commanded by General Chen Chien, were set on to an indiscriminate assault on the foreigners in the city, in which two British subjects, one American, and a French, and an Italian priest were killed, and several foreigners were wounded. The remainder only escaped under the protection of a heavy barrage put down by H.M.S. *Emerald* and the American destroyers *Noa* and *Preston*.

There is a good deal of reason to believe that the Nanking outrage was deliberately planned by the extremists in order to discredit Chiang with the foreign Powers and throw the rising Right Wing movement into confusion. It did not succeed, however, perhaps because at that time the attitude of all the Powers towards the revolutionaries (except Great Britain which was then in the full tide of Sir Austen Chamberlain's appeasement policy as it would now be called) was 'a plague on both your houses.' And in the upshot Chiang came into grace and favour; 'the dog it was that died.'

In March, 1927, when Chiang arrived in Shanghai from up-river, conditions in the district were most serious. While the Foreign Settlements remained safely guarded within the strong ring of the foreign Defence Force, the twenty thousand men sent by Great Britain having now been augmented by several thousand Americans and French native troops from Indo-China, the surrounding districts were at the mercy of the Communists and the rabble of bad characters which naturally spring up in the wake of all such agitations.

Whether the Hankow Government would have been able to impose authority and order, is now only an interesting speculation. But while Chiang had kept his own well-trained troops with him, it must be remembered that the

average provincial army in those days was little better than a band of brigands, with leaders in keeping, feared and detested by all peaceful citizens, and there appeared every reason to fear that all China south of the Yangtze would dissolve in a bloody chaos as it had done in the T'aiiping Rebellion. Night after night the skies around Shanghai were lit up by fires, and from the interior, whence all the missionaries had had to flee, came terrible reports of arson, pillage, and slaughter. Peking was far away and, in any case, powerless. The need of some strong hand to restore order was urgent.

That need was filled by General Chiang. The big Chinese bankers at Shanghai were ready enough to support him. Among the Right Wing Nationalists there were, at first, considerably divided views as to the attitude to be taken towards Hankow and the Communists. But the revelations of Moscow's designs disclosed by Marshal Chang Tso-lin's raiding of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, and perhaps, even more, the insulting tone in which Moscow wrote of the Chinese leaders and Generals, brought the waverers round to Chiang's side, and without more ado he proceeded to exterminate the Communists round Shanghai.¹ With the expulsion of the Russians, the Nationalist capital was transferred to Nanking.

One cannot look back on this period of General Chiang's career with any pleasure. Probably he does not himself. But neither China, nor any other country in such a state of passion as China was then, is to be judged by the standards of law and respect for human life which ordinarily prevail in civilized countries. It was a case of kill or be killed, and there is no telling where the Kilkenny cat process would have stopped if Chiang had not been ruthless.

The march on Peking, the flight and death of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the civil wars with the Kwangsi Generals in 1929 and the Northern Generals in 1930, and the first injudicious, over-ambitious, futile years of the Kuomintang Government have already been described. To trace in detail all the jealousies and intrigues against General Chiang

¹ The actual commander in the fighting with the Communists at Shanghai was General Pai Chung-hsi. But the chief responsibility was General Chiang's.

would be as wearisome as it is unnecessary. They have nothing to do with the story of the awakening of China, except in so far as they serve to deepen the feeling that the cause of the Chinese people was always Chiang's cause.

What were his thoughts in the years between the setting up of the capital at Nanking and the Japanese rape of Manchuria, Madame Chiang may know, but no one else. He was living at this time very simply in a modest house on the slopes of Purple Mountain, outside Nanking, near Dr. Sun Yat-sen's tomb, and keeping himself as far as possible aloof from the interminable committee meetings and exasperating delays of the raw new Government in its raw new city.¹ He took great pleasure in the company of young people, whom he liked to have with him at dinner after the toils of the day—like Herbert Spencer, though without that stony philosopher's inhuman habit, when he tired of their prattle, of asking them a question 'which they could not answer without some thought as, for instance : "Why does a duck waddle when it walks?"' But there was little that went on in China of which General Chiang was not informed.

Twice he resigned from office ; the first time in the summer of 1927, due to the feeling aroused by his stern dealing with Hankow. The second time was in the autumn of 1931. The Canton junta, safely removed from contact with the Japanese, had raised a furious clamour against Chiang's failure to react drastically to the seizure of Mukden. Probably Chiang thought it would do them good to have

¹ Nanking, as it was for nearly seventy years after the overthrow of the T'aipings, was one of the loveliest, dreamiest old cities in the world. Most of its buildings, including, alas, the Porcelain Tower, had been destroyed, and within the twenty-three miles enclosure of its noble walls, dating from the Ming dynasty, so broad that a couple of carriages could have been driven abreast on the top, three-quarters of the ground was open country sprinkled with bamboo copses, abounding in game, while on the lakes around the wall fishermen filled their boats with the aid of cormorants. But this was scarcely the sort of modern capital which the Nationalists desired, and there came a wholesale uprooting of old landmarks and pulling down of crazy houses to make way for new roads and Government offices, often with very scant regard for the rights of property-owners and with much land speculation at their expense by dishonest politicians. But the methods improved later, and by 1937 Nanking had become a very imposing city with broad boulevards radiating from a huge centre and some magnificent Government buildings, most of which the Japanese have wantonly destroyed.

some personal experience of the difficulties and responsibilities of office. He accordingly resigned, and the Canton group came up to Nanking to form a Government. They soon had enough of it, especially when the fighting spread to Shanghai, and General Chiang took up the burden again in February, 1932, with the title of Chairman of the National Military Council, a post he has retained ever since, with others of a more expressly political character added to it from time to time. He has never, by the way, been President of the Republic of China, that position being filled by a venerable scholar named Lin Sen.

At what time Chiang realized that sooner or later China would have to fight Japan is not clear. By the summer of 1931 the Chinese Communists, who had scattered from Hankow on the expulsion of the Russians, had got together in the mountainous country of southern Kiangsi and had created a formidable state which extended right up to the Yangtze, and eastwards along its northern bank through the province of Anhui to within measurable distance of Nanking. At the heyday of their power it was estimated that there were 80,000,000 people in some of the richest lands in China living completely under the Communists' authority. Not a few people were prophesying that the Communists would eventually take Nanking. True to his usual practice of dealing with one thing at a time, Chiang decided that before any resistance could be offered to the Japanese this rival power must be cut out of the body of China. He sent some troops to assist in the defence of Shanghai in February, 1932, but otherwise made no attempt to resist Japan's rape of Manchuria, which indeed would have been futile, and for four weary years he concentrated all his attention on the immensely expensive task of subduing the Reds.

Looking back one cannot but speculate whether there might not have been some other way of dealing with the Communists. But it is not for the outsider to say, seeing how much there is which he can never know of the circumstances of the case. Both Chiang and the Communists were very different from what they are now, he, perhaps, still being inclined to look at things from a military point of

view, while they were still under the influence of their Moscow teaching.

The only conclusion of the matter is that in 1931 China was still badly discordant and fissiparous, no less in Government circles than throughout the country. The Nationalists' victory over Peking had touched but a fraction of the nation. The proudly proclaimed unification of China was the most transparent pretence. In their eagerness to see China free and taking her equal place among the nations—the consummation of which was their grand claim to popular support—the Nationalists neglected the obvious necessity of taking first things first. They reminded one of 'the self-made Chicago merchant's' saying that 'Your head may be so full of grand and noble thoughts that you haven't time to think of the dandruff on your collar, but most people won't let you get near enough to explain that.' In their impatience the Nationalists grasped at everything and achieved nothing. The result was frustration, disillusion, and the normal tendency to blame everyone but themselves. New vital forces were working underneath the surface, but it needed the shock of Japanese aggression give to them the cohesive impetus and direction.

One indication of General Chiang's thoughts was his engagement, early in 1929, of a number of German officers led by the late Colonel Bauer,¹ who had been Chief of Staff to Ludendorff, to train his army. Their numbers were increased to about one hundred, and there is no question but that they served China very faithfully, although it is said that they were often driven to despair by the Chinese failure to follow up a success against the Japanese—perhaps an unconscious relic of the habits of the civil wars, when it was the practice to leave a beaten adversary a loophole of escape, on the sound principle that you never knew when you might need similar consideration. The German officers are also credited with the planning of China's 'Hindenburg Line' among the hills and lakes around Soochow, a naturally strong position about fifty

¹ Colonel Bauer had only been a few weeks in China when he caught small-pox, and died at Hankow immediately after General Chiang's defeat of the revolting Kwangsi Generals. Subsequently General von Falkenhausen became leader of the German instructors.

miles west of Shanghai. Unfortunately the Chinese hung on too long at Shanghai, their retreat became a rout, and the 'Hindenburg Line' proved useless.

The Germans stayed in China until the summer of 1938 when, under pressure from Japan, Hitler told them to come back to Germany. Most of them were very sorry to go.

'The Generalissimo's Own,' as Chiang's army is called, between its German trainers and officers largely drawn from General Chiang's old academy at Whampoa, became an extremely efficient force of about 300,000 men. Some observers said sardonically that Chiang had merely created it in order to overawe his opponents according to the time-honoured practice of Chinese warlords. Up to a point there may have been some truth in this gibe, though plenty of justification could be found in the uncertain state of the times. But one cannot doubt that General Chiang was looking ahead and across the seas. His passionate cry: 'Give me only ten years,' is proof enough of that. No one knew better than he that the slipshod style of the average Chinese army could never beat the Japanese.

He became fervently interested in aviation and engaged a number of American instructors. Then it occurred to Mussolini to make a great show of friendship for China, and he presented Chiang with an aeroplane. Inspired by the performance of Italian planes, the Chinese Government ordered several and engaged Italian experts to build an aerodrome in Kiangsi. But the Italian aeroplanes needed a particular kind of petrol unprocurable in China; and the experts bolted directly the war with Japan began, leaving the aerodrome unfinished, a desertion which the Chinese felt keenly. Altogether the Italian name was mud in China.

In other respects than military efficiency 'the Generalissimo's Own' was unique. There is a strong strain of the Puritan in General Chiang. He never tried to impose his religious beliefs on his men, as Feng Yu-hsiang did in his Christian days, but he founded an Officers' Club, whose members were pledged to every kind of puritanical abstention. Drinking, smoking, and card-playing were strictly

taboo ; eating must be of the simplest kind ; frivolity of any sort was rigidly eschewed. To be a member of the Officers' Club in Chiang's army was a high honour, and was only attained after a long testing period to prove the candidate's worthiness of it.

And this fittingly brings us to that most remarkable reformation (it is assuredly not unworthy of the name) inaugurated by General Chiang in March, 1934—the New Life Movement. It seems to have been started almost by accident, although the germs of it had been traceable in Chiang's speeches for three years previously, and are certainly visible in the Officers' Club.

The story goes that one day at Nanchang, the headquarters of his campaign against the Communists, General Chiang was horrified by the sight of a student, with clothes all awry and cigarette hanging from his lip, brawling and shrieking in the street. The sight prompted him to a fiery discourse on the evils of bad manners, slovenliness, lack of decorum, and popular degeneracy all round. National regeneration, he declared, would never be won until each individual had amended his personal habits and his attitude towards other individuals.

With the usual Chinese passion for drawing up regulations—in which they are unrivalled—the idea thus born was expanded into a code entitled the New Life Movement, with eight main headings and minute subdivisions. The whole is too long for full quotation, but some of the chief injunctions will be interesting :

Of eating.—Good manners and table etiquette are imperative ; sit straight ; don't throw bits of food on the floor ; don't make a noise in drinking or chewing ; don't smoke ; don't drink.

Of clothing.—Keep your clothes clean and in good order ; doff the hat when bowing, at public meeting-places, in entering a room ; carry a handkerchief and use it properly.

Of travel.—Walk on the left side ; do not loaf, but don't hustle to overtake others. Don't eat while walking. Don't push and scramble when buying your railway ticket, but wait your turn. Lend a hand to old, young, or women, in train or steamer. Don't make noises in public.

Of work.—Concentrate, persevere, don't procrastinate, don't complain, be punctual, obey your superiors, play fair, don't take bribes.

Of recreations.—Control your emotions and your temper. Don't gamble, eradicate prostitution, choose only wholesome amusements.

Of social contacts.—Don't speak before others have finished ; don't gossip on idle topics for above fifteen minutes ; refrain from bad words and violence ; prevail upon others with right instead of might ; be polite, chivalrous, and humble to women ; don't indulge in useless entertainments ; economize on weddings and funerals ; don't invite guests to smoke ; don't borrow unless in dire need.

The sections on eating and housing also include several rules of a purely hygienic nature, such as injunctions to 'drink several bowls of water' on rising, to kill rats, flies, mosquitoes, etc. The educational section bids you to 'keep yourself up to date with the happenings in your own country and abroad,' and 'frequently participate in instructive meetings'—the latter, perhaps, a faint echo of the baptismal service's injunction that the infant shall be called upon 'to hear sermons.'

Reformers are ever prone to excess, and it is obvious that converts to the New Life Movement were being tried too high for poor human nature. To forbid smoking, drinking, eating while walking, and gossiping on idle topics 'for above fifteen minutes,' was indeed a counsel of perfection, let alone that many people would demur to making perfection dependent on such trifles.

Furthermore, cleanliness and poverty are not easily mated. The unutterable squalor of 90 per cent of China's population, multitudes of whom produce large families in tiny one-roomed wattle or mud huts, with the earth for flooring, where public sanitation and laid-on water are simply unknown, makes the injunctions on clothing and lodging sound like a mockery.

Yet, for all the apparent difficulties, the New Life has met with astounding success which has spread and deepened with succeeding years. Travellers report that there is a notable improvement in manners on the railway and less vacuous staring and aimless jostling in the street. 'New

Life' weddings have become very popular, particularly, one may imagine, with the parents. For centuries the extravagant celebration of marriages and funerals has been the most prolific means of self-ruination in China. Now it is an everyday event to have twenty or thirty couples married simultaneously by a Government official, after which all sit down together to a common feast, the total expenses of each amounting to only a few dollars.

The reason for the popularity of the New Life is that, apart from certain evident borrowings from American puritanism like not smoking or drinking, it is simply the teaching of Confucius compressed and rewritten in modern phraseology, from the grand doctrine of reciprocity—'do not do to others what you would not have them do to you'—to the injunction 'not to sit on a mat that is not straight'; and from this fine definition of goodness:

'In private life, courteous; in public life, diligent; in relationships, loyal. This is a maxim that no matter where you may be, even amid the barbarians of the east or north, may never be set aside'¹

to the dictum that 'to tell in the lane what you have heard on the high road is to throw merit away'—which bears a close affinity to the New Life's warning against idle gossip.

Confucius, it may perhaps be recalled, not only taught great moral truths, but also a minute code of everyday courtesy and etiquette, from which any number of parallels to the rules of the New Life might be quoted.

In his inaugural speech at the launching of the movement, General Chiang explicitly exhorted his audience to return to the Confucian virtues of courtesy and good manners, justice and uprightness, frugality and integrity, modesty and self-respect. He particularly emphasized good manners and cleanliness—respect for others and respect for self—as the first stages in mastering the New Life. And Dr. Chu Chia-hua, a learned scholar and leading educationist, has acclaimed Confucianism as the whole basis of the New Life, which, he explains, seeks to work

¹ Arthur Waley's translation of *The Analects of Confucius*.

through the improvement of the individual to the regeneration of the whole State.

Nothing could more violently contrast with the teaching of totalitarianism that the individual is nothing, the State everything. For a century or more before the Revolution of 1911 Confucianism had stiffened into a mere empty shell of ceremonial observance. It is the revival of the spirit of the old teacher which seems to form so marked a feature in the development of modern China and her resistance to the deadening hand of Japanese militarism; and though one may smile at some of its precepts, the New Life has helped greatly to stimulate this awakening.

It is not, perhaps, without significance that the renewal of Japanese military aggressiveness should have coincided so closely with the popularizing of the New Life. In the spring of 1935, as described in Chapter V, the Japanese invaded Charhar, the easternmost province of Inner Mongolia adjoining Jehol.

That this rape of yet another province from China should have gone so little noticed abroad, can only be explained by supposing that Western Governments had by now abandoned all hope of checking Japanese rapacity. In the autumn, 1935, came Major-General Doihara's attempt to convert the five northern provinces into a separate State under Japanese control, and the actual creation of the East Hopei autonomous area.

Supported by the terrific protests of northern Chinese, General Chiang was able to foil Doihara's plans. But he none the less clung steadily to his resolve to stave off another breach with Japan, although the temper of the country was growing hotter and hotter. It found vent in an attempt to murder Wang Ching-wei, the then Premier, at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang in November, 1935, for his 'pro-Japanese policy.' The accusation was hotly denied by his friends, but as he has since become head of Japan's puppet Government in Nanking, there may have been more in the charge than was admitted. How Wang escaped death from the assassin's automatic pistol, fired from barely ten yards distance, is a miracle. He was for two years in a very weak state with one bullet lodged near

the kidneys which the European doctors, whom he went to France and Germany to consult, thought it too risky to remove.

At this session of the Kuomintang General Chiang made a statement of policy regarding Japan, which showed exactly where he stood.

"The Chinese race (he said) comprises one-fourth of the world's population. So the rise and fall of our nation must have a great effect upon a world peace as well as the welfare of mankind. . . . It is natural, therefore, that our neighbour Japan should take a deeper interest in the peace of Asia as well as the common weal of the two countries. What we have been striving for incessantly is nothing more than our existence as a nation, and co-existence with other countries in the family of nations. . . . If international developments do not menace our national existence or block the way of our national regeneration, we should practise forbearance in facing issues not of a fundamental nature. At the same time we should seek harmonious international relations, provided there is no violation of our sovereignty. We should seek economic co-operation based upon the principle of equality and reciprocity. We shall not forsake peace until there is no hope for peace. We shall not talk lightly of sacrifice until we are driven to the last extremity which makes sacrifice inevitable. . . . Granted a limit to conditions for peace and a determination to make the supreme sacrifice, we should exert our best efforts to preserve peace with the determination to make the final sacrifice in order to consolidate and regenerate our nation. I believe this is the basic policy of our Party for the salvation and upholding of our nation."¹

No offer to Japan could have been fairer or more conciliatory, especially when we remember what she had been doing to China in the previous five years. Nothing could more clearly disprove the later Japanese charges of the supposed wickedness of General Chiang and his secret instigation of anti-Japanese plottings in China. It is to be remembered that Japanese trade was becoming more and more predominant in China with every year that passed. Had she been contented with 'economic co-operation based upon the principle of equality and reciprocity,' she could have got from China all the things that she now has to buy so much more expensively from further away—coal,

¹ *China Year Book for 1936*. Translation.

cotton, iron, salt, hides, tobacco, and a dozen other commodities. Certainly the Chinese would have raised no objections.

But such a reasonable course would have meant the end of the Japanese military dreams of mainland empire *à la* Tanaka Memorial. Economic co-operation between Chinese and Japanese business men must have meant increasing importance for the latter, increasing power for the civilian element in the Government, growth of liberal thought and international proclivities, demands for the reduction of naval and military expenditure. The Army had seen quite enough of that in the 1920's, and having made so promising a start in Manchuria towards the suppression of these hideous tendencies it was not to be turned back now.

So came July, 1937, when General Chiang Kai-shek was forced to realize that China was 'driven to the last extremity - which makes sacrifice inevitable.'

And for him, too, once the fateful decision had to be made, there was no turning back.

CHAPTER X

DEMOCRACY VANISHES FROM JAPAN

THE years 1931-37, which witnessed in China a recovery, a closing of the ranks, and an advance towards national consciousness that amazed all onlookers, saw Japan moving in the opposite direction with ever-increasing speed, agitated by frightful passions and scarred with hideous murders. They saw the rise of that distorted growth, the so-called 'Showa Restoration,' and concurrently of that much dreaded party, the 'Young Officer' class, and in the end the disappearance of the last vestiges of constitutional government.

The 'Young Officers' were, or rather are, only young in the same sense as the Young Turks of former years and indeed Young China, though they resemble these examples in no other respect. Many of them are colonels and majors, and at least some generals. For instance, the notorious General Araki and General Mazaki, if not members of the party, are closely associated with it. So, too, is a particularly ferocious secret society born in these years with the name of the 'Blood Brotherhood,' which it well deserves.

The 'Young Officers' represent the most violent sect of extremist patriots. Their rallying cry and political slogan was a demand for the 'Showa Restoration.' Every new reign in Japan, it should be explained, is given a special title. That of the present reign is 'Showa,' which might be translated 'Peace Manifested,' and anything less appropriate could hardly have been devised.

As the Meiji Restoration signified the return of the Emperor to his rightful throne after the expulsion of the Shoguns, so the Young Officers preached that the dignity of the present Emperor was being dishonoured by corrupt politicians and policies unworthy of Japan, which must

be purged of such impure influences for the restoration of the Emperor to his rightful exaltation.

It is not only by the people of Japan that the Young Officers are feared ; even the great Generals are distinctly nervous of them. A Japanese does not fear death ; he has invented the most painful form of suicide in existence as a sacrificial rite, *harakiri*, or, for that is a vulgar word, as it should be properly called, *seppuku*. But it is certainly trying to the nerves to know that at any moment you may be accused of some crime against patriotism and have a bullet or a knife put into you. The Young Officers do not merely not boggle at murder, they glory in it as will be seen. They are, moreover, extremely intractable ; in China their insubordination has often been gross ; and as they represent a very large class, which hangs together like bats in a barn, and as they are in much closer touch with the troops than Generals can be, they have to be handled with a delicacy which they do not deserve. After the Chinese retreat from Shanghai in November, 1937, it is well known that General Matsui, the Commander-in-Chief, was very averse from the 'victory march' of Japanese troops through the Foreign Settlements, as he feared some incident which would cause conflict with the Powers. But, although he took no part in the march and remained at the Japanese Consulate, he could not prevent its being held.

It must, in fairness, be pointed out that not all Japanese Generals are to be tarred with the same brush. There are moderates among them as well as extremists. General Ugaki, for instance, has a well-deserved reputation for broad and statesman-like views. General Hayashi, though hardly to be called a moderate, did make a real effort when he was Premier, in 1935, to purge the Army of politically-minded Young Officers, and, having managed to get rid of General Mazaki, whom they worshipped, put in his place a well-known moderate, General Nagata, to effect the purging—with fatal results to the latter as it turned out. General Matsui was a stern fighter, but the foreign authorities at Shanghai would, on the whole, give him a good name. When the news eventually got through to him of the unspeakable behaviour of the Japanese troops during

the four weeks' sack of Nanking, General Matsui went to Nanking, assembled the officers, and, sitting on his horse, gave them such a tongue-lashing as they had probably never had before, telling them that they had indelibly disgraced their uniform, their country, and, worst of all, their Emperor, before the whole world. Some of the officers, it is said, were reduced to tears. General Matsui is reported to have retired into a Buddhist monastery to pray continually for the souls of Japanese soldiers who have died in China. It is not unlikely to be true.

Generalities are almost proverbially dangerous. Throughout this book I have spoken of the Japanese Army doing this or that, in order to draw a distinction between the perpetrators of the criminal assault on China and the even more criminal deeds which have accompanied it, and the men of whom one is positive that, although they dared not speak out, they must have disapproved of the whole evil story. Yet no such distinction can be taken as absolute. There are grades of opinion in the Army and equally so in the country. Generally speaking (again that fallacious word) Japanese business classes are regarded as antagonistic to military adventures, if for no other reason than that they are bad for trade. Yet continually the big-business men and the soldiers are found playing into each other's hands. No disapproval of the 'China incident' came from Osaka or Nagoya in its earlier phases. On the contrary, these centres appeared chiefly interested in planning how, by means of big monopolistic syndicates, they might make the greatest profit out of the Japanese victories. What one feels justified in saying is that the men who have, since Mukden, got the control of Japanese affairs completely in their grip are but one section even of the class to which they belong, and that the Japanese people as a whole should not be lumped in the same condemnation with them. The worst of it is that the Japanese people have very little moral courage, and where patriotism, still more the name of the Emperor, is involved, there are few who dare speak out, even against what all their better judgment condemns.

The seizure of Mukden, as has been shown, was entirely

a military move. It was the clearest notice to the Home Government that the Army was henceforward in control, this warning being further driven in during the ensuing months by the falsification of every undertaking given to the Powers or at Geneva, from the bringing in of more troops from Korea to the attack of Chinchow.

But the completion of the military domination was still far from perfect. Liberalism had had a long run in Japan. Since the resignation in July, 1929, of the egregious Baron Tanaka, whose brief Premiership had heaped up expenses and brought upon Japanese trade in China a vicious boycott by his wanton expedition to Tsinanfu to stop General Chiang Kai-shek's march on Peking, a real era of peace, retrenchment, and reform had been inaugurated by Mr. Hamaguchi, supported by Mr. Inouye, one of the finest Finance Ministers Japan ever had, and with General Ugaki as his War Minister, who agreed to reductions in military expenditure, including the elimination of four divisions.

Even after Mr. Hamaguchi had died of the wounds inflicted on him for 'the disgrace' of the London Treaty, he was succeeded by another civilian Premier, Mr. Wakatsuki, a man of known Liberalism and a champion of civil authority, with Baron Shidehara as Foreign Minister. The Press was still reasonably free, though this did not last very much longer. And what the soldiers much more disliked than the Press was the Diet, in which the Minseito, or Liberal Party, had a considerable majority over the Sciyukai, or Conservatives, and was remarkably vocal. The Army did not fully get the upper hand of the Diet until the outbreak of war with China, when, of course, all criticism or appearance of divided opinions was automatically stilled in the sacred name of patriotism.

The League of Nations really played directly into the hands of the Japanese Army by its prolonged irresolutions. If, for example, directly after the seizure of Mukden it had telegraphed to the Diplomatic Body in Peking to appoint an international commission of, say, three members to investigate and report on what had happened, a task for which Legation Quarter could have supplied an abundance



THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON CANTON
Japanese troops emerging from a wood under cover of machine-guns.



A JAPANESE PROPAGANDA POSTER

The Japanese are doing all they can, by posters, to win over the Chinese. The wording on this poster says: "Come back to your homes; Food will be given you; Trust the Japanese Army." But the Chinese peasants are not convinced.

of first-class men too well versed in Far Eastern ways for any dust to be thrown in their eyes ; and if the League had refused to discuss the matter until the report had arrived, invaluable time and much temper might have been saved.

It is true that China might have lost Manchuria just the same, since the League was incapable of action, even if it had really wished to act. Yet even that is not certain, seeing that the conciliatory elements in the Japanese Government were still in office up to Christmas, and not wholly bereft of power. But the occupation of Mukden had set every ruffian and bully tramping through the street with shouts of victory, and every report from Geneva of the wounding things said about Japan increased the popular passion which it was the business of these *ronin* to inflame. Lord Lytton's Commission produced a statesman-like survey of the whole position, just thirteen months after the seizure of Mukden, by which time Japan had finally decided to create an 'independent' State of Manchuria under her own direction. The fatal weakness of the League was finally revealed ; it could do nothing but express disapproval and Japan left it. Many besides her military men had always been suspicious of her belonging to the League and were glad of the breach.

The Wakatsuki Cabinet lasted for four months after the Mukden *coup* and then resigned. Its downfall was complicated by the controversy over whether Japan should follow Great Britain's example in going off gold, in which 'big business' saw great possibilities of profit, but to which Mr. Inouye, the Finance Minister, was strongly opposed. Directly the new Government came in Japan did go off gold, and it was popularly reported that 'big business' had netted several millions thereby. But such scandals are, unfortunately, common in Japan without possibility of anyone being brought to book. Even without this complication, it is certain that the Army would not long have tolerated a Prime Minister and a Foreign Minister who stood for national economy, civilian control of the forces, and a liberal policy abroad.

The new Premier, Mr. Inukai, was somewhat of a mixture. He was a man of comparatively humble origin, who

believed in Japan's Imperial destiny, but also, like Mr. Wakatsuki, in representative government and the ultimate power residing in civilian hands. He had a reputation for honesty, and he assuredly did not lack courage as he was only too soon to show. The essential part of his brief Premiership, apart from the fact that he was plainly powerless against the Army, was that it saw the beginnings of political murder as a fine art. There had, of course, been no lack of political murders for seventy years back. But each of them could be regarded as an isolated instance of punishment for a particular crime against patriotism. From 1932 one murder led to another in visible connection, against a background of the fanaticism of the 'Showa Restoration.'

The first victim was Mr. Inouye, the former Finance Minister, shot down on 9 February, 1932. Although no longer in office his speeches in the Diet had shown that he stood as firmly as ever for liberal government and civilian authority. This naturally sealed his fate with the patriots.

Less easy is it to understand why, a month later, Baron Takuma Dan, head of the great firm of Mitsui, was also murdered. Baron Dan was the leading business man of Japan; he had taken part in various economic missions abroad; and shortly before his death he had welcomed the Lytton Commission to the Far East. From these facts one may construct a series of accusations in the tortuous minds of the Blood Brotherhood—business men were the enemies of the State and underminers of Imperial prestige; men who went abroad on economic missions inevitably harboured international proclivities; and everyone who could speak peaceably to the agents of Geneva must be a villain. So Baron Dan, a kindly and generous man, was slain.

It was Mr. Inukai's turn next. By this time, however, the patriots of the Blood Brotherhood could no longer be satisfied with a single murder. In some hazy way they seem to have had a plan to paralyse the life of Tokyo by bombing the power stations and seizing the police headquarters.

On the night of 15 May, 1932, about twenty men forced

their way into the Premier's house, killing two policemen on duty at the door. The aged Premier faced them courageously, asking what they wanted, though he had been threatened often enough to know full well. Their reply was to riddle him with bullets. They then went to the house of Lord Makino, the Lord Privy Seal, a notorious Liberal, with the same murderous intention. But the gates were too strong and the police arrived before they could break them down. The attacks on power stations and police headquarters had failed ingloriously. The Press was not permitted to mention the murder of Mr. Inukai for a long time. When it did, it had little difficulty in demonstrating the nobility of the murderers' motives and the consequent excusability of their crime. What happened at their trial, when one of the Judges had to retire for having insulted them, has been mentioned already.

This chapter is not meant to be a history of Japan between Mukden and Marco Polo Bridge, which, indeed, would fill a large book, but only an attempt to pick out certain landmarks on the road to the destruction of constitutional government. Admiral Viscount Saito succeeded the murdered Inukai as Premier. His Finance Minister was Mr. Takahashi, a name famous for careful guardianship of national wealth and balanced Budgets. But against him was General Araki as Minister of War.

There is no one more notorious than Araki among the extremists. His speeches and writings during the long wranglings at Geneva and afterwards were the fieriest sort of fire-eating, with the expulsion of all white influences from the Far East as a specially tasty morsel. By most hard-headed Japanese Araki is regarded as a joke, and, on character, one would prefer him to many other less outspoken but sinister men. He has a certain strain of chivalry in his nature and a code of morals to which, fantastic as it would seem in the West, he strictly adheres. But the effect of his extravagant spoutings on the young minds of the 'patriot' class cannot be underrated, and though it is more than possible that he goes much further in speaking than he intends ('incubriated with the exuberance of his own verbosity'), he cannot be exonerated from a large

share in the stirring up of the passions which were to burst out in the 'Blood Bath' of 1936.

For the moment, General Araki's business was to see that the Army got all the money it wanted whatever Mr. Takahashi might say. In 1932 the Army's demands ran the Budget to about 1000 million yen above available revenue. In 1933 the Budget rose to yen 2,238,000,000,¹ of which the Army and Navy collared some 70 per cent. Of sums ear-marked for new expenditure of all kinds the Army and Navy took more than half. And this, in peace-time, with no visible threat to Japan anywhere. Since Mr. Takahashi did succeed in refusing to increase taxation, the difference between revenue and expenditure had to be met by loans, which have risen year by year with ever-increasing acceleration, until to-day it has become a difficult matter to get even the banks to take them up.

The Saito Ministry coincided with a period of great distress among the farmers, who are 57 per cent of Japan's population. Their misfortunes are due to many causes. Their farms are, on the average, far too small to afford a return big enough to support their families, pay their rent, their taxes, and the cost of fertilizer, and to enable them to hold their crops for remunerative prices. Since rent has to be paid in money the farmers are usually constrained to sell even before the crops are harvested. Consequently, if harvests are poor and the Government is persuaded to grant a subsidy, it is the middlemen who get the money, having already secured the grain. If harvests are plentiful, the price of rice goes down, and the farmer loses again. In the 1920's a scheme was devised to enable the farmer to purchase his land by means of cheap Government loans. But this failed of its purpose, because the farmers were soon forced by increasing debt to sell their land. By 1934 it was calculated that the total indebtedness of the farming population was as much as yen 6,000,000,000.

¹ This is a fleabite compared with the Budget of 1941-2, about 11½ thousand million yen. In translating yen into sterling it is necessary to multiply by fully 3 in order to get the equivalent of English values. Thus yen 2,238,000,000 at 17 to the £, is nominally equal to £132,000,000, but actually to at least £528,000,000—in a country much poorer than Great Britain.

Agrarian riots became so common that the papers ceased to report them.

It is from the peasant class that the mills of Osaka, Nagoya, and Tokyo recruit their myriad female workers. In the big factories the law now enjoins very fair treatment for the girls. Their housing and food are good by Japanese standards, and at the end of their contracts they usually take home a fair sum in savings for a dowry. But the law does not apply to factories employing under ten workers. These small firms supply a large proportion of the cotton and other exports, the big houses supplying the raw material and seeing to the marketing of the finished article. Thus it is that Japanese piece-goods can be produced so cheaply, since the little firms can work their employees for endless hours under the most insanitary conditions without fear of being hauled up by an inspector.

The peasantry are also the recruiting ground for another staple industry, the huge brothels of the cities. There is nothing to prevent a father from selling his daughter to the agents of these places, and the daughter, bred to implicit obedience like all Japanese women, has no option but to pack up her pitiful little bundle of clothes and go to a servitude from which there is rarely any returning.

The misfortunes of the farmer class are an important feature in the conflict between Army and Diet. Many Japanese officers and most of the N.C.O.s come from peasant stock, and in the Japanese Army, when off parade, there is much freer intermingling between officers and men than in any other country. In this manner the officers have an unrivalled insight into the miseries of the peasants, for ever sacrificed by politicians to the interests of townsmen and the multiplication of exports—just as British agriculture has been sacrificed. For years past Japanese soldiers have been denouncing the Diet for its callous indifference to the down-trodden peasant. Their indignation does not go the length of any abatement of their greed for armaments. But, then, the soldiers would argue that once the Diet is reduced to impotence and the Showa Restoration is accomplished, all evils will be eliminated and peace and prosperity will reign throughout the land.

Mention has been made of the Army's rigorous application of the political aspects of the Shinto religion and its exaltation of the divine nature of the Emperor. To such an extent has this been carried that in every school there is a portrait of the Emperor kept in a safe, before which the pupils make daily obeisance, the portrait itself only being exhibited on high days. Should the school catch fire it would be the schoolmaster's first duty, before thinking of his family, to save the portrait. This extreme form of Emperor-worship is a new thing in Japan. That the Emperor is divinely descended has always been a part of the Japanese creed, but it was not pushed to its present lengths until the soldiers discovered its value for securing their own ascendancy.

An extremely interesting feature of this development was the witch-hunt set up by the Army in 1935 upon the so-called Minobe Theory. Dr. Minobe is a profoundly learned legal professor and authority on constitutional law. His pupils were to be found among the professors of every university, in which his writings were standard textbooks. One of the best known, a book dealing with the Constitution which had been taught to legal students for fully twenty-five years, was now discovered to contain a frightful heresy. Dr. Minobe actually taught that the Throne was an organ of the State. Once admit this and it follows that the Throne has responsibilities to the State, and might even be liable to control by it. The convenient theory of the soldiers that the whole State derives from a divine Emperor (whose purpose they alone are capable of expounding) is at once shattered. A frightful hullabaloo was raised, no one dared say a word for Dr. Minobe, who was forced to resign his seat in the House of Peers and hunted out of his professorship (he was perhaps lucky not to be murdered), and all his books were banned.

In this year, 1935, the arrogance and political activities of the 'Young Officers' had become so virulent that General Hayashi, who had succeeded General Araki as Minister of War when the Saito Cabinet resigned in July of the year before, decided that their ranks must be purged. The Army, it may be mentioned, had been strictly forbidden by the

Emperor Meiji to interfere in politics, but no doubt the officers felt (as the fanatic said of Providence) that he would have done differently if he had known all the circumstances of the case. The Prime Minister now was Admiral Okada, whose moderation (or heresies) had been shown by his acceptance of the London Naval Treaty. Mr. Takahashi, too, was Finance Minister.

In order to carry out the purge, General Hayashi succeeded in getting rid of the extremist General Mazaki from the all-powerful post of Inspector-General of Military Education, and replaced him by a moderate General Watanabe. (General Hayashi was able to do this by the assistance of Prince Kanin, Chief of the General Staff, whose recent resignation on account of old age is much to be regretted in the present critical state of the Far East.) Another moderate, General Nagata, was made Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.

There followed a long list of transfers of insubordinate Young Officers to remote parts of the Empire. Among them was a Colonel Aizawa, who was ordered to Formosa. Thereupon, on 12 August, Colonel Aizawa called upon General Nagata and shot him dead. That he was quite convinced that he had acted righteously was shown at his trial, where he posed as the saviour of the national honour and treated the Judges to interminable harangues, which they suffered with becoming humility. Aizawa's trial dragged on through the winter, and there can be no doubt that his inflammatory speeches contributed largely to the frightful orgy of killing known as the Blood Bath of 26 February, 1936.

In the early morning of that day one thousand five hundred men of the 1st (Tokyo) Division started from their barracks, ostensibly to entrain for Manchuria. They were under the command of a Captain Nonaka and Captain Ando. Instead of marching to the station they seized the principal Government offices—Tokyo's Whitehall—surrounding the Imperial Palace, and parties of them, led by Young Officers set out to kill.

They butchered General Watanabe; the aged Finance Minister, Mr. Takahashi (he was eighty-two when they left

him weltering in his blood on his bedroom floor) ; Admiral Saito, the Lord Privy Seal, and they badly wounded Lady Saito who had tried to defend her husband ; they wounded Admiral Suzuki, the Grand Chamberlain, very severely but he did not die ; they broke into Admiral Okada's house to murder him, but they met his brother-in-law, Colonel Matsuo, who resembled the Premier, and killed him instead ; Admiral Okada being ultimately smuggled out of the house in disguise. They went to the house of Count Makino, the ex-Lord Privy Seal, but he had got wind of the plot and, knowing what the patriots thought of him, was not to be found. A party of the murderers started for Prince Saionji's house at Okitsu, a seaside village not far from Tokyo, but the police got there first and carried off the aged Elder Statesman to safety in the Prefect's house—only just in time, for the lights of the murderers' car could be seen closely pursuing through the dark, snowy winter's morning.

Tokyo awoke to find the mutineers barricaded in the centre of the city and the country literally on the verge of a civil war. For three days the Emperor himself was virtually a prisoner. Two proclamations were given to a local news agency by the rebels for publication, a few copies of which got about although the police suppressed most of them. These proclamations, signed by Captain Nonaka, claimed for the rebels the title of 'Soldiers of the Kingly Way,' and in extraordinarily inflated language denounced the statesmen, military cliques, plutocrats, bureaucrats, politicians, and all traitors who were said to be dishonouring the Emperor, obstructing the Showa Restoration, and endangering Japan.

'The Imperial work will fail unless we take proper steps to safeguard the Fatherland by killing all those responsible for impeding the Showa Restoration and slurring Imperial prestige,'¹ this amazing document concluded. The importance of it will be missed unless one realizes that its authors were quite sincere and, no doubt, believed themselves to be divinely commissioned.

General Kashii, Military Governor of Tokyo, saved the

¹ *The Far East Comes Nearer*, by H. Hessel Tiltman.

situation. He brought in an overwhelming number of loyal troops from the surrounding country, and with them he ringed round the Government offices where the mutineers were gathered. The Navy, too, not a little outraged by the number of Admirals who had been murdered or listed for murder, brought the 1st Fleet to Tokyo Bay. Confronted by this force the rebels yielded to an ultimatum on the evening of the 29th and returned to barracks. Captain Ando and Captain Nonaka were permitted to shoot themselves.

A young lieutenant of the Guards, Aoshima by name, committed *seppuku*, his young wife accompanying him into the Shades, having left a letter for her parents to tell them that the time had come for her to act as a soldier's wife should do. Lieutenant Aoshima had had nothing to do with the rebellion, but he had felt so keenly the disgrace it had brought upon the whole Army that he could see no way but to sacrifice his own life in protest and expiation. His death was the one touch of nobility that relieved the darkness of this horrid story. Much as the unbridled fanaticism and ruthlessness of the Japanese military extremists is to be condemned, it cannot be denied that they have a certain code by which they conduct their lives and by which they are prepared to lay them down.

Retribution was somewhat slow in coming to the soldiers of the Kingly Way, but it came. The rebellion had caused so much horror in Japan that the Army, for the first time, found itself definitely unpopular and saw the urgent need in its own interest of taking drastic action. About one hundred and twenty officers, N.C.O.s, privates, and civilians who had been connected with the outrage were tried in the following July, when seventeen were sentenced to death and a number more to terms of imprisonment.

One good outcome of the mutiny was that Colonel Aizawa was no longer allowed to harangue his Judges on his nobility in murdering General Nagata. Public feeling was so high that he was condemned and executed.

But the spirit which had fired the rebellion was not crushed; nor, need it be said, the Army's determination to keep a firm grip on the national policy.

This quickly became evident under the new Ministry (that of Admiral Okada had necessarily resigned), formed by Mr. Hirota, with General Count Terauchi as War Minister. Hirota was the son of a stonemason and had, at one time, been a disciple of Toyama, the notorious and formidable head of the Black Dragon Society. This sounded alarming. Yet, in fact, Mr. Hirota was a man of considerable statesmanship and as near to being a Liberal as the Army would accept. But from the first General Terauchi adopted a dictatorial tone, editing Mr. Hirota's list of Ministers as if he himself were the Premier.

At the same time as the criminals of 26 February were sentenced, steps were taken to tighten discipline in the Army by transferring the personnel and affairs of the General Staff from the Chief of the Staff to the War Office. But by way of reward for so much virtue, the Army demanded more money for the 'strengthening of national defences,' and in August presented a scheme of 'new national policy' to cost yen 150,000,000, mostly to be devoted to armament.

It is true that by this time Russia had begun to build up her Far Eastern army, prompted thereto not only by Japan's seizure of Manchuria, but by the strong desire of the Young Officers that the Manchurian job should be rounded off by the occupation of the Russian Maritime Provinces, with their splendid harbour Vladivostok, which run down between Manchuria and the sea. This proposal does not seem ever to have been seriously considered, but Russia can hardly be blamed if she kept it in mind. On the other hand, it is highly improbable that she would have molested Japan spontaneously. Her schemes for internal development of her vast territories were more interesting to her than any thought of war. Confronted with the Japanese rape of Manchuria and the Japanese Army's increasingly arrogant tone, the creation of the Russian Far Eastern army, under Marshal Bluecher, was fairly to be regarded as a measure of defence. No such excuse was visible then for the Japanese Army's demands for money, and events have proved that defence was no part of their motives.

And now we come to the climax of the struggle between

the Army and the Diet (as representatives of the rapidly crumbling Constitution and civil authority), which was undoubtedly one of the causes for the letting loose of war on China in 1937.

Having partially appeased public indignation by sentencing the authors of the 'Blood Bath' the Army announced that, as it had purged its own ranks, the political parties should likewise purge theirs. It went further than merely paternal advice, and set out a list of national concerns—foreign policy, education, and economics, on which it not only desired reform, but expressed its intention of being the final arbiter.

In November the magnificent new parliamentary buildings, which had cost approximately £1,700,000, were inaugurated by the Emperor in great state. The irony of the event—so reminiscent of the vast and mocking palace at Geneva, was visible enough even then. In the light of later years the Tokyo Parliament House stands as no more than a gilded tomb for the Japanese people's hopes of freedom.

In the same month, while the political parties had shown little inclination to purge themselves, the Army and Navy produced their plan for the amalgamation of several of the existing Ministries and the creation of a Super-Ministry, which, under the leadership of an Army chieftain, would draft all national policies. Some described the proposed new Council as a 'brain trust,' but the name is obviously inapplicable. The Army and Navy plan also included the State control of all capital. A start was actually made in this direction by creating a State monopoly of all electrical power concerns in spite of their violent protests; and very badly it appears to have managed itself.

The Diet's reactions to the projected Super-Ministry were swift and unmistakable. They charged the Army with wishing to reduce Parliament to a mere 'rubber-stamp' machine and to set up a Fascist regime. And at the annual memorial service to the murdered Hamaguchi, Mr. Wakatsuki, the former Premier, courageously denounced Fascism, saying that 'it brings no bliss to the people; it hampers national development; and we must fight it.'

Fascism, on European lines, is not practicable in Japan

because it implies the existence of a dictator, a figure incompatible with a god Emperor and contrary to Japanese instincts. The Japanese prefer to act by means of groups, of which the prominent personality for the moment (at this time the War Minister Terauchi) is only the spokesman of some invisible collective power in the background. But that the Diet's suspicions of the obscurity designed for it were well grounded there is not the slightest doubt. Of course, the Army protested hotly that it sought not to destroy the Constitution but to fulfil it. But nobody believed the soldiers, while their partisans continually spoke and wrote of the blessings that would accrue when the Emperor was restored to his rightful authority, served by a small council of his faithful soldiers and sailors to interpret and execute his divine will for the benefit of his subjects.

The fight raged throughout the autumn. On 21 January, 1937, the Government resigned. Consulted, as usual, about the choice of a Premier, Prince Saionji recommended the Throne to appoint General Ugaki. But in spite of their supposed implicit obedience to the Throne the soldiers would not hear of a Premier who, as War Minister seven years before, had allowed the Army to be cut by four divisions. For a week General Ugaki strove vainly to form a Government. Then he had to ask the Emperor to relieve him of the task. It speaks volumes for the fearful power which the Army wielded that the Emperor did not order them bluntly to do his bidding. But, in all probability, Ugaki never told him the real state of affairs. In all parties in Japan there is a common reluctance to involve the Emperor in political squabbles.

Prince Saionji then recommended General Hayashi as the best chance of placating the Diet. But the politicians were in no mood to be placated, and their anger with the Army was further inflamed by additional huge demands for money for armaments in the new Budget for 1937-38. Limited as the Japanese Diet's powers always have been, it has the right to throw out the Budget. Passion rose to such a pitch that the Government had only one resource. On 31 March, 1937, it dissolved Parliament in the hope that the country would return one more amenable.

The country did nothing of the kind. This, in itself, was remarkable proof of the deep-seated suspicion of the Army. For electioneering in Japan is a doubtful business, where the police can, and do, stop any meeting which is likely to prove inimical to the Government, and shoo away persons so misguided as to wish to attend it. In the upshot a Diet even more antagonistic to the Army's Super-Ministry was returned. Not the least extraordinary part in it was that the Social Mass Party, the equivalent of our Labour Party, increased its numbers from twenty-nine to thirty-seven, although it had no funds or organization, no rich patrons among the big mercantile syndicates, labour unions had been dissolved by the Government, and meetings of its representatives were, of all others, most frequently banned by the police as being productive of 'dangerous thoughts.'

The new Diet met the Government in May and at once showed such pugnacity that the Hayashi Cabinet resigned, and Prince Konoye became Premier. The Diet adjourned until July. In itself this was normal procedure. But by July the war with China had begun and therewith all criticism ceased. Patriotism closed the ranks and the mouth of every doubter.

Some space has been given to this chapter partly because it so clearly indicates the totalitarian lines on which the Army was travelling to the ultimate dissolution, in the summer of 1940, of all the political parties in favour of Prince Konoye's 'new political structure'; partly for its importance in fixing the date of the invasion of China.

For that act of brigandage five main reasons can be seen. Japan wanted the five northern provinces of China for their wealth in coal, iron, cotton, and other commodities. She wanted them as a buffer State against infiltration of Russian propaganda and Communist influences into Manchuria, Korea, and the Japanese islands. She wanted them against the ultimate war with Russia, which the Japanese Army then considered inevitable, as a base from which to strike northwards at the Trans-Siberian railway and cut the Russian Far Eastern Army's communications.

It was also obvious that China had become something very

different from the country that lost Manchuria so easily and, if not promptly checked, might grow too strong to be hit.

Last, and by no means least, the Army saw clearly that the national displeasure aroused by the massacre of February, 1936, had been deepened by the collision between itself and the Diet. Under ordinary conditions the Diet is not popular in Japan ; it has no prestige as the Army has. But the Army had never before gone to such lengths in asserting its power—and its contempt for popular institutions—as it did in the summer and autumn of 1936. After all, the Diet were the representatives of the people ; they stood for that definite progression towards popular government which was implicit in the granting of the Constitution. And men could remember that it was only a very few years since this consummation had seemed to be well within view.

All these feelings were silently voiced in the elections of 1937. The Army realized that they must be suppressed, and it chose the ancient device of a war to distract public attention from its own misdoings and to enable it to posture once more before the eyes of Japan as saviours of the nation.

CHAPTER XI

THE 'CHINA INCIDENT' BEGINS

IT is still the 'China Incident,' in Japanese official utterance, not a war, since no formal declaration has ever been made, although the carnage, misery, and destruction it has caused rival, if they do not actually exceed, the tragedies of the Four Years War in Europe.

Looking back on these three and a half dreadful years, in which at least 60,000,000 Chinese have been driven from their homes, unknown millions have perished or been slaughtered, and the fairest parts of China laid waste, one thing may possibly strike the observer even more than China's undaunted resistance. That is the Japanese commanders' unsurpassable stupidity.

That the 'incident' itself was perhaps the most lunatic folly on record needs no demonstration. As has already been pointed out, Japan, in spite of Manchuria, was gaining a position in China's trade and industry (for more and more of the big mills in China were passing to, or being erected by, Japanese) with which no other country could compete. And the Chinese would always rather trade amicably than fight. The Japanese insist that anti-Japanism in China had reached such a pitch that they were forced to intervene in self-defence. That their own aggressive conduct in the previous six years was to blame and not any spontaneous malignity on China's part, is what they cannot be brought to confess. In the years 1925-27 Great Britain was the target for as much deliberately fomented hatred as any nation has had to endure. So far from retaliating, she went out of her way to be conciliatory; passions subsided, the normal Chinese temper reasserted itself, and long before 1937 perfect friendship prevailed between the two countries.

But since the war began the Japanese have made blunder after blunder, throwing away their chances with a pertinacity which seems only explicable by the familiar tag that 'whom the Gods would destroy they first drive mad.'

The Japanese wanted the five northern provinces for their economic and strategic value ; and these they overran in the first autumn of the war. Had they been content to sit tight behind the Yellow River, which forms a perfect natural rampart round all that they needed, China could never have turned them out. The Communists in Shensi would have been a nuisance, but their remoteness from the rest of China would have made it very difficult to send them arms, and a few patrols along the river should have sufficed to keep them in check.

It may be objected that the Chinese cleverly forced the Japanese to come out of the north and fight at Shanghai. That is true enough, and the Japanese lost heavily in the fighting. But after the Chinese had been driven back and Nanking had fallen the Japanese blundered again.

There were three courses open to them. They might have occupied all the east coast of China from the Yangtze to the Great Wall, as in fact they ultimately did, and refused to be drawn further into China. This would have been more expensive than stopping in the north, but it would have been feasible and profitable.

Or they could have offered terms of peace which would have been worth negotiating, seeing that China's powers of resistance were at their lowest ebb, her armies shattered, her leaders mostly demoralized. But when Japan got Dr. von Trautmann, the German Ambassador, who had lived long in China and was very pro-Chinese, to go to Hankow and offer terms of peace, they were such as Tokyo ought to have known no Chinese could, or would, sign. It is reported that when Dr. von Trautmann put Japan's offer before General and Madame Chiang, the latter, after a glance at her husband, said sweetly : " And now, shall we talk of something else ? "

Lastly, the Japanese could have driven swiftly up the Yangtze from Nanking and seized Hankow. Some months ago an article appeared in a German military magazine

certainly inspired, if not written, by one of General Chiang's former German officers, which reviewed the whole course of the war, with the conclusion that Japan had lost her chance of winning solely by her failure to strike decisively after the capture of Nanking. At that time the Chinese were in no condition to resist. When at last the Japanese Army, sated and drowsy from their orgies in Nanking, began to think of moving, General Kai-shek's genius and personality had pulled his shattered forces together and Japan's opportunity had gone. It may well be that Nanking's torture during that awful month was the price of China's salvation.

The Japanese commanders have further shown their stupidity in the treaty forced upon their puppet President Wang Ching-wei, and signed at Nanking on 30 November last. With all the will to patriotism in the world, many Chinese in the Japanese-occupied parts must be very weary of the war. If the Japanese had had the sense to grant Wang really liberal terms, it is not improbable that some leading Chinese business men would have been tempted to give the treaty a chance. And if Japanese restrictions on trade had been relaxed and business had begun to recover, more and more Chinese would probably have been drawn to Nanking's side. They would not have liked it, but they would have consoled themselves with the thought that China always ends by absorbing her conquerors, and why not the Japanese, like the Manchus, the Mongols, and earlier invaders? Instead, however, the Japanese Generals dictated a treaty (it is obvious that the Foreign Office in Tokyo had little to do with it and it was, in fact, arranged by a General, the ex-Premier Abe) which simply handed over China bound hand and foot as a Japanese colony.

But the greatest of all the Japanese blunders—indeed, it goes far to vitiate the arguments in the last paragraph—is the ruthless, unbridled cruelty with which they have waged the war. Everywhere the Japanese troops have gone they have been permitted to loot, burn, ravish, and murder to their hearts' content. The attested reports of the sack of Nanking, by the little band of foreign eyewitnesses who

bravely stayed in the city after the Japanese entry in order to endeavour to protect some of its people, are so sickening, that one can scarcely read them to the end. It was the same in nearly all other cities and villages, Canton and Hankow being exceptions, no doubt because of the world-wide horror which Nanking's fate had aroused. But this merely shows that the Japanese troops could have been kept in order if their officers had wished.

Japanese aeroplanes have sailed over China deliberately bombing to atoms hundreds of villages of no possible military virtue. Nothing has been more clearly proved in this war than that the Chinese morale is not to be shaken even by the worst air-raids. Yet the Japanese persist. Last summer Chungking was subjected to twenty-three merciless bombings in quick succession, although it is perfectly well known that all Government offices and dwellings of officials are safe in shelters dug deep in the rocky hill on which the old city stands; and the only part that suffered, the only part which the Japanese aviators apparently cared to attack, were the new suburbs surrounding the hill, composed of shops and private dwellings.

The Japanese Army is fond of depicting itself as the saviour of the Chinese people 'from the corrupt and oppressive Kuomintang Government.' In a notice issued to Nanking three days before it fell, General Matsui declared that 'though harsh and relentless to those who resist, the Japanese troops are kind and generous to non-combatants and to Chinese troops that feel no enmity to Japan.' If that had indeed been the spirit and practice of the Japanese troops, the war would have ended already. The masses of the Chinese people are too deeply engrossed in the precarious business of making a meagre living to have much leisure for national politics or to concern themselves about who are their rulers. But the Japanese aeroplanes and the excesses of the Japanese troops have created for Japan such hatred all over China as will not be effaced for generations to come. Nothing has so effectually aroused the myriads of Chinese and welded them into a compact mass of dour determination and resistance as this blind cruelty.

There is still a controversy as to how the clash at Marco

Polo Bridge, about fifteen miles south-west of Peking, which opened the war on the night of 7 July, 1937, actually began. Close by the bridge is the little town of Wanping, where some troops of the 29th Army of Sung Cheh-yuan, head of the Hopei and Charhar Council, were stationed. Some Japanese troops were indulging in night manoeuvres (which they had no right to do) near by, and it seems possible that the Chinese, hearing the shots, thought they were being attacked and fired back.

Whether it was all accidental or whether the Japanese were out to create an incident one can only speculate. But as no one appears to have been hurt the Japanese Army, from what happened afterwards, evidently decided to make the fullest use of an encounter which otherwise a few words of explanation could have settled. The Japanese commander at Marco Polo Bridge sent for reinforcements, and on their arrival opened fire on Wanping, whence the Chinese briskly replied. At daybreak Chinese mediators arrived and the firing was stopped, only to break out again later in the day.

The next few days were a succession of momentary truces quickly broken, while Japanese troops, tanks, guns, and aeroplanes were poured into North China from Manchuria to supplement the 7,000 already *in situ*. Within six days of the clash there are believed to have been 20,000 troops from Manchuria between Peking and Tientsin. Within two days more troops were being sent from Japan.

Meanwhile the Japanese, both in Tokyo and in North China, were taking the line that the affair was a purely local one, to be settled locally; and a blunt warning was given to Nanking that it was not to interfere nor to presume to send troops to the north. This was the insufferable demand on which the Japanese insisted again and again, the clearest proof of their intention to cut off North China for themselves as Doihara had tried to do in 1935. Even if the temper of China had been far less heated than by now it was, no self-respecting Government could have lain down under such dictation.

General Chiang Kai-shek was at this time taking a summer holiday at Kuling, a mountain resort behind Kiukiang on

the Yangtze, where he immediately called a council of war. It is worth mentioning that General Pai Chung-hsi flew from Kwangsi to attend. Twice since 1929 he had been at war with General Chiang, and his presence at the council was a sign to all China (to Japan also if she had had the sense to see it) that past differences were forgotten and that China stood united against the enemy.

The outcome of the council was a dignified statement, dwelling on China's total lack of any wish for war, the responsibility for which was Japan's alone, but saying firmly that the Chinese Government would 'not allow any alteration in the status of the Hopei-Charhar Provincial Government, nor agree to the removal of officials through outside pressure, nor allow any restrictions on the disposition of the 29th Army'—which the Japanese insisted must be withdrawn. At the same time General Chiang expressed his readiness to negotiate a settlement provided that it did not infringe China's sovereign rights. But that was precisely what Japan was resolved to do. To show that he meant what he said, General Chiang had already begun to move troops northwards.

On July 25 the Japanese Army presented General Sung Cheh-yuan with an ultimatum, demanding the withdrawal of the 37th Division of the 29th Army, which was certainly the most bellicose of the lot, by noon next day, while all other troops were to be withdrawn within three days. Already the Japanese had heavily bombarded Wanping and their aeroplanes had attacked the Peking-Tientsin railway, although through all these days from the 7th to the 25th negotiations were going on.

With the presentation of the ultimatum fighting began in real earnest. To follow it in detail is hardly possible, owing to its indiscriminate nature. It spread all round Peking, along the railway to Tientsin, and in and around the Tientsin Chinese city, where the Japanese were quick to show their hatred of the modern intelligentsia by bombing not only all official buildings but the splendid Nankai University, which they utterly destroyed. The Chinese troops fought bravely, but their equipment, drill, and

officers were hopelessly inferior to the Japanese, and the carnage among them was terrible. Sung Chih-yuan vanished at an early moment to Paotingfu, a hundred miles down the railway towards Hankow. It does not sound a creditable action, but there must have been extenuating circumstances of which we know nothing. For he was not cashiered and has been heard of again on the Chinese side, though not in any very important connection. It may be mentioned that three or four Generals have been shot for dereliction of duty since the war began, a novelty in Chinese modern history, which not only shows her determination, but suggests that Sung was found guiltless.

One episode of which the Japanese made a great deal was the so-called Tungchow massacre. Tungchow, only twelve miles east of Peking, was the capital of the East Hopei autonomous State which, it will be remembered, Major-General Doihara had created in the autumn of 1935. It had been equipped with a Chinese militia of about one thousand men. These now revolted against their Japanese masters and slaughtered every Japanese they could catch. The Japanese papers were full of virtuous wrath at such an atrocity, and the Chinese Government has never attempted to palliate it. Others, however, may be more lenient. It was no doubt a shocking occurrence. But compared with the bombing of Chinchow five years before, and with the Japanese record for atrocities all through the present war, it fades into utter insignificance. It is worth noting that on two occasions when the Chinese flew some aeroplanes over Japan in May, 1938, they dropped not bombs but leaflets.

It will be convenient to summarize the fighting in North China before speaking of the Titanic struggle at Shanghai, although actually events overlap. Northward of the Great Wall the 89th Division of the Chinese Army was stationed around Kalgan. By early in August this force was moving southward and established itself in the Nankou Pass through the mountains north-west of Peking. The Japanese attacked on 11 August, and by dint of sending troops by forced marches from Charhar in the east, they got the Chinese

between two fires and captured the whole pass before the end of August.

After taking the Nankou Pass the Japanese advanced upon Tatung, situated on the outer section of the Great Wall, from which there is a narrow-gauge railway to Taiyuanfu, capital of Shansi, the 'Model Province.' From the Revolution in 1911 Shansi had been governed by the same man, Marshal Yen Hsi-shan, and very well governed. Yen, it may be remembered, had joined with General Feng Yu-hsiang in war upon General Chiang Kai-shek in 1930. But all that was forgotten now and Shansi proved a very hard nut for the Japanese to crack. One serious reverse and a number of expensive checks were suffered before the Japanese finally reached Taiyuanfu on 8 November.

The campaign in Shansi is interesting for two reasons. There, for the first time, the 8th Route Communist Army showed what masters they were of guerrilla tactics, melting away at the first sign of a positional battle and continually harrying the Japanese rear. In Shansi, too, the Chinese armies began to develop the tactics which they have used with so much effect in later days of seeming to retreat in order to draw on the Japanese and then falling on their tail. Shansi, as its name indicates, is a series of rugged mounted ranges which lend themselves well to this strategy. Even now, after some conspicuous defeats, which will be mentioned later, Japanese Generals appear to retain their old contempt of Chinese troops and are extraordinarily careless in guarding their flanks and communications. Only a fortnight before these lines are being written they launched a large-scale attack up the valley of the Han River which enters the Yangtze at Hankow. The Chinese employed their favourite device of falling back and then closed in on each side of the enemy inflicting on him a severe defeat. They claim to have wiped out 20,000 Japanese.¹

¹ There may be some poetic licence in this. But it is generally agreed among impartial foreign observers of the war that the Chinese claims are pretty trustworthy. The fact that they admit reverses inspires confidence. On the other hand, Japanese reports of battles are regarded as always untrustworthy and often fantastic. A Japanese reverse is never admitted; only a strange silence descends on the military reports, as in the case of the Han River Valley fight, after two days of vainglorious messages about the 'big dent' they had made in the Chinese front.

The Japanese have not yet succeeded in establishing control over more than the capital of Shansi, the railway, and some roads and towns in the north of the province. Southern Shansi, in spite of repeated efforts, they have never yet fully held. Here, too, in the autumn of 1940, the Chinese have been taking the offensive on a wide scale and with no little success.

The Japanese invasion of Shansi coincided with a thrust up the Peking-Suiyuan railway into Suiyuan, the Inner Mongolian province west of Charhar, which was already theirs. They penetrated as far as the towns of Kueihua, Suiyuan, and Paot'ou, which they had captured by 17 October, and proceeded to set up the now familiar puppet Government under a Mongolian Prince named Teh Huang, a rather vivid personality, who speaks English, drives a motor-car over the Mongolian plains as easily as he rides his horse, and had long been the recognized leader of the Mongols' Nationalist aspirations for the resuscitation of their ancient glory and independence. How much of these dreams Prince Teh has been able to realize with Japanese 'advisers,' so to speak, 'about his path and about his bed and spying out all his ways,' we shall not know till after the war, for at present Mongolia is a closed book. But it is not likely to be much.

To complete the survey of Japanese operations in North China in the first autumn and winter of the war, they pushed their way down the Peking-Hankow railway and captured Paotingfu, formerly the seat of China's best military academy, and Chengtingfu, the junction for the line into Shansi. And in the east they pressed down the Tientsin-Pukou railway as far as the Yellow River in Shantung. There for the moment they rested. Shantung contained a great deal of valuable Japanese property, particularly cotton mills; and its Governor, Han Fu-chu, a former lieutenant of the 'Christian General' Feng Yu-hsiang, was believed to be friendly to the Japanese. He was certainly at this time sitting very tight on the hedge.

Here it may be mentioned that in the following spring when the Japanese, in their fight for the whole of the Tientsin-Pukou railway, crossed the Yellow River into the

heart of Shantung, Han Fu-chu made no resistance worth mentioning. He was arrested, taken to Hankow, court-martialled, and shot. By all accounts his astonishment was as great as the satisfaction of China at seeing that even so powerful a man as the Governor of Shantung could not escape his deserts.

The epic of the fighting at Shanghai is naturally the best-known chapter in the whole war, partly because it was fought under the uncomfortable noses of the biggest foreign community in the Far East, partly because of the heroic resistance of the Chinese, who hung on for three mortal months though battered by heavy naval as well as army artillery and bombed by swarming aeroplanes, in all of which respects they were hopelessly outnumbered.

Shanghai, it may be explained, is roughly of frying-pan shape. The handle is the district called Yangtzepoo, which stretches eastward for five miles along the River Whangpoo which enters the Yangtze at Woosung, fourteen miles from the Foreign Settlements.¹ The Japanese seized the whole of Yangtzepoo and Hongkew behind it, as the base of their attack on the Chinese. The battle area was thus a rough triangle, from the International Settlement north-westwards to Liuho, about twenty miles away on the banks of the Yangtze; down the latter to Woosung, where the Chinese had a big fort which gave a good account of itself; and from Woosung up the Whangpoo to Yangtzepoo.

Hongkew and Yangtzepoo are separated from the International Settlement by the Soochow Creek, an important waterway. All to the north and east of the creek was Japanese or Chinese territory, all to the south of it the Foreign Settlements. From the foreigners' point of view it was much as if, for Londoners, a fierce battle were being fought to the east and north-east of Blackfriars along the Thames, with New Bridge Street and Farringdon Street

¹ It may perhaps be explained that the Foreign Settlements of Shanghai were originally French Concession south, British Concession centre, American Concession north and east. In 1863 the two latter were amalgamated into the International Settlement. The French retained their Concession as a separate administration of their own. The whole area directly governed and owned by foreigners is about thirteen square miles.

(converted into a canal for the sake of the picture) as the dividing line.

To complete the comparison it may be added that Hongkew and Yangtzepoo contain all the industrial wealth of Shanghai, mills, factories, wharves, warehouses, docks, waterworks, and the huge electric power station which feeds everything. A pleasant position for the foreign population. Even now, though there has been no fighting near Shanghai for over three years, the Japanese continue to dominate Hongkew and Yangtzepoo, the amount of control recovered by the Municipal Council of the International Settlement being very partial and continually liable to be interrupted when the Japanese Army gets an attack of nerves, to which it is very liable. Every Chinese crossing the Soochow Creek is required to bow to the Japanese sentries on duty at the bridges—a small matter, perhaps, which, however, illustrates how admirably the Japanese are *not* fitted to be colonists. If the Chinese do not salute, they are liable to be shot or bayoneted on the spot.

On 9 August, by which time, it may well be imagined, Chinese temper around Shanghai was boiling over events in the north, a Japanese officer and bluejacket were caught and killed when trying to enter a Chinese aerodrome at Hungjao, west of Shanghai. Two days later four Japanese cruisers and seven destroyers steamed up the Whangpoo and landed men and munitions in Yangtzepoo. The same night the 87th and 88th Divisions of the Chinese Army marched in and seized the terminus, in Hongkew, of the Shanghai-Nanking railway and Kiangwan, a big country village five miles to the north. Fighting began on the 13th.

As to who really was responsible there is some controversy. The Japanese contend that the Chinese had violated the agreement, which had closed the fighting in 1932, by marching into the Shanghai area. The Chinese replied that in view of the Japanese invasion of North China the 1932 agreement was void, which is certainly a good argument. It is in no way to the Chinese discredit if they decided to spread the war by bringing it to Shanghai, through which they could get the advantage of their superior

numbers and vast country, instead of leaving it concentrated in the north with all the advantage to Japan of supplies in Manchuria close at hand.

It is very much to the Chinese credit that although the Japanese were illegally using foreign-owned territory for their base, as they had done in 1932, the Chinese never attempted on either occasion to violate the foreign boundaries in replying to the attack.

At the beginning the Japanese were outnumbered by at least five or six to one, and were only enabled to hang on by the help of the guns and aeroplanes of the Japanese ships in the river. As it was, the Chinese for some weeks prevented a junction between the Japanese in Yangtzepoo and their reinforcements, which the Chinese continually penned up in groups wherever they landed along the Whangpoo, while the Chinese fort at Woosung reacted with great spirit and effect both to land and river attacks.

By 20 August the Japanese had landed 50,000 troops at Shanghai and Woosung, and these were by no means the last. How many had to be employed first and last is not known, but including the forces landed in November at Hangchow Bay and marched overland (which eventually turned the Chinese retreat into a confused flight by taking them in the flank), an estimate of 150,000 Japanese would probably be conservative.

Japanese fury now knew no bounds. The Chinese resistance had completely upset their plans, spoiled their timetable, and committed them to a much bigger undertaking than they had ever contemplated. Instead of a local 'incident' in a remote part of the north, which they had calculated on settling with little trouble and lots of loot in three or four months, their reckless brigandage had landed them in a full-dress, even if still undeclared, war with China. Worst of all, they had badly lost 'face.' The pleasant illusion that they could cut through the Chinese like a knife through cheese was shattered for ever. Although the carnage among the Chinese was terrible, Japan's losses ran into many thousands. Man to man, the Chinese were proving themselves much better soldiers than their foe, and in every civilized country in the world sympathy was

overwhelmingly on their side. One may judge of Japanese feelings by the fact that even the Premier, Prince Konoye, always reputed to be a sane and liberally minded man, lost his head and publicly declared that Japan must 'beat China to her knees so that she may no longer have the spirit to fight.' How many times since he must have regretted that wild, Clausewitzian speech!

For Shanghai's foreign community life was a purgatory. Hundreds of women and children had to be evacuated to Hongkong. Day and night the bombardment thundered on, the occasional variety of a machine-gun duel coming as almost a relief. The Chinese had sent forces round into the wooded country of Pootung on the opposite side of the Whangpoo, where they proved a serious annoyance to the Japanese rear. A dense cloud of smoke from burning villages hung over the surrounding country, and bullets and pieces of shrapnel continually fell in the Settlements, wounding and killing not a few. A terrible disaster occurred on 14 August when a Chinese aviator, sent out to attack the Japanese battleship *Idzumo*, lying in the river opposite the middle of the Settlement, accidentally dropped his bombs on the lower end of the Nanking Road, Shanghai's principal thoroughfare. The death-roll numbered over a thousand, including eleven foreigners, and as many more wounded. The cause of this dreadful accident has never been explained, though that it was an accident there is no doubt.

Twelve days later the British Ambassador, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, when travelling by car from Nanking to Shanghai with Lieutenant-Colonel Lovat-Fraser, the Military Attaché, and Mr. E. L. Hall-Patch, financial adviser to the Embassy, was attacked by Japanese aeroplanes and shot in the spine, in spite of the fact that the British flag was painted on the roof of the car and the aeroplanes came down so low that they could not possibly have missed seeing it. The common explanation is that the Japanese believed that General Chiang Kai-shek was in the car, or, if not that, then in another one, and that they shot at every car indiscriminately. Obviously this did not excuse their machine-gunning a car under the

flag of a supposedly friendly Power. But anything is to be expected from Japanese soldiers in the excitement of battle.

The most discreditable part of a very discreditable affair was the protracted insistence of the Japanese Foreign Office that it had not been proved that Japanese aeroplanes had done the shooting. It was not until 22 September that Japan replied to the British protest with a formal expression of regret, coupled with the preposterous suggestion that 'the incident [*sic*] may have been caused by Japanese 'planes which mistook the Ambassador's car as a military bus or truck.'

Only a few days after the attack on the Ambassador's car some Chinese aeroplanes, sent out over the Yangtze to attack Japanese transports which had been signalled approaching, bombed the American liner *President Hoover*, doing damage and wounding some of the crew. Without a moment's delay the Chinese accepted full responsibility, apologized, and offered to pay damages.

Throughout August the Chinese held their own well and the Japanese could make little headway. Two appointments at the end of this month are worth mentioning as further illustration of how bygone dissensions were now utterly forgotten. General Pai Chung-hsi was appointed Commander-in-Chief of General Chiang Kai-shek's troops, and General Chang Fah-kuei, former commander of a formidable force known as 'the Ironsides,' and once one of General Chiang's bitterest opponents, was appointed leader of the forces in the provinces of Kiangsu, Chêkiang, and Anhui. But by the end of the first week in September weight of metal was beginning to tell, and the Chinese, still keeping their right wing firmly based on the outskirts of Shanghai, were forced to wheel back from the neighbourhood of Woosung, behind the Woosung-Shanghai railway, the left-hand end of their line being based at Liuhö on the Yangtze.

They clung to this line until 27 October when the Japanese, by the heaviest concentration of artillery yet seen, broke through the Chinese centre. Again and again the Chinese had counter-attacked with extraordinary courage, killing great numbers of the enemy. One battalion of the 88th

Division in a village named Tazang, refused to retreat, and died to the last man. At Chenju, the first station out of Shanghai on the railway to Nanking, General Chu Yao-hua, with a small force, hung on heroically to cover the retreat of the main force, and eventually shot himself when he could do no more rather than be made a prisoner.

Mention has been made of the 'Hindenberg Line' round Soochow, about fifty miles from Shanghai. Here the vast Tai Hu, almost an inland sea, with numerous other lakes and a network of creeks around it, interspersed by ranges of steep hills, provided the groundwork for a splendid defensive system which had been prepared under the German officers' directions, the whole system linking up with heavy booms across the Yangtze at the Kiangyin forts.

Whether the Chinese could by this time have held this line, shaken as they were by their terrible trial at Shanghai, is doubtful. The common opinion is that they had held on too long, and when their centre was broken they were unable to form a new line anywhere, while the Japanese, now helped by the Shanghai-Nanking railway, were able to advance at great speed. But the question was put beyond doubt by the unwelcome appearance of a large Japanese force which had landed in Hangchow Bay, about fifty miles south of Shanghai, and come up by Sungkiang (Gordon's old headquarters in the T'aiiping Rebellion) along the Shanghai-Hangchow railway.

There is a mystery about this landing. Some say that the Chinese had neglected to protect the bay; others that the General in command had been bought. Either way the Japanese appearance in this quarter was fatal. Besides taking the Chinese in the flank as they fell back from Shanghai, they brought overland shallow-draft motor-boats and ferried troops across the Tai Hu to take the 'Hindenberg Line' in the rear. Further retreat became inevitable, and by 4 December Tanyang, the centre of the last line of defence before Nanking, fell to Japan.

During the days of their advance on Nanking the Japanese were guilty of a series of attacks on British and American ships on the Yangtze which, in more robust times, might well have led to war. On 5 December Japanese

aeroplanes heavily bombed the British steamers *Tuckwo* and *Tatung* at Wuhu, the next big port, about fifty miles upstream from Nanking. The *Tuckwo*, crammed with 2000 Chinese refugees, caught fire and burnt to the water. How many of the refugees perished will never be known.

On 12 December H.M.S. *Ladybird* was shelled by a Japanese battery at Wuhu from a quarter-of-a-mile range, and was hit six times, one man being killed and two wounded. H.M.S. *Bee*, flagship of the British Admiral of the Yangtze, hastening to the spot, was also fired on by the same battery. The excuse calmly offered by Colonel Hashimoto, the Japanese commander, was that he had orders to fire on all ships on the river. But is it conceivable that these orders included ships flying the British flag?

On the same day H.M.S. *Scarab* and *Cricket* were attacked by aeroplanes a few miles above Nanking. But they promptly returned the fire and the Japanese made off.

The sinking of the U.S. gunboat *Panay*, also on 12 December, is as outrageous an event as can be recalled. She was bombed by aeroplanes about thirty miles above Nanking and completely wrecked. The aeroplanes came down low and machine-gunned the survivors as they rowed ashore. Three Americans were killed and seventeen wounded. Then a Japanese launch appeared, fired more shots into the *Panay*, and sent a party on board her which, however, only remained for a few minutes. Shortly afterwards the *Panay* sank. H.M.S. *Bee* came down the river at full speed to rescue the Americans, who were more or less marooned on a marshy bank. Altogether four of the people in the *Panay* were killed, twelve seriously, and thirty-eight less seriously, wounded.

Tokyo was badly frightened, the more so because President Roosevelt requested that his protest should be conveyed to the Emperor. It is unlikely that this was done, but apologies were showered on every American in sight. The Japanese Army in China denied everything that it could and continued to deny even when irrefutably proved to be lying. Eventually the Japanese naval authorities accepted responsibility, and Japan paid two million dollars indemnity. But the United States refused to accept the plea that the

attack was 'a mistake.' An apology was made to Great Britain for the firing on British gunboats, but she, too, rejected the Japanese allegations of a 'mistake.'

In the absence of any other explanation it seems very possible that the Japanese aviators, and Colonel Hashimoto, intoxicated with the long-delayed victory at Shanghai and 'swollen with the rank mists' of Young Officer agitation, thought that the promised elimination of the white races from the Far East might as well begin then as later. Alternatively, they were merely mad with blood lust.

The sack of Nanking by the Japanese will go down in history as an expression of horror equal to the sack of Magdeburg. British officers, who had taken part in the Allied expedition for the relief of the Legations at Peking in the Boxer rising, could not understand what had happened to the Japanese soldiers. In 1900 the Japanese contingent had been conspicuously well behaved. Excepting the British they were the most orderly and restrained. At Nanking they behaved like fiends unchained.

Already the Japanese Army had given ample proof that terrorism of civilians was one of the means by which it proposed to induce the Chinese to establish a Government (as Prince Konoye had said in his speech about beating China to her knees) friendly to Japan. During the fighting at Shanghai, the Japanese bombings of the residential parts of Nanking had drawn forth a strong condemnation by the League of Nations. Repeatedly, too, Japanese aeroplanes had bombed hordes of refugees at the southern station at Shanghai, in towns along the railway and in trains. In one such attack, at the Shanghai station, three hundred people were killed and many wounded. But Nanking was something more than terrorism.

The attack began on 10 December. The Chinese either had no heart for the defence or were badly led—Purple Mountain, for instance, which overlooks the city from easy gun range, was scarcely defended—and the city fell on the 13th. Then began the most terrible slaughter of Chinese troops. The infection of panic spreads quickly, and their one idea was to get away through the northern suburb of Hsiakuan between the city walls and the Yangtze,

in order to escape up-river. But Japanese forces had been landed on the Pukou side (opposite Nanking), and the fugitives were shot down by hundreds. In the gateway leading to Hsiakuan corpses lay so thickly that vehicles passing in and out had to drive over them.


The Japanese were in full possession of the city within twenty-four hours, and they were then let loose to do their worst. A group of fifteen foreigners, Americans, British, Danes, and Germans, after having failed to persuade the Japanese to allow them to form a neutral zone before the city fell, stayed on to give what protection they could. They saw what happened.

For nearly a month the Japanese looted, murdered, burnt, and raped every female they could find, from mere children to old women. Many women were raped in the open street. Some were even carried off forcibly from the foreigners' houses in which they had sought safety. Every shop was ransacked and then burnt down. Refugees were plundered even of the few cents they possessed. The tale of murders is almost too atrocious for words. Soldiers who were promised safe conduct and work if they gave themselves up were taken away in droves and machine-gunned. Small boys were bayoneted to death. The foreigners made repeated appeals to the Japanese Consul, but he was completely powerless. From the officers no help was to be expected.

When the news of the atrocities that were being committed in Nanking leaked out, the outburst of horror startled even the Japanese commanders. At the time the greatest caution had to be used in printing anything that might be connected with the foreigners in the city, though since then their reports have been published in book form,¹ with names and dates in full. They constitute such a record as cannot be excelled in history. Nanking was the worst example, perhaps, but all cities in the Shanghai-Nanking area (and in most provinces entered by the Japanese) suffered unspeakably.

Soochow, a rich and thriving city, suffered a drop in population from 350,000 to under 500 when the Japanese

¹ *What War Means*, by H. J. Timperley.



MAO TSE-TUNG

The famous Chinese Communist political leader, sometimes called the Chinese Lenin.



CHU TEH

The great Communist General of the 8th Route Army, unquestionably one of the most brilliant strategists in the war.

occupied it. Sungkiang, with a population of some 200,000, was practically wiped out. Kashing, a noted silk centre, was wrecked and completely evacuated. In Wusih, another famous silk city, all the mills except one, and hotels, shops, business houses, and private houses, were burned down. This dreadful record might be extended indefinitely.

Meanwhile, on 8 January, 1938, the *Sin Shun Pao* of Shanghai, a Japanese paper published in Chinese, wrote as follows :

'Before the Japanese troops entered the city (Nanking) the herds of refugees suffered from the oppression of the anti-Japanese armies of the Chinese. Not a grain of rice or millet could reach their hands. The sufferings of plain good citizens were infinitely miserable.

'Fortunately the Imperial Army entered the city, put their bayonets into their sheaths and stretched forth merciful hands in order to examine and to heal, diffusing grace and favour to the excellent true citizens.

'Many thousands of refugees cast off their former absurd attitude of opposing the Japanese and clasped their hands in congratulations for receiving assurance of life. Men and women, old and young, bent down to kneel in salutation to the Imperial Army.

'Within the Refugee Zone Japanese soldiers gave out military bread, cakes, and cigarettes to refugees of both sexes and all ages . . . the crowds of refugees, beaming with joy, could not cease their thanksgiving . . . Nanking is now the best place for all countries to watch, for here one breathes an atmosphere of peaceful residence and happy work.'

Strange, is it not, that for many months to come it was quite impossible for any foreigner to obtain leave from the Japanese Army to enter Nanking. One might have thought that the Japanese would welcome in all the world to see the paradise they had created.

CHAPTER XII

THE CHINA INCIDENT—FROM NANKING TO HANKOW

IT will be convenient to finish the survey of military operations before touching other features in Japan's attempt to subjugate China, such as the setting up of puppet Governments and the economic warfare to which she resorted when armies had proved powerless to break Chinese resistance.

When Nanking fell, most observers thought that China was defeated. The Japanese Army certainly thought so, and published a vainglorious notice that the Kuomintang Government was now 'completely destroyed and exterminated.' However, the Japanese Government thought there was still enough life in it to be worth the offer of peace terms, and Dr. von Trautmann, the German Ambassador, was persuaded to go to Hankow and see what he could do. The Japanese terms, as reported from several sources, were as follows :

- Repudiation of Communism ; co-operation with Japan against it ;

- Economic co-operation, including the building of new railways and establishments of Sino-Japanese air services ;

- China to acknowledge the justice of the Japanese invasion ; no indemnity, but Japan to have a lien on certain revenues, including the Customs ;

- Recognition by China of Manchukuo ;

- Demilitarized zones round Shanghai and other places to be designated by Japan ;

- China to employ Japanese advisers, and agree to Japanese troops being stationed at points designated by Japan.

It is obvious that acceptance of these terms would have given Japan a strangle-hold on China. Yet there is reason to believe that Prince Konoye, the Japanese Premier, really thought that they would be accepted, and that he held back

a statement of the results of an Imperial Conference which met early in January, in the hope of being able to announce that China had capitulated. He was bitterly disappointed that she did not.

Whether *post hoc* or *propter hoc*, cannot be said, but on 16 January, 1938, came the Japanese Government's declaration that it would henceforth not recognize nor have any dealings with General Chiang's Government. It is generally supposed that Japan's intention was to frighten the Chinese people and detach them from the Generalissimo. It had exactly the opposite effect, in fact, no Japanese proclamation could have been better calculated to rally the Chinese to General Chiang's side.

With Madame Chiang, the Generalissimo had left Nanking for Hankow six days before it fell. There he announced his resignation from his political posts in order to devote himself to military reorganization. He was receiving large quantities of arms from Europe which were shipped through¹ Hongkong and up the Canton-Hankow railway, and there was never any lack of men in China. In spite of the slaughter at Shanghai and Nanking, vast numbers of Chinese soldiers got away. Some went south into Chêkiang; others westwards along the south bank of the Yangtze. The latter have since been formed into the 4th Route Army by Communist agents from the north. Both they and the men in Chêkiang have lived to be very sharp thorns in the Japanese side. The ability of considerable armies thus to form and maintain themselves far from contact with their Government and to continue doing effective service is a vivid illustration of the vastness and resources of China.

How many men escaped up-river to Hankow is uncertain. But by the end of January General Chiang had formed a new army of fully 250,000, which in the coming Battle of the Railways was to prove that it could give a very good account of itself.

China's railways north of the Yangtze are roughly in the form of the letter A, with Peking at the apex. The eastern

¹ Contrary to aggrieved Japanese complaints, these arms did not come from Great Britain. Most of them came from Germany. Some consignments came from Russia, the bills for them actually being backed by Germany.

leg extends down to Pukou on the Yangtze opposite Nanking; the western leg to Hankow. The crossbar is formed by the Lung-hai railway which starts at Haichow on the coast, crosses the Tientsin-Pukou railway at Hsuchowfu, travels across China crossing the Peking-Hankow line at Chengchow (just south of the Yellow River) and continues to Sianfu in Shensi, scene of General Chiang's kidnapping.

The Japanese had fought their way down the Peking-Hankow railway to the north bank of the Yellow River by the end of October, but could get no further, owing to the strong Chinese resistance.

On the Tientsin-Pukou line they also reached the north bank of the Yellow River by the end of November, but there they stopped for a while to see whether Han Fu-chu, the Governor, would make terms with them. Han had ruled his province with considerable ability, and not a little sympathy for the 'underdog,' the Chinese peasant. But he belonged to the old-fashioned order of Tuchun, with no loyalty to the Central Government, and a strong feeling that Shantung was his own province to do with as he liked. When the Japanese decided to push into Shantung he made but a half-hearted resistance, and the Japanese easily crossed the Yellow River and entered Tsinanfu, the provincial capital, on 27 December. They hastened down the branch railway to Tsingtao, the old German port, where they had vast possessions. But they were too late. The Chinese troops, acting under General Chiang's order, had blown up all the Japanese mills, representing £12,000,000 worth of capital, and had vanished. Han Fu-chu, as previously related, was taken to Hankow and shot.

Hsuchowfu, the great railway junction, now became the Japanese objective, though they did not get under way with their attack, which was made along the Tientsin-Pukou railway from both north and south, until February, by which time the Chinese had assembled fully 200,000 men round Hsuchowfu with new aeroplanes and guns. Probably the Japanese Generals were still in a mood to despise their opponents. If so, they had some very unpleasant surprises in the ensuing weeks.

The Chinese commander was one of the famous Kwangsi

pair ; General Li Tsung-jen, whose ability has been proved again and again all through the war. By a series of clever flank attacks he delayed the Japanese advance for some weeks. Then, in May, he succeeded in encircling a large Japanese force at Taierchuang. One Japanese division was completely wiped out, another badly mauled, and the Chinese captured a large quantity of tanks and guns.

This brilliant victory (which was followed shortly afterwards by another Chinese success at Ichowfu in Shantung) naturally caused wide excitement throughout China. It was not only a splendid tonic after the loss of Shanghai and Nanking, but it shattered once and for all the myth of Japanese invincibility. The latter were to win plenty more victories, but the old terror of their name had gone for ever. On a conservative estimate it is probable that the Japanese lost 20,000 men killed in the two battles mentioned besides unknown numbers wounded.

The Japanese now had to collect reinforcements from all over the north before they could move again. Towards the end of May, by a double advance from the south-east and north-west, they got some troops behind the Chinese on the Lung-hai railway, and the Chinese had to fall back from Hsuchowfu. Then was heard the first of many Japanese boasts that they had 'enclosed the Chinese in a ring of steel' from which escape was impossible. Yet it is a simple fact that these boasts have never yet been realized. It is on such occasions that the individualist genius of the Chinese soldier completely baffles his enemy. He seems to need no leadership, but, like the Cheshire cat, fades into the landscape to reappear fifty miles off. Apart from this trick a large part of the Chinese Army broke through the Japanese westward of them and retreated along the Lung-hai in good order taking the bulk of their equipment with them. That they were anything but demoralized is shown by the fact that when Major-General Doihara pushed ahead too rapidly, the Chinese caught and surrounded him. He was so closely held that his troops had to be provisioned by aeroplane, and Japanese reinforcements only arrived just in time to save him.

As against the tremendous moral gain for China of the

victory at Taierchuang and the losses inflicted on the Japanese, China's own losses in killed and wounded cannot have been less than 60,000 men, while the whole of the Tientsin-Pukou railway was in Japanese hands as well as a portion of the Lung-hai. For many miles round Hsuchowfu the country was a desert, dotted with ruined villages and broken implements of war. The population had fled, joining in that vast migration from east to west, which has already been spoken of. And with their going the Chinese commanders, following the Russians' example in 1812, enforced their terrible 'scorched earth' policy. Nothing was left which could be of any use to the Japanese. All food and all beasts were carried off; bridges were blown up; the roads which the Chinese Government had made with so much pride were hurriedly ploughed under; fields were devastated; the few mines were destroyed; it was a solitude which the most imaginative Japanese spokesman could not call a peace. But worse was to follow.

With Hsuchowfu in their hands the Japanese started a thrust along the Lung-hai railway westwards, with the object of taking Chengchow (the junction of this railway as mentioned above with the Peking-Hankow), south of the Yellow River, which they had so far failed to reach from the north. This would have enabled them to come down the Peking-Hankow line upon Hankow, the Chinese Government's seat. They had actually got within twenty-five miles of Chengchow by June. If they had reached it then, they would probably have got Hankow four months before they did, and, with no time to effect their retreat westwards in an orderly manner, the Chinese might indeed have been conquered. To stop them the Chinese took the desperate course of cutting the banks of the Yellow River.

This famous river, rising among the mountains of the remote north-west of China, flows through Kansu, between the borders of Shensi and Shansi, and then turns sharply eastwards, forming the boundary between the latter province and Honan; it eventually finds its way into the sea north of the Shantung promontory. Five times in recorded history 'China's Sorrow' has changed its course, the last time

being in 1852, with untold destruction of life and property. In summer, when the mountain snows melt in the north-west, the Yellow River is in places five or six times as wide as in winter, and from the loose nature of the soil through which it flows it carries down huge quantities of silt. Thus, owing to the Chinese age-long habit of banking up the sides of the river instead of dredging it, there are long stretches in Honan where the river's bed is as much as sixteen feet above the surrounding plains.

It was between Kaifeng and Chengchow that the Chinese cut the banks. The Japanese papers raised a terrific cry against General Chiang Kai-shek's inhumanity towards the millions of Chinese peasants who inhabit the Honan plains. But, in fact, the peasants knew well what was coming and had removed themselves and their cattle westwards before the flood occurred. A few cuts in the bank were all that was necessary, and the mass of water surging through them soon did the rest, tearing down the intervening portions of bank till the whole Yellow River was rushing southwards in a great yellow-brown torrent many miles wide.

It caught the Japanese troops utterly unprepared. Many were drowned ; masses of guns, munition lorries, and equipment were sunk in the waters. The Japanese brought up sappers and as many Chinese peasants as they could catch, and strove to stop up the breaches in the bank. It would probably have been a hopeless task in any case as the river up-stream was still rising, but the Chinese had artillery trained on the spot from the north bank, and between fire and flood work was impossible.

Hankow was saved for another four months, but at what ultimate cost to China it is impossible yet to say. Much of the flood water went into the Hwai River to increase the annual floods which, before the war, the Chinese Government had been working to overcome by making an outlet for the river to the sea. But the worst fear, namely that the Yellow River would join up with the Yangtze, has not been realized. A huge area southward of Kaifeng in Honan has been converted into an inland sea, and this may prove the ultimate solution. There are other lakes in China which were probably formed in a similar manner, for

instance, the Tai Hu near Soochow, which although of vast extent, is very shallow. China is so big that she can carry such inland seas without inconvenience, and it is to be remembered that most of the peasants from the flooded area have long ago made new homes in the west. Downstream from Kaifeng the bed of the Yellow River is reported to be practically dry. One cannot but think it will be a long time, if ever, before the great stream flows through its old channel again.

Two other events may be mentioned of this period for the light they throw on Japanese methods in China. Shortly before the fall of Hsuehowfu the Japanese attacked and took Amoy. They were seen by the crews of foreign merchant vessels lining up captive Chinese soldiers on the waterfront and mercilessly shooting them down.

Just a year later Amoy was to provide one of the few examples of foreign Powers standing up resolutely to Japan and of the fact that, when they did so, the Japanese invariably gave in. On 12 May, 1939, on the pretext that the Municipal Council of Kulangsu (the island foreign settlement at Amoy) had been negligent in respect of the murder of the pro-Japanese Chairman of the Amoy Chamber of Commerce, the Japanese landed two hundred marines on the island and presented a list of demands which would have put the Council completely under their control. The British Government made the usual futile protest in Tokyo. But when, on the 17th, the American Admiral arrived and landed sailors on Kulangsu the British Admiral followed suit, and so did the French. Next day the British Ambassador in Tokyo was informed that the Japanese marines were being withdrawn.

They were not all withdrawn, however, and an equal number of British, American, and French guards were left on Kulangsu to support the Council. The quarrel dragged on until October, when a settlement was reached on the Council's agreeing to engage some additional Japanese police officers. But its independence was preserved and the Japanese foiled. It was an instructive example of the unquestionable fact that Japan cannot afford to risk a breach with Great Britain and America.

The other event in the early summer of 1938, which excited world-wide horror, was the hideous Japanese bombing of Canton from the end of May till the middle of June. In February the Japanese had tried to capture Canton by the aid of 'thirty thousand gold bowmen.' But the Chinese officers who were to have staged a revolt in the city merely took the money and reported the matter to the authorities ; and when the Japanese advanced up the Pearl River they were met with such a withering fire from the Bocca Tigris forts that they were driven back.

Naturally this memory rankled. There was also no doubt that very great quantities of munitions were passing through Canton and up the railway to Hankow. But in the event it was abundantly clear that military objectives were but a minor part of the Japanese aim, and that the real purpose was terrorization by indiscriminate destruction.

Day after day from 29 May to 16 June aeroplanes sailed over Canton discharging their bombs. Since the Revolution many of the old narrow lanes of Canton had been replaced by broad boulevards flanked with fine, many-storied buildings. Now they were deliberately reduced to heaps of rubble, while many fires added to the ruination of this great, populous, and wealthy city, home of the most exquisite crafts in silk, ivory, lacquer, brass, and porcelain. Over 3000 people were killed and many thousands more wounded.

Horrified protests poured into Tokyo from Washington and London, but the Japanese were not to be turned from their cruel game. Indeed, the Foreign Office spokesman frankly admitted that their object was to terrorize the Chinese people and Government into submission. It may be said nowadays that the world is divided into two classes, those who believe in making war only on armed forces, and those who believe in indiscriminate murder. The latter are obviously impervious to any argument based on decency and honour. But it is curious that the Japanese, who in spite of their boasted superiority are keenly sensitive to world opinion, should not have realized that their brutality in China has now caused them to be regarded with disgust by every civilized nation, without bringing victory one step

nearer. In the first year of war they made one thousand four hundred air-raids on the province of Kwangtung, of which over eight hundred were directed at Canton. Not by a hairsbreadth has the Chinese will to win been deflected, even in Kwangtung. Many of China's best troops continue to be drawn from that province.

Throughout the summer and early autumn the Japanese slowly fought their way up the Yangtze to Hankow. Space forbids describing the campaign in full. It must suffice to say that the Chinese land forces acquitted themselves nobly, contesting every inch of ground ; their river defences showed up very much less well. A formidable boom had been built across the Yangtze at Matang, just below Kiukiang, where the river narrows and high hills on either side make fine positions for defence. The Yangtze is fullest of water in the summer, and the Japanese were able to cross the boom in shallow-draft boats. But even so, Matang and Kiukiang should never have fallen so easily as they did, the forts at either end having by some misunderstanding hardly fired a shot.

With Kiukiang captured on 26 July, the Japanese were well posted for a further advance on Hankow, although there were other booms to be forced, and the Chinese armies south of the river were fighting like tigers. If Matang had been defended with the same spirit, it is quite probable the Japanese would never have reached Hankow before the Yangtze waters fell in the autumn,¹ when further approach by the river would have been impossible, and the whole fortunes of the war might have been altered. In the rank damp heat which makes the Yangtze Valley one of the most intolerable places in the world in summer-time, cholera added to the Japanese difficulties. Between sickness and battle their losses cannot, by foreign calculation, have been less than 100,000 men. Those of the Chinese were probably double that.

On 10 October, 'the Double Ten' anniversary of the

¹ The writer will never forget his first sight of the Yangtze at Hankow, which happened to be in November. From the Bund one looked down into a vast chasm with what seemed a quite insignificant stream at the bottom. The difference between summer and winter levels, due to the snows in Tibet where the great river rises, is from 70-80 feet.

outbreak of the Revolution in 1911, the Chinese had the joy of trapping and slaughtering a large Japanese force at Teian, some distance south-west of Kiukiang. They claimed that it was a bigger victory than Taierchuang. But it was their last success in the defence of Hankow. Within two days came the news of a Japanese Army landing at Bias Bay, just northwards of Hongkong, for an attack overland on Canton.

It is amazing that so little effort was made to defend this all-important city, China's only remaining means of effective communication with the sea. At Bias Bay the country for a short distance inland is flat and unfavourable for defence. But behind that, what with hills, rivers, and lakes, there is the making of three good lines on which the comparatively small force of 35,000 Japanese should have been held. The distance from Bias Bay to Canton is over eighty miles as the crow flies. Yet the Japanese were in possession of the city within nine days. The local Chinese General was degraded, other Kuomintang leaders disappeared. They may have been supine in taking the necessary precautions to fortify the approaches from Bias Bay. But it is clear that when the crisis came the Chinese had not enough men on the spot; and, if they could have been spared from the Yangtze Valley, they could not have reached Canton in time.

The loss of Canton sealed the fate of Hankow. Having pushed far enough up-river to be to the west of the Yellow River floods the Japanese were able to get astride the Peking-Hankow railway and come down on the city from the north as well as by the river and from the south-east. The population of Hankow had begun to leave—another mass-emigration—on 19 October. General Chiang Kai-shek did not leave until the 25th. On the 26th the Japanese entered Hankow and Wuchang, the provincial capital on the south bank of the Yangtze. The Triple Cities—Hankow, Hanyang, and Wuchang, Queen of the Yangtze, were theirs.

But not the Chinese Government, its Army, nor anything of value. For weeks before the loss of Hankow, mill machinery, electric-light plant (some of it the Japanese

had put in and payment of the bill had not been completed), tools, engineering appliances, materials of all kinds had been carted away to West China. What could not be removed was wrecked. Every factory building in Wuchang and Hanyang was destroyed, most of the Japanese Concession in Hankow was razed to the ground.

The era of 'positional warfare' was over. The Japanese were still as far from final victory as ever. Between them and the new capital lay nine hundred miles of river and the terrific barrier of the Yangtze Gorges flanked by barren mountains. They were now to wrestle with China's strategy of time and space—the time of her own inexhaustible patience, the spaces of her endless, unassimilable plains and mountains.

CHAPTER XIII

THE STRATEGY OF SPACE AND TIME

SINCE the fall of Canton and Hankow the war has lost all coherent shape. Seen in retrospect the Japanese tactics remind one of the sort of ineffectual schoolmaster most of us can remember, wildly scattering impositions over the class without the slightest disciplinary result. Throughout 1939-40 Ministries succeeded each other rapidly in Japan, each one pledged to bring 'the China incident' to a quick conclusion. The arrival of each new Premier was the signal for some fresh burst of activity in China, for the most part fruitless, not infrequently ending in real disaster.

Although Japan had occupied all China's most important cities and a large part of the rivers and railways, her position might be described as only one of dots and dashes. Over the intervening country her control was of the scantiest. Even last July, when, with the temporary closing of the Burma road and Nanning and Ichang in Japanese hands, China's fortunes seemed at their blackest, the Chinese Government continued to administer two-thirds of the *hsien*, or counties, within the Japanese lines, as if there had been no invasion at all. By now this proportion must have largely increased by the Japanese evacuation of Kwangsi and the ground recovered from them in the north.

One real tragedy has to be recorded in November, 1938. From Hankow the Japanese had pushed up the Yangtze to Yochow, where the Siang River affords a good waterway to Changsha, capital of Hunan. Alarmed by the prospect of the enemy reaching Changsha the local authorities, in compliance with the 'scorched earth' policy, had the city evacuated and burnt large parts of it.

Changsha was not only a beautiful city, adorned with many lovely old temples and ancestral halls; it was an

historic monument of the greatest importance. The T'aping Rebellion which had destroyed all other relics of the past in South China broke to pieces on the walls of Changsha, which thus continued to preserve more of the atmosphere of Imperial China, with many solid monuments of that time, than any other city in China. Not only did the Japanese never reach Changsha, but twice in coming months they were to be heavily defeated in trying to do so. The burning appears to have been due to some terrible misunderstanding.

On 22 December, 1938, Prince Konoye made another attempt to persuade China to make peace on terms certainly milder than those of a year before, namely, recognition by China of Manchukuo, China to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact, Japanese troops to be stationed at certain points for the suppression of Communism, and Inner Mongolia to be a special anti-Communist area, the Japanese to have freedom of residence in China for trade, and special facilities to be given them in the development of natural resources, particularly in North China and Inner Mongolia. Nothing, it will be noticed, was said about Japanese advisers, and demands for territory or indemnities were expressly disclaimed. Japan formally repeated her respect for China's sovereignty. It was also stated that 'Japan does not intend to exercise an economic monopoly in China, nor to demand that China shall limit the interests of those third Powers which grasp the meaning of the new East Asia and are willing to act accordingly.'

Here we have the first intimation of that 'new order in East Asia' on which Japan has since incessantly harped. The theme was further enlarged upon by Mr. Arita, the Foreign Minister, in his statement on policy in the Diet on 14 January, 1939. "It is the Japanese Government's firm conviction," he said, "that such a new order is not only absolutely necessary for the existence and the healthy development of Japan, Manchukuo, and China, but also conducive to the real peace and well-being of the whole world." But neither then, nor since, has it been possible to induce Japan to define her 'new order' in concrete terms.

Prince Konoye's offer made no impression on the Chinese Government as a whole. Only Mr. Wang Ching-wei and a few of his satellites took a different view ; of whom more later on. China did not trust Japan, and with very good cause. Moreover, in November General Chiang Kai-shek had issued a statement, not only declaring his determination to fight on, but emphasizing that the real fight, based on the strategy of drawing Japan on into the interior and wearing her down, was only just beginning. This declaration was enthusiastically approved by the People's Political Council meeting in Chungking.

Eight months later, in an interview with the manager of the German Trans-Ocean news agency, General Chiang asserted firmly that China was in a position to carry on the war even without munitions from abroad ; that there could be no hope of peace until Japan withdrew her troops from China ; and that no mediation by third Powers would be accepted.

There is a good deal of reason to think that this second rebuff had much to do with Prince Konoye's resigning the Premiership in January, 1939.

A great part of 1939 saw tremendous efforts by the Japanese to extend their control over southern Shansi. The ultimate object was to cross the Yellow River and advance along the Lung-hai railway to Sianfu, in order to cut the road by which China was receiving supplies from Russia. Seven attempts were made to drive the Chinese from the Chungtiao mountains which guard the railway from the north, and all were defeated. Before the end of the year the Chinese had taken the offensive and recaptured two rather important towns which they had lost earlier. The Japanese thus ended the year in Shansi worse off than they began it. Yet without control of the whole of this province, they cannot get possession of its mineral wealth which they so greatly need. They have made further efforts but without success, nor have they yet been able to force their way into Shensi.

Between May and July, 1939, the Japanese launched an attack up the Han River valley from Hankow, with the object of capturing the important town of Siangyang and

thence advancing overland to Ichang, the big treaty port at the foot of the Gorges. The Yangtze makes a loop to the south between Ichang and Hankow, double the distance between the two towns by land. No detailed accounts of the struggle, which continued for several weeks, are available, but the Chinese appear to have used their favourite tactics of drawing on the Japanese by a feigned retreat and then attacking their rear. Certain it is that the Japanese attempt was completely defeated and that the Chinese improved their position along the Han River.

This reverse was followed by a conspicuous defeat for the Japanese in September when they tried to march from Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi, across country to seize Changsha. Although, as described earlier in this chapter, the city had been largely destroyed, the position it occupies on the Canton-Hankow railway is extremely important. If the Japanese had captured it, they would have been able to get possession of the whole of this railway of which hitherto they have never controlled more than the two ends. On this occasion the Chinese strategy was really admirable. Reports were circulated that they did not intend to try to hold Changsha. The Japanese were allowed to march almost within sight of its walls before the Chinese fell upon their rear forcing them to make an extremely expensive retreat. By the middle of October they were back where they had started at Nanchang. Other efforts conducted in connection with the advance on Changsha to round up the Chinese forces in the Sin River valley (between Nanchang and Changsha) also failed with serious loss.

But to offset the Chinese successes the Japanese dealt China a heavy blow in November when they landed troops at Pakhoi, in the extreme south-east of China, and advancing rapidly across the intervening eighty miles captured the town of Nanning, a key-point on the road to Indo-China, by which the Chinese had continued, after the loss of Canton, to draw supplies from abroad. The loss of Nanning also blocked the trade that had been passing through the border treaty port of Lungchow, before the war a somnolent little place of small business, but until Nanning fell doing a roaring trade.

Considering the mountainous and often difficult nature of the road from the coast to Nanning, it is another of the mysteries of the war, in which the Chinese alternately have shown the greatest determination and sagacity, and at other times inexplicable lack of foresight, why Nanning was not adequately defended. Apart from its tradal importance its possession by the Japanese presented a real danger of a further advance upon Kunming, capital of Yunnan, whence they could conceivably have pressed on to Chungking, while also stopping all inward and outward traffic by the Burma road.

It also put the Japanese in a favourable position to bomb the railway from Haiphong to Kunming, another avenue of supplies to China of which Japan had repeatedly complained to France. Bomb it they did, and by wrecking a train in the mouth of a tunnel near the Indo-China border brought all traffic to a standstill. Although the railway had been built and was owned by the French, they could do nothing, being themselves by now at war with Germany, but the bombing caused great indignation in America, from which no little material had passed into China over this railway.

If the Chinese could not hold Nanning they effectively smashed an attempt by the Japanese to extend their holding at a town named Pingyang, thirty miles north of Nanning. And shortly afterwards they defeated yet another Japanese effort to reach Changsha, this time directed up the railway from Canton. On both occasions they used identically the same tactics of allowing the Japanese to advance and then closing in upon them from all sides.

They also managed to some extent to neutralize the loss of Nanning by making another road further west into Indo-China, not so good as the old one, but serviceable enough. The continual ingenuity of the Chinese in getting themselves out of tight corners must be peculiarly exasperating to the Japanese, who organize excellently, but are poor inventively when things do not proceed according to plan.

One extremely important event of 1939, though its bearing on the war with China was comparatively secondary,

was the Japanese seizure of the island of Hainan in the Gulf of Tonking, and within easy striking distance of Indo-China. Although the island belongs to China, France had always taken the attitude that it lay within her sphere of influence, and that she would not tolerate its occupation by another Power.

Consultations were held between the British and French Governments and protests were duly lodged in Tokyo, which replied that the occupation was only temporary, due to the need of tightening the blockade of China, that Japan had no intention of occupying the island, or indeed any part of China permanently. And so forth and so on. It had all been heard fifty times before.

It seems strange that the British and French Governments did not at least order some marines or bluejackets to be landed on Hainan (as they did with such good results at Amoy). The moral effect of such action, in showing that they did not intend to acquiesce in the island's passing under Japanese control permanently or impermanently, would have been great and could have been improved upon at a more convenient time. There was no doubt in the mind of anyone acquainted with Japanese policy that the occupation of Hainan was a direct step towards the furtherance of Japan's aims in the South Seas, which ought to have been challenged immediately. But Great Britain had lost the knack of anything more than empty protests in Tokyo; and of the French Government's inability to take decisive action it is sadly needless to speak.

The Chinese suffered another serious reverse in June, 1940, when the Japanese made a determined thrust up the Yangtze and took Ichang, 400 miles up-stream from Hankow. Not only did the loss of this port interfere with considerable internal trade of 'free China's,' but it gave the Japanese an aerodrome within 500 miles of the capital. Again they resorted to their cruel and futile bombing. Twenty-three air-raids were made on Chungking in less than a month. Chungking is built on a steep promontory between the Yangtze and a tributary stream, but since it has become the capital large suburbs have spread out on the more level ground below. These, however, contained nothing

but business and residential houses, some hospitals, and the headquarters of foreign Embassies. All Government offices, as the Japanese knew very well, for everyone else did, were well underground in the rocky sides of the old town, which has also been honeycombed with refuges for the public. Yet it was against the purely non-official, non-military part of Chungking that they directed their bombs, reducing almost the whole quarter, including an American hospital, to ruins. Even after nearly three years of war the Japanese had not realized that such barbarism has no effect but to lower them still further in the world's black books and to score up another mark against themselves in China's memory.

From the time of the French collapse before Germany the war in China becomes so much entangled with the fortunes of Western democracy that it is a little difficult to follow it without lengthy cross-references. The French defeat had three direct consequences in Japan. It stimulated the pro-German faction to renew its agitation for an alliance with the Axis, which bore fruit in the signing of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy on 27 September. It whetted the general appetite for the expansion of the Japanese Empire in the South Seas, particularly over Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies: this had always been a pet scheme of the Navy's, in which the Army now cordially co-operated in the hope of getting something to offset its ruinous losses in China. And it enabled Japan to put pressure on France and Great Britain for the final closing of Indo-China to supplies for 'free China,' and the temporary closing of the now all-important Burma road. There was not a soul in Great Britain that did not feel an almost personal disgrace when, on 18 July, the Government consented with heavy heart to close the road for three months. But it had to be accepted that only those fully acquainted with the extraordinary gravity of the British position at that time were able to judge the merits of the case.

The closing was coupled with a stipulation that in the three months Japan should make a real effort to come to terms with China, which she obviously had no intention

of doing. This and the improved fortunes of Great Britain, especially the heavy defeats inflicted on the German Air Force, made it easy to reopen the road when the three months were up, since when there has been an evident tendency on Great Britain's part to give increasing help to China. It needs no argument to prove that it is all to British advantage that China should continue to keep Japan immobilized.

In Indo-China Japan had no difficulty in having the roads into China closed and in obtaining permission to send her own officials to 'co-operate' in keeping them closed, and to ensure that there was no leakage of the large consignments awaiting transport into China at Haiphong. But when the Japanese demanded the right to land troops and make air-bases in the colony the French Governor-General, Admiral Decoux, proved unexpectedly stubborn. If he had had any support by Vichy he would very probably have kept the Japanese out. But, no doubt under German pressure, Vichy had the negotiations transferred to Tokyo, where the Ambassador, M. Henry, signed an agreement on 23 September which gave the Japanese a good military foothold in northern Indo-China. As their avowed object was to pursue the war upon China more effectively, the statement issued by Vichy that the agreement had been signed for the furtherance of peace and the restoration of order in the Far East, merely made a bad business worse by covering this gross betrayal of a friendly Power with a cloak of sanctimonious hypocrisy.

The Chinese took their misfortunes extremely well, admitting the dire necessities of Great Britain's position with a generosity that did them credit. They declared their confidence that the Burma road would be reopened and that their resistance to Japan would be in no way lessened. China, said General Chiang, had sufficient munitions from abroad for another year, without counting what she herself could make.

Nevertheless it had been a dark year for China. With Great Britain at war and needing all she could produce for herself, no more materials could be expected from that quarter. Then came the loss of Nanning and of Ichang, and

the closing of the Indo-China and Burma roads. Russia continued to help. But the amount of materials that could be imported across Turkestan and North-west China was small compared with what the other two avenues, both connecting at relatively short distances with the sea, had carried.

Paradoxically enough, the signing of the Tripartite Pact on 27 September, the very event which, in the view of its Japanese authors, was to have been the foundation of Japan's hegemony over East Asia, was the sign for an upward turn in China's fortunes and a setback in those of Japan. America showed her contempt for the Japanese challenge by immediately extending credits of £25,000,000 to China. Great Britain reopened the Burma road and shortly afterwards also announced further credits to China of £10,000,000. The Government of the Dutch East Indies announced that in no circumstances was it to be regarded as coming within the scope of Japan's new order in East Asia, as a Japanese Foreign Office spokesman had had the effrontery to claim. And in November the Japanese found it advisable to evacuate Nanning and the whole of Kwangsi province.

Their version is that since they had established themselves in Indo-China Nanning was no longer necessary to them, and that they withdrew voluntarily without loss. The Chinese claim to have attacked Nanning from two directions and to have retaken it after six days' hard fighting. The truth probably lies somewhere between. It is inconceivable that the Chinese would have allowed the Japanese to retreat to the sea over eighty miles of difficult road unmolested, and there is an ominous hiatus of six days between the Japanese claiming to have reached the coast and the day when they reported their evacuation complete, which suggests some heavy rear-guard fighting.

We know, too, that since August the Chinese had been increasingly aggressive in several directions. During September they had attacked and retaken three or four towns in Shansi, and had then crossed over into Hopei and done considerable damage on both the big railways out of Peking. In October the Japanese started a series of drives over a vast area southwards of the Lower Yangtze,

in which they met with no success and were certainly rather badly beaten once at Shaohsing, the famous wine centre in Chêkiang. And in November a large-scale Japanese attack designed to clear the Han River valley north-west of Hankow was fairly and squarely smashed. This was no skirmishing with guerrillas, but a considerable battle, the Japanese intention, it is believed, being to give a fillip to the Wang Ching-wei puppet regime at Nanking, which they recognized as the Government of China on 30 November. The Chinese claimed that the Japanese had lost 20,000 men in the battle. The total silence in Japanese messages on the issue of their attack tells its own tale.

The moral effect on China of the recovery of Nanning and Kwangsi was enormous. It was visible proof that at last their strategy of 'time and space' was becoming too great a strain for their opponent to endure. For the obvious fact is that the Japanese, knowing well what it would mean to China, would not have evacuated Kwangsi except from dire necessity. Apart from air-bases for the bombing of Kunming and the Burma road—in which respect indeed they are no better off in Indo-China than they were in Kwangsi—they are worse placed in Indo-China for an invasion of Yunnan, if they have such a plan in mind, owing to the difficulty of the intervening mountains. And the evacuation of Kwangsi restores to China trade routes and natural sources of which she may be trusted to make all possible use.

At the time of writing the Japanese are credibly reported to have a million men in China strung out over a 2000-mile front which, at some points, is 1000 miles deep. They also have to maintain between 600,000 and 700,000 in Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa, besides another 300,000, in Japan itself. And this has been going on for three and a half years.

The Japanese have tried to build up a Chinese militia in the occupied areas. The Chinese recruits accept this service philosophically on the ground that their wives and families are in the Japanese power and that it is better for the Chinese masses that they should be policed by their own countrymen than by Japanese. But they will not fight

against the troops of free China, and there are several instances of such militia going over *en masse* to the other side.

If the Japanese really make up their minds to gain a particular objective, they can probably do so. But it looks as if they would have to import an entirely new army for the purpose. Telegraphing on 20 November last, *The Times* correspondent in Peking quoted, from a traveller lately returned from northern Honan, 'evidences of great discouragement and war weariness among the Japanese troops garrisoning the towns in those parts. The troops (said this traveller) seldom leave the protection of the town walls, and on the rare occasions when they meet Chinese formations they do not open fire but merely wave to them.' This is by no means the only report that has been received of increasing staleness in the Japanese army of occupation.

It is stated by the Japanese themselves that General Chiang Kai-shek has 2,000,000 men under arms, besides 1,000,000 or more guerrillas. These probably vary much in quality from 'the Generalissimo's Own,' about 300,000, constituting the flower of the Army, down to the old provincial armies which have grown out of the former Tuchuns' armies. But there can be no doubt that the whole standard of the Chinese armies, and particularly of their officers, has improved out of all comparison with that of 1937. Foreign observers testify that their movements are far better co-ordinated, and that the vital importance of keeping to an exact time-table seems to be at last properly appreciated.

One recalls, from early days in the war, a leading article in *The Times*, which compared the Chinese forces with those of France in the Hundred Years War, when the French began in utter inferiority both in arms and military science as compared with their opponents, but gradually learnt from their conquerors until they were able to turn the tables on them.

The Chinese have hardly started the strategy of 'time and space,' and the first-fruits of it are certainly encouraging. If they can preserve the wonderful unity which has upheld them so long, the Japanese may come to repent their gay invasion of North China even more than in secret they do already.

CHAPTER XIV

PUPPET GOVERNMENTS AND ECONOMIC WARFARE

NOTHING has been more conspicuous throughout the war than Japan's earnest declarations that she has no designs either upon China's territory or the interests of other nations—nothing, that is to say, except the regularity with which every such pledge is dishonoured. As recently as 19 December, 1940, at a farewell lunch to Admiral Nomura, the newly appointed Ambassador to Washington, Mr. Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, declared fervently: "Japan is not waging an Imperialist war of greed and aggression in China. It is not a war of conquest or covetous ambitions. We are engaged in a moral crusade. . . . We shut the door nowhere and to no one." Yet, less than three weeks before, the Japanese Army had forced upon Wang Ching-wei, head of the new, self-styled 'Government of the Republic of China' at Nanking, a treaty which, as will be seen later, delivered China to Japan bound hand and foot.

The method by which the Japanese would presumably claim that they keep their promises while securing everything they want, is the simple one of creating a series of puppet Governments, ostensibly Chinese, but in every particular perfectly directed by Japan. The system has been familiarized in Manchuria, where the former Boy-Emperor of China, now called the Emperor Kang Teh, acquiesces in the farce of entertaining a Japanese Ambassador in Hsinking and of sending one to Tokyo, while the Japanese Army in Manchuria dots every line on which the Emperor and his Ministers sign their names. Great care is taken to see that these signatures are only put upon contracts which enure to Japanese advantage.

The first puppet Government set up by Japan was at Kueihua, in Suiyuan, with which most of Charhar was amalgamated to form a single administration for Inner

The Nationalist Mongol Prince T'eh Huang declared as the head of this concern; but, from what is learnt of it, it is entirely run by Japanese military.

As already pointed out, the Japanese Army is very nervous about Russian infiltration through Mongolia.

Creation of this puppet Government led immediately to the strengthening of Russian guards along the Outer frontier. But as yet no clash in this direction has occurred, although it is credibly reported that the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, who are in contact with their relations across the border, actually prefer to link up with Outer Mongolia under Japanese patronage than be under the Japanese. It may be mentioned that no Chinese more heartily detest the Japanese than those who have tried to work with them. The same is true of the Mongols.

The provisional Government which appeared at Peking in December, 1937, caused ribald mirth. It had no President, no Premier, no Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister or Minister of Communications. However, the Japanese have managed to get hold of three men, Wang Keh-min and others who had been in the Peking Government before; and in due course a number of old gentlemen were dragged from retirement to fill empty chairs. General Terauchi, Japanese Commander-in-Chief in North China, sent a congratulatory message and aeroplanes scattered leaflets over Peking how Japan loved the Chinese, whom it was here to rescue from the corrupt pro-Communist Government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Wang Keh-min is probably the only man of force of whom it is not excepting Wang Ching-wei at Nanking, of whom the Japanese have managed to get hold. The Japanese in China at his coming out on their side was so strong that they had vetoed his inclusion in the

Charhar Council set up in 1935. Wang is now sixty-five, the son of a wealthy retired official of the Manchurian Government and brought up in the correct classical style. He was the Chinese Chancellor of the Chinese Legation in Tokyo

in 1902 and afterwards Superintendent of Chinese students in Japan, an unruly body whom he managed with considerable tact. In 1913 he went to France, assisted in the establishment of the *Banque Industrielle de Chine*, and became its first compradore in Shanghai. In 1917 he became Minister of Finance in Peking and held this office two or three times in the next thirteen years without rising any higher. He is slightly hunch-backed, quite blind in one eye, and very short-sighted in the other, but a man of undoubted ability.

Why he joined the Japanese is still a mystery. Some say he needed money; others, that he had a private pique against Nanking. One hazards a guess that he may be trying to hold up the Chinese end in the north against post-war days. It is noticeable that, unlike Wang Ching-wei, he has never uttered a word against Chungking, though no little abuse has been thrown at him, and there is reason to believe that the Japanese have found him far less pliable than they expected.

For Wang Ching-wei he is known to have the greatest contempt. During the months in which the former was trying to form a Government, the two had a prolonged interview at Tsingtao. Smooth assertions of 'perfect accord' between them were published by the Japanese, but it is fairly clear that these were fictitious. When Wang Ching-wei's Government was proclaimed at Nanking on 30 March, 1940, Wang Kch-min was present; one pictures him peering sardonically through his thick dark glasses at the flags, the complimentary aeroplanes, the rows of artificially smiling Japanese officers, the processions of well-drilled Chinese coolies mechanically shouting "Banzai." Immediately after the ceremony he returned to Peking and told interviewers quite plainly that the only thing changed about his administration was its name.

Wang Ching-wei¹ is the antithesis of his elderly, myopic,

¹ A 'New Reformed Government of China' was set up at Nanking by the Japanese on 28 March, 1938. Its nominal head was Liang Hung-chih, one of the pro-Japanese Anfu Government of 1919, which was chased from office by the students after the Treaty of Versailles. We need not waste time on it. It did nothing, and vanished when Wang Ching-wei was at last able to furnish Japan with some sort of administration.

but keen-witted, confrere in the north. Tall, gay, debonair, perfectly dressed, reputed the handsomest man in China, a born orator, a poet of some repute, he is one to fill the eye anywhere, and has been a leading figure in the Nationalist Party since in his youth he tried to assassinate the Manchu Prince Regent. He was imprisoned but released a year later, after the Revolution. Then he went to Europe for five years and returned to become secretary to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and one of his most intimate friends. Wang was with Dr. Sun when he died and is generally believed to have written his Political Will.

Wang Ching-wei's enthusiastic partisanship of Borodin in the days of the Russian ascendancy put him at loggerheads with General Chiang Kai-shek. But on the Japanese seizure of Manchuria the quarrel was patched up and Wang became President of the Executive Yuan, a position analogous to that of Premier, in 1932. After the attempt to murder him in 1935, Wang spent nearly two years in Europe under treatment, but returned in time to accompany the Government to Chungking. What disputes may have occurred there over China's war policy is not known. But in December, 1938, Wang, with a few friends, slipped away to Hanoi, in Indo-China, and there issued a demand, which electrified all China, for peace negotiations with Japan on the basis of Prince Konoye's offer.

For this Wang was instantly stripped of his offices in the Chinese Government and expelled from the Kuomintang. For several months nothing more was heard of him.

During this time the Japanese were doing all they could to induce the late Marshal Wu Pei-fu to emerge from his retirement and head a Government for them. He would have been a very big fish to catch, far bigger than the magnetic but unstable Wang Ching-wei, with his notorious dislike for the dull routine of hard constructive work. During the Tuchun warrings in the 1920's Wu had won a reputation as a most courageous and able soldier, of unblemished integrity and honour. His worst political opponents have always spoken of Marshal Wu with respect. He took the field for the last time to resist the Nationalist march on Hankow in 1926, but was defeated, chiefly by

political propaganda, and retired into private life to study Buddhism and write poetry.

The Japanese importunities that he should join them only just stopped short of physical violence. Repeatedly their papers announced that he was about to set up a reformed Government of all China. But Wu was more than a match for them. He wrote mellifluous and exquisitely worded screeds on the blessings of peace and the particular desirability of friendship between China and Japan. But the only terms on which he would consent to act were that he must be given an army, and the Japanese must withdraw theirs. The discomfited Japanese had to fall back on Wang Ching-wei.

Wang came into the open in the summer of 1939 (before that he was said to have spent some time in Japan) and presided at Shanghai over, what he called, the sixth national congress of the Kuomintang, attended by two hundred and forty people, of whom nothing worth mention had ever been heard before. Then followed many months of bargaining with Wang Kch-min and Liang Hung-chih (the Nanking puppet), neither of whom, having borne the burden and heat of so many months' obloquy, was disposed to play second fiddle to the theatrical Mr. Wang. There is reason to believe, too, that the Japanese Army in North China, who play their hand quite independently of the Army in Central China, were sticking out for their share of the loaves and fishes.

It was not until 30 March, 1940, that Wang managed to announce his Government in Nanking with himself as acting President. It consisted of Wang's brother-in-law, some of his former henchmen, and a few men long known for their pro-Japanese sympathies, not one among them of any repute. China laughed or remained indifferent. However, the Japanese gave Wang a tremendous send-off, and immediately appointed no less a person than the ex-Premier General Abe as Ambassador to Nanking to negotiate peace.

The negotiations lasted eight months. Wang's friends said that he was being very stiff with the Japanese, and that China would be surprised by the good terms he had secured

for her. The actual terms, given by Domei, the official Japanese news agency, of the Treaty signed on 30 November, 1940, show how far the Japanese soldiers are from any sense of moderation or of the opportunity they were throwing away of tempting war-weary Chinese from allegiance to Chungking.

Nanking is recognized as 'the National Government of the Republic of China' and Wang Ching-wei as its President. Taking the essential points of each article, the two Governments agree that they shall

1. Mutually respect their sovereignty and territories and take mutually friendly and helpful measures, political, economic, cultural, and otherwise ;

Eliminate and prohibit in future such measures and causes as are destructive of amity in politics, education, propaganda, trade, and commerce, and in other spheres ;

2. Co-operate closely in cultural harmony and development ;

3. Engage in joint defence against all destructive operations of a Communistic nature, eliminate Communistic elements and organizations. In order to carry out defence against Communist activities Japan shall station the required forces in Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) and North China for the period necessary in accordance with terms to be agreed upon separately ;

4. Areas for stationing Japanese forces for the period required shall be agreed upon separately ;

5. Japan may for the required period station its naval units and vessels in specified areas within the Republic of China ;

6. The two Governments shall effect close economic co-operation between the two countries. With reference to the specific resources in North China and Inner Mongolia and mineral resources required for national defence, China undertakes that they shall be developed through close co-operation. In other areas which are required for national defence China shall afford the necessary facilities to Japan and to Japanese subjects ;

With regard to the utilization of resources referred to in the preceding paragraph China shall afford positive and full facilities to Japan and Japanese subjects. The Governments of the two countries shall extend especially close co-operation in respect of the promotion of trade and commerce in the lower basin of the Yangtze ;

7. Japan shall abolish the extra-territorial rights possessed by Japan in China and render to the latter its Concessions, and China shall open her territory for domicile and business to Japanese subjects.

Articles 8 and 9 provide for separate agreements 'necessary to accomplish the objects of the present Treaty,' and that it comes into force on signature.

Under a protocol of five articles attached to the Treaty, Nanking is to acquiesce in all measures deemed necessary by Japan 'to attain its military objectives,' and will compensate Japanese subjects for losses incurred in the war. Evacuation of Japanese troops is to be effected within two years of the restoration of peace, but 'subject to the Chinese Government guaranteeing a state of peace in their territory.' Industrial, mining, and commercial undertakings now controlled by Japan are to be transferred to Chinese management, 'with the exception of those of enemy character or having a special character due to military necessity.' Lastly, if China 'finds it necessary to control foreign trade' (i.e. to raise her tariffs) she 'may not infringe upon the principle of Sino-Japanese economic co-operation laid down by the Treaty.'

Wang Ching-wei also agreed to recognize and 'co-operate with' the Government of Manchukuo.

In the above summary the actual words of the Treaty have been used and the parts omitted, for sake of space, do nothing to mitigate its harshness.

It seems almost inconceivable that Wang should have signed such a document. He had little enough 'face' before. Now he must be an object of loathing and contempt by every decent Chinese. It will be noticed how, at every point where any possible dispute might arise, words are inserted—'for the required period,' areas, raw materials, and businesses 'required for military defence,' etc., leaving the interpretation in Japanese hands. Of 'economic co-operation,' one example of what the Japanese mean may be given: at Shanghai (and no doubt elsewhere) many Chinese factory-owners have been forced to sell the majority of their shares to Japanese, payment being promised out of future profits. The stipulations for 'co-operation' in

educational and cultural matters are particularly vicious, since they will enable Japan to rewrite all Chinese school-books, as indeed she has already been doing.

The greed of the Japanese military dictators has, however, brought their country one serious blow, from the quarter least desired. When the Treaty was published everyone at once lighted on Article 3 as being pointedly aimed at Russia. Evidently the Japanese Foreign Office (which had palpably had nothing to do with the Treaty) felt nervous about this Article, for M. Smetanin, the Soviet Ambassador, was asked to call at the Foreign Office, where he was assured that the Article had no reference to Russia, but was concerned only with the internal affairs of China and Japan.

M. Smetanin replied by taking note of the Japanese statement without deigning to discuss it, adding that he was instructed to inform the Japanese Government that Russia's policy as regards China remained unchanged.

A more unpalatable snub, with all that it implied in military assistance for General Chiang Kai-shek, could not be conceived. And only five weeks before the Treaty with Nanking was signed, a new Japanese Ambassador, General Tatekawa, had arrived in Moscow, specially charged to settle all outstanding differences and to conclude a non-aggression pact !

The Treaty's eventual worth probably depends on the outcome of the war in Europe. For the Chinese it changes nothing, except to give a spurious coating of legality to the actual position of occupied China as a Japanese colony. From the foreigner's point of view the Treaty's 'nuisance value' may be considerable. Protests to Tokyo against the many violations of foreign rights in China have never had any value, but at least Japan accepted them, thereby tacitly admitting her responsibility. Henceforth she will blandly refer the protestants to 'the recognized Government of China.' Furthermore by raising tariffs against all except Japan, as provided for in the protocol, by introducing a rival currency to the national dollar, and in many other ways, Nanking has it in its power (with Japan behind it) to do great harm to such foreign trade as can still be done in China.


How long Wang Ching-wei will survive to enjoy his empty dignity of 'President of the National Government of the Republic of China,' is merely a question of when a gunman succeeds in slipping through his guards. The mortality among Japan's puppet officials and their sympathizers is already high. Well over a hundred of them have been assassinated, including the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, Fu Siao-en, for many years a leading and rather popular merchant in Shanghai. It was a bad omen that a train full of Japanese and Chinese going to Nanking from Shanghai for the signature of the Treaty was dynamited by guerrillas, and over a hundred persons killed. Wang Ching-wei never moves a yard, except in an armoured motor-car closely surrounded by guards. His Government, of course, would not last a week without the Japanese Army's protection.

The economic means by which the Japanese have been striving to break China's resistance and monopolize her resources and trade are less dramatic but more serious than her military successes. They take the form of the creation of banks issuing their own currency, of monopolies, the closing of all roads and waterways to non-Japanese users, and increasing manipulation of the Customs.

The first bank to appear was the Federal Reserve Bank, opened in Peking and Tientsin on 10 March, 1938. It had no capital except a credit in the Bank of Japan for yen 100,000,000, but as it was not permitted to exchange yen against any currency, this was as good, or as bad, as having no capital at all. It hoped to acquire foreign exchange by selling in Shanghai the national notes which the Japanese had obtained by seizing all Government revenues in the north. But this game was checkmated by the Chinese Government limiting the issue of exchange to the Government banks in Hongkong and Shanghai, and very strictly rationing the foreign banks in the weekly amounts allowed them. The Federal Reserve Bank also announced that it was going to take over the silver (between \$50 and \$60 millions) belonging to the Chinese Government, which was lying partly in the Concessions in Tientsin and partly in Legation Quarter in Peking. But in this, a crucial



CHINA'S LIFE LINE, THE BURMA ROAD



THE OLDEST FORM OF TRANSPORT

Thousands of coolies are employed in China to supplement motor lorries in bringing supplies to the Army. Some of them can carry as much as 200 lb., marching all day without apparent distress. Their ages are about 100 or is a day.

factor in the subsequent blockade of the British Concession at Tientsin, it did not succeed.

For some time the 'F.R.B.' made little headway. The foreign banks in the north would not accept its notes, though the municipalities of the British and French Concessions in Tientsin found themselves obliged to take them in payment of rates; and in the interior the guerrillas killed any Chinese found in possession of F.R.B. notes.

But a regulation that exports would only be allowed out of North China if provided with a certificate to show that the foreign exchange resulting from them was sold to the Federal Reserve Bank, pointed the way to a general strangulation of trade in North China which was to grow tighter and tighter.

Concurrently with the creation of the F.R.B. a syndicate was formed in Japan called the North China Development Co., with a capital of 350 million yen, half of which was contributed by the Government. The Army now began to declare monopolies over one staple after another. Foreign traders in the north have managed to avoid dealing in F.R.B. notes by means of a 'link' system, which is, in fact, barter. But it is clear that the Japanese Army is set on freezing out all foreign trade.

No produce can be sent to Tientsin from Inner Mongolia (the chief source of the wool, furs, hides, egg products, etc., in which Tientsin deals) without a permit, which is only obtained after long delays. A further regulation announced on 20 June, 1940, forbids the entry of all imports unless provided with a pass from the Federal Reserve Bank. Finally, in October, 1940, the Peking correspondent of the *North China Daily News* reported the formation of a so-called 'Shimizu unit',¹ which is to have the sole right of deciding what export goods it desires to deal in, and will have power to enter any warehouse and acquire these goods at a price to be fixed by itself, or by the Army, as 'goods classifiable as war supplies.'

If the miseries of foreign merchants in North China are

¹ Actually, the correspondent says, a company. But as it is sponsored by the Japanese Army, which theoretically does not concern itself with such low matters as money-making, it is called a 'unit' as if it were a regiment to inflict further defeats on China.

great, so are those of the local Japanese who were trading there for years before the North China Development Co. was thought of. The Yokokama Specie Bank did everything it could to prevent the establishment of the Federal Reserve Bank, but, powerful organ though it is, it could not prevail against the Army. Japanese merchants in Tientsin have sent deputations to Tokyo to protest against the interference in trade by the Army—whose regulations are often so badly drawn that no one understands them—but in vain. The Army is killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. North China produce, which once went regularly to Tientsin, now flows more and more towards Russia. And though the 'Shimizu unit' may make a momentary profit by plundering the warehouses, it will make only one. Next time it comes the Chinese Mother Hubbard's cupboard will be bare.

The case of North China has been dealt with at some length, because it provides so striking an example of the Japanese Army's methods in a field where it has matters more easily in its control than at the much larger centre of Shanghai. In the latter city not only the interests of all nations are centred, but especially those of America, whose displeasure Japan has always been particularly anxious to avoid exciting. Added to this, by means of old-established banks, shipping and insurance companies, and factories, the strength of foreign business at Shanghai is very great. Before the fighting in the autumn of 1937 there were over four hundred factories in Yangtzepoo. The Power Co., waterworks, gas works, and Shanghai dockyards escaped injury. The vast majority will never reopen, although the Japanese Army has relaxed the embargo on the entry of Chinese workers and foreigners into the district, as they were either destroyed or have been completely plundered of their machinery and all metal work by the Japanese.

But on the other hand, hundreds of new factories, big and little, financed by Chinese money, which took refuge in Shanghai early in the war, have sprung up in the western districts and the French Concession, away from Japanese control. And although all the principal Chinese ports

are blockaded by Japan, the coast of China is so huge, and so serrated with small bays and the mouths of little rivers, and the ability of the Chinese to do business under seemingly impossible conditions is so uncanny, that foreign merchants continue somehow to keep their end up.

Nevertheless, the obstacles surrounding them are increasingly grave. Since the fall of Nanking only Japanese vessels have been allowed to trade on the Yangtze above that city, although the Japanese Army promised in December, 1939, shortly to open the river. The usual plea of 'military necessity' bars fulfilment of the promise. The Army asserts that the Japanese ships only carry military requirements. But from time to time the *North China Daily News* has been able to publish exact details of cargoes in these ships, which certainly suggest that 'military requirements' is a most elastic term.

A syndicate known as the Central China Promotion Co. (similar to that in North China) was formed in March, 1938, with a capital of yen 100,000,000, the scope of which is apparently designed to monopolize all activities along the Yangtze. Japan believes in conducting business by means of vast syndicates—another example of totalitarian rule—and the formation of further enterprises to take over telephones and telegraphs, the trade in silk yarn, harbours, and city rebuilding, and all the shipping on the China coasts and rivers, has been announced from time to time. In the Yangtze delta a huge network of creeks and rivers has in time past carried a great trade in fleets of launches and barges. From this foreigners are completely shut out. On the Pearl River, one British and one Portuguese steamer are allowed between Hongkong and Canton once a fortnight. But they may only carry passengers and supplies for the Foreign Concession of Shameen. Meanwhile, of course, Japanese vessels ply freely on the river.

A peculiarly gross infringement of foreign rights (a stronger phrase could well be used) is seen on the Shanghai-Nanking railway, the building of which was entirely financed by British capital. Since the fall of Nanking, now over three years ago, this railway has been running regularly and certainly carrying an enormous volume of

passengers.¹ But not one penny has been paid to the British bondholders. The Japanese Government coolly declares that there are no profits available for dividends, the plain English of which may be that there are none after the demands of the Japanese Army in China have been satisfied.

British bondholders in the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo, the Canton-Kowloon, and the Tientsin-Pukou railways are also whistling for their dividends, which the last-named railway, at least, should be able to pay. Oddly enough, the dividends on the Peking-Mukden railway continue to be paid, although it is entirely under Japanese control. But Japanese conduct in such matters is full of contradictions. On their own loans, whether national or municipal, they are scrupulously punctilious; their record for punctual payment is not exceeded by any nation in the world, and they are deservedly proud of it. Why they behave so differently in China can only be explained by the fact that there the Army is the sole arbiter.

The Army's control over the actions of puppet banks and commercial syndicates is intensified, not only by the ever-tightening grip which it has acquired throughout the war on all national activities, but through its having made itself exclusively responsible for all questions affecting China in the establishment of the Department of China Affairs in May, 1938. Mr. Hirota, the then Foreign Minister, fought against this strongly, maintaining that China, being the most important of Japan's foreign concerns, should be left in the charge of the Foreign Office. But he was defeated and resigned office, to be succeeded by General Ugaki. At a later date the latter had reason to regret that he had sided against Mr. Hirota and, in the defence of the Foreign Office rights, was himself forced to resign. Meanwhile the soldiers had got the new China Affairs Department and proceeded to fill its chief posts almost exclusively with military men.

The position of the Chinese Customs, for so many years

¹ For many years China has been alone in the world in making railways pay mainly if not entirely on their passenger traffic. The Chinese faculty for getting more human material into a pint pot than appears even remotely conceivable is perhaps the explanation.

the backbone of China's finances and security for important foreign and domestic loans, might be described as one of unstable equilibrium. On 24 November, 1937, it was announced that all Customs revenues in North China were to be paid into the Yokohama Specie Bank, and Wang Kch-min, of the Peking Provisional Government, announced that he was taking over the control of all the service in the north.

In May, 1938, an agreement was concluded in Tokyo between Sir Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador, and the Japanese Government, by which the British Government agreed to 'offer no objection' to the 'temporary measures' which Japan intended to take during hostilities as regards the servicing of foreign loans secured on the Customs; all revenues at ports occupied by Japan were to be paid into the Yokohama Specie Bank; Japan was to receive the arrears of the Boxer Indemnity due to her which had been accumulating in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank; and the servicing of foreign loans would be regarded as a first charge on Customs revenue. The United States and France were stated to have agreed.

The morality of this bargain seems highly doubtful. Putting it bluntly, it could hardly be otherwise interpreted than that Great Britain agreed to Japan's collaring the swag, provided that she got her rake-off. The Foreign Office plea that the agreement would maintain China's credit by ensuring payments on her loans did not conceal this unpleasant fact. It is not surprising that the Chinese Government uttered a strong protest, and entirely refused to recognize the agreement or to release the Boxer Indemnity arrears. Japan therefore refused to release the requisite moneys for the loans. So the agreement might as well never have been concluded. All of which could have been foreseen before Sir Robert Craigie started his negotiations.

There is no doubt but that Sir Frederick Maze, the Inspector-General of the Customs, has achieved wonders in keeping the service intact. That he has had to suffer much Japanese interference was inevitable. Yet he has held the whole machinery of the service together with extraordinary tact and skill, and has happily managed

to avoid anything approaching an open breach. For this he is entitled to the gratitude of China and every nation that has dealings with her - not excluding Japan.

On 1 May, 1939, another puppet bank was started in Shanghai, called the Hua Hsing. This was rather more respectable than the Federal Reserve Bank. It was said to have a real capital of \$50,000,000 in silver, half subscribed by Japanese, half by Chinese banks, and it appears to have acted with reasonable restraint, not so much trying to drive out the *fapi*, or national currency, as to prepare an alternative one if the *fapi* became entirely discredited.

A more serious menace to the national currency is the announcement by the Wang Ching-wei regime that a Central Reserve Bank is to be opened in Nanking on 6 January, 1941, with branches in due course in all occupied China, the notes of which are to be the only legal tender. The immediate result at the time of writing is a further decline in the Chinese dollar to about $3\frac{1}{2}$ d, to which, in successive stages, it has gradually sunk from a pre-war 1s. $2\frac{1}{2}$ d.

In March, 1939, the British Government guaranteed an advance by British banks in China of £5,000,000, the Chinese banks adding another £5,000,000, to form a Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund. Its early career was not very fortunate, partly owing to China's large adverse trade balance, partly to the unexpectedly big amount of Chinese notes in circulation; and eventually the Fund was obliged to let the dollar drop from the 8d. at which it had held it pegged for some months.

In December, 1940, the British Government extended further credits to China of £10,000,000, of which half goes to the Stabilization Fund. The latter is understood to have built up its reserves again to £7,500,000, so that it should be in a much stronger position than formerly. Half the American loan of £25,000,000, announced in September, 1940, is to be devoted to stabilizing Chinese-American exchange.

Thus there appear to be the elements of a sharp currency fight, though its outcome is unpredictable. Japan's object, of course, is to link the currency of China with the 'yen

bloc' (Japan and Manchukuo). Such an aim it is to the interest of every nation concerned in the Far East to prevent. Once Japan gets control of the currency, China will become as much her bondslave and a *terra clausa* to foreign trade as Manchukuo.

To deal, in detail, with all the Japanese assaults on foreign rights in China would need a very large book. From what has been written—a fraction of the whole story—China's contention that she is fighting the battles of the West on the most material grounds as well as on those of high principle, seems well founded. But space must be allowed for a brief account of perhaps the most disgraceful outrage ever committed against a Power that had not given Japan the slightest offence, namely the blockade of the British Concession at Tientsin.

On 9 April, 1939, a Dr. S. G. Cheng, the puppet Government's Superintendent of Customs in North China, was assassinated in the Concession, the first such murder, by the way, that had occurred there. The authorities invited the Japanese to assist in looking for the assassins, and four men were arrested and handed over to the Japanese, who returned them later to the British authorities, asserting that they had confessed their guilt. The four men, however, said that they had been tortured and recanted the alleged confessions. The British authorities thereupon refused to give them up until convincing evidence of their guilt were produced.

A suggestion that the question should be referred to a commission of three, with a neutral chairman, was rejected by the Japanese Army, who, on 14 June, having withdrawn all their nationals from the Concession and surrounded it with barbed wire, declared it blockaded. They also announced that the mere surrender of the four Chinese would not now be enough to raise the blockade. The British in Tientsin must abandon their 'pro-Chiang Kai-shek attitude,' recognize the Federal Reserve Bank currency, and generally co-operate in Japan's 'new order in the Far East.' They also demanded the surrender of the \$50,000,000 worth of Chinese Government silver partly deposited in the British Concession.

The blockade was accompanied by the grossest insults to British subjects passing through the barriers of the Concession. Women were searched to the skin, men were actually forced to strip themselves naked before crowds of onlookers. The least offensive form of insult was to compel every Briton to wait at the tail of the queue of people being examined.

The indignation in England at the Government's tame acceptance of this intolerable behaviour was great. The Prime Minister, the late Mr. Chamberlain, was bombarded with questions from all sides of the House of Commons. But he would say practically nothing, and was obviously determined to do nothing.

On 9 July it was announced that the negotiations were to be removed from Tientsin to Tokyo. But any hope that the withdrawal of discussion from the super-heated military atmosphere of North China might better the situation was quickly frustrated by the publication of the following formula—presumably meant to define in some way the circle within which negotiations were to be conducted—which was agreed upon by Sir Robert Craigie and the Japanese Foreign Minister on 24 July :

‘ His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom fully recognize the actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress, and note that, as long as that state of affairs continues to exist, the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order in regions under their control, and that they have to suppress or remove any such causes or acts as will obstruct them or benefit their enemy.

‘ His Majesty’s Government have no intention of countenancing any act or measures prejudicial to the attainment of the Japanese forces, and they will take this opportunity to confirm their policy in this respect by making it plain to British authorities and British nationals in China that they should refrain from such acts and measures.’

Friends of the British Foreign Office pointed to this remarkable statement as a triumph of diplomatic draftsmanship, by which Great Britain was committed to nothing. Critics objected bitterly that a document so vaguely worded

could be interpreted by the Japanese as a *carte blanche* to do whatever they pleased without hindrance. Whichever view is taken, one thing is clear enough. In all the formula not one spark of consideration for China, or her feelings, or rights, is visible—many people would say the very reverse.

On 12 August it was disclosed that the four Chinese prisoners were to be handed over to the Japanese Army. An attempt was made by sympathizers in England to prevent this judicial murder by serving on Lord Halifax a writ of habeas corpus on their behalf. But the Courts held that the writ could not legally apply to Chinese in China, and the unhappy men were given up.

Meanwhile grave, and there is little doubt well-founded, fears had arisen that the Government were preparing to surrender the silver. But so strong was the pressure brought to bear privately, that it nerved itself on 21 August to inform Japan that it could not discuss the question.

So the blockade dragged on with varying degrees of violence, but on the whole with little relaxation of insult, and none of injury, to the British in Tientsin. There is no doubt that its long continuance was due to the profits which the Japanese Army were making out of the transport of commodities into the Concession, the charges for which were proportioned to the value and nature of each lorry-load. A question in the House of Commons on this point, to which sufficient assent was given by Mr. Butler, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, caused a terrific hullabaloo in Japan. It is not, of course, pleasant for apostles of a 'new order'—a millennium for all mankind—to be detected in mean trickery.

The issue finally narrowed down to that of the silver, on which the Japanese Army had set its heart. On 19 June, 1940, a compromise was arrived at—the suggestion is said to have come from Sir Robert Craigie—that a portion should be devoted to the relief of Chinese victims of the floods and famine in North China during the previous summer, while the balance was deposited in a neutral bank. It was also agreed that the British Concession should accept the help of Japanese police in looking for terrorists ;

and that Federal Reserve Bank currency should circulate in the Concession. At last the blockade was lifted, the barriers disappeared.

The Tientsin blockade was not an episode on which the British Government could look back with satisfaction. It had treated China badly, both in the formula of 24 July and in the final disposal of the silver, which was indubitably her property.¹ It had suffered its nationals to be outraged as no Englishmen have ever been before without speedy vindication. Yet it had means of retaliation ready to hand—the closure of British ports or of the London money market against Japan, the denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese trade agreement of 1911. All these measures were urgently pressed upon the Government.

After two years' costly war in China, with no end in sight, Japan could not possibly have allowed herself the luxury of another war. But 'appeasement' was immovable. The treatment prescribed by Sir Robert Craigie of playing to the Japanese liberal element, though it visibly grew feebler every day, still retained its spell. Principle and policy alike kept their heads buried in the sands.

¹ The Chinese Government scored heavily in this respect, merely informing Great Britain that it was indifferent to any arrangements made between her and Japan, but would require its silver in full when peace was restored. How Great Britain can escape liability, is not easily seen.

CHAPTER XV

THE COMMUNISTS

“**T**HERE are no Communists in China,” General Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have said recently. With the formation of the United Front that is true, theoretically, and, in practice, the Chinese Communist doctrines have moved very far from the Russian brand. But there is none the less an exceedingly, it may be said increasingly, strong party of the extreme Left, for which the name Communist may be conveniently retained.

After the downfall of the Hankow Government and the expulsion of the Russians in 1927 the Communist forces scattered into central southern China, and after an abortive rising at Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi, in August, they moved off to the mountainous country in east Kiangsi and west Fukien. Here they were gradually joined by other Communists from all parts of South China and formed ‘the Chinese People’s Soviet Republic’ which, by 1930, had become so strong that it was a serious rival to Nanking. Its authority extended over a considerable part of Kiangsi, Hunan, and Hupeh, and to the north of the Yangtze, in Anhui, and Honan. When Sir John Hope Simpson went to China in 1931 to assist in administering international relief for the victims of the appalling floods of that year (which spread over an area above and below Hankow nearly as big as England), he came to a point, placarded with the title of the Chinese Soviet Republic, where he had to accept the Communists’ authority in order to get his work done.

The Communists had their own printing-presses, stamps, post offices, and money. They organized textile factories and planted schools everywhere. They abolished title deeds, taxes, arrears of loans, and redistributed land wholesale. Their strong suit was the welfare of the peasants, in which

there is no doubt that they are perfectly sincere, and this gave them a tremendous advantage when General Chiang Kai-shek launched the first of his series of campaigns at them in 1930. Through their peasant allies they were always perfectly informed of the Government troop movements, avoided positional battles, and perpetually harried their opponents from every direction, vanishing before they could be fairly hit at. They kept themselves largely in equipment on what they captured from their opponents, many of whom were seduced into joining them.

For four years Chiang could make no impression on the Communists. In 1934 he tried a new method, like that of Lord Kitchener in the South African War; and by innumerable blockhouses, barbed wire, and a network of roads for swift communication, he gradually hemmed them in among the mountains, facing them with starvation.

The Communists saw that they must break out or perish, and in October, 1934, they fought their way through the barrier and started on the famous 'Long March,' which in Chinese Communist annals has become a date almost as important as the founding of the Han dynasty for the whole Chinese people. Their fighting force is said to have numbered some 80,000 men. But there went with these a mixed multitude of men and women, old and young. They contrived also to carry with them quantities of machinery, tools, printing-presses, sewing machines, and other useful implements which they had accumulated in their mountain State.

They travelled in a deviating line through Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, Yunnan, along the borders of Tibet in western Szechuan, through Kansu into Shensi. They were fighting most of the way, they had to cross great rivers and terrible mountain ranges, on which thousands of them died of cold. Sometimes they were opposed by savage tribes in the remote west as well as by Government and provincial troops. But just a year after their start from Kiangsi, the remnants of them, perhaps a tenth of the original company, won through to Shensi, having covered no less than 6000 miles in their incredible venture. They had also managed to bring with them no small quantity of their machinery.

It stands to reason that men and women who could accomplish such a feat must have been buoyed up by tremendous purpose, and also must have had exceptional leaders. Of the latter the best known are Chu Teh, the Commander-in-Chief, and Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Soviet. They are unquestionably two of the ablest men in China. Mao Tse-tung particularly appeals to the imagination. He is now about fifty years old, tall, slender, rather round-shouldered, with thick hair and strongly moulded features. He is the son of a Hunan farmer, and worked in his father's fields as a youth, but is said to be well read in the Chinese classics and well informed on world affairs. He is unconventional in his ways, still very much the peasant, but a gifted speaker and magnetic leader. Mrs. Cressey Marcks, who, as described in her recent book, *Journey into China*, visited Yen-an, the Communists' capital in Shensi, and saw a good deal of Mao, gives a graphic account of a speech she heard him deliver :

'Mao Tse-tung is, I think, the only orator I have ever seen who made no gesture whatsoever. He kept his hands clasped behind him and he spoke for three hours. He had no notes and just looked at his audience. . . . Only a lantern or two swung over a line in front of the stage. The rest of the hall was in darkness. All around me the tense faces with solemn eyes never left Mao's face. . . . There was no doubt that these people all worshipped him. He was their leader, to whom they looked up, and they took unquestioningly his advice and doctrine.'

Chu Teh's antecedents are the opposite of Mao Tse-tung's. He came of a wealthy family of officials, and in the early days of the Republic held a lucrative official post in Yunnan. By what mental process he was led to forsake the luxuries of office and join himself to the Communists in Shanghai (who must have eyed him, at first, much as the disciples eyed St. Paul on his arrival in Jerusalem from Damascus), only he knows, and perhaps he could not say. Chu Teh is said to have been an opium-smoker, but to have cured himself by his iron will. He went to Europe for five years, and returned to throw in his lot finally with the Communists in the rising at Nanchang, in August, 1927.

As a military leader Chu Teh is a genius. Even in his

official days in Yunnan he had distinguished himself in local fighting. As leader of the Communist Army, now called the 8th Route Army, his record is dazzling. The skill with which he brought his followers through their hosts of enemies in the Long March must have been worthy of the greatest generals. He and the 8th Route Army between them have developed guerrilla tactics to a pitch of perfection which must be the despair of the Japanese. Again and again the latter have sent out expeditions from Peking, which are duly reported to have 'exterminated' or 'mopped up' the 'Communist bandits.' What actually happens on these occasions is that the Communists melt into the face of China to reappear in stinging groups, blowing up railways, harrying the Japanese flanks, cutting off their convoys. They can perform marches of fifty miles at a stretch without discomfort, and at high speed, on the scantiest food. Their chief difficulty is lack of arms and munitions, such arsenals as they have built round Yen-an not being able to produce more than a limited amount. But they manage to capture a good deal from the Japanese by attacking convoys and garrisons.

According to Major Evans Carlson, of the United States Marines, who has spent many months with the various Chinese armies since the war began, the Communists do not expect to defeat the Japanese by these tactics, but they believe they will be able to wear them down, exhaust them, and prevent them from organizing China politically or working her mineral resources.¹ For the latter part of this belief there certainly seems to be abundant justification.

Since the beginning of the war the Communists have extended their influence very far. Shantung was left in a particularly bad state by the Japanese seizure of the railways, the capital, and Tsingtao. Shantung is one of the most backward provinces in China, and the troops of its defunct Governor, Han Fu-chu, belonged very much to the order of Tuchun armies of the previous decade. Scattered and leaderless they took to brigandage in the old-fashioned way, and conditions in the interior of

¹ *The Chinese Army*, by Major Evans Fordyce Carlson. Institute of Pacific Relations Inquiry Series,

Shantung were very bad in the summer of 1938. Since then the Communists have come and organized these rovers into regular guerrillas, for the farmers' relief and the further annoyance of the Japanese.

Another area left full of leaderless soldiers by the fall of Shanghai and Nanking extends all down the Yangtze from Wuhu, fifty miles above Nanking, to the mouth, chiefly on the south bank, but with a good number also on the north. These, too, have been rounded up by the Communist agents and formed into the 4th Route Army, which, by all accounts, is a formidable force. At the moment of writing this army has recently recaptured Matang, where the river narrows between hills near Kiukiang, and is reported to have succeeded in sinking a number of Japanese ships.

Political propaganda forms an important part of the Communist offensive, and by means of it they have won over considerable numbers of the Chinese militia formed by the Japanese. Incessantly they preach resistance to Japan, which, it is interesting to note, was their cry even before the Long March. In social matters, as has been said, their creed has become more and more Chinese. On entering Shensi they immediately abolished all taxation for a year, except the land tax, in order to help the farmers to straighten their affairs; and, as usual, proceeded to a redistribution of the land. They enforce the ancient Chinese principle that everything found under the ground belongs to the State; and they believe in State-ownership of industries. But they do not object to privately run industries, nor to the private ownership of land, in fact they encourage it, with the sole proviso that there must be no landlordism. In matters of religion they have reverted to the old Chinese tolerance, and Christians, Buddhists, and Taoists follow their respective creeds in the Communist ranks openly and without hindrance.

At Yen-an the Communists have set going a number of little factories, housed in caves, like their hospitals, for safety against air-raids, which chiefly produce clothing, uniforms, and shoes. They are fortunate in having under their control the only oil wells in China. The Communists are very good

business men judging by a report that reached the writer not long ago. Some of their agents came to Tientsin (they pass through the Japanese lines quite fearlessly) to buy certain machinery from a foreign agent. They knew exactly what they wanted, how much they ought to pay, and having satisfied themselves as to the quality of the goods by several searching questions they paid up and departed. The pay both in the Army and in official departments is very small, and the officers do not receive more than a few dollars above the private's pay. Even Mao Tse-tung himself probably does not get more than the equivalent of £25 or £30 a year. The integrity of the Communist leaders is extolled by everyone who has come in contact with them. There is not the faintest sign of a bureaucratic plutocracy growing out of their movement as has appeared in Russia.

The Chinese Communists' grand aim—apart from the immediate task of destroying the Japanese—is in everything the peasant's welfare. The present writer has no more sympathy with Communism than with any other 'ism,' the essential thing being not a particular form of Government, but good men. But there is indubitable evidence that the Communists in China, with their strange mixture of shrewd hard-headedness and fantastic idealism, have given the peasants a better life than they ever had before, and Heaven knows their lives have been bitter hard from the dawn of history. To pay for what they buy, to treat the people among whom they pass kindly, to put things straight on leaving a village where they have spent the night and, as the Catechism has it, 'not to covet nor desire other men's goods, but to learn and labour truly to get mine own living'—these rules are drilled into the Communist troops without ceasing, and are faithfully obeyed.

The benefit of this good conduct is shown in the peasants' readiness to help the guerrillas in every possible way. It is an axiom that guerrilla warfare cannot be waged successfully without the support of the local people. But, in spite of the Japanese ruthlessness towards villages suspected of helping the Communists, that help is seldom, if ever, refused, and the Japanese cannot move an inch without news of it coming straight to the guerrillas.

There is, however, another aspect of the Communists' interest in the peasants, not without its seriousness. Rural China abounds, like other countries, in vested interests. The landlord, money-lender, tax-farmer, see their occupation gone, and they naturally resent it. Their grievances drift up to the Kuomintang, many of whom have interests to be threatened by the Communists' revolutionary ways. The Communists have repeatedly urged that the peasants should be provided with weapons, that a 'nation in arms' is the only guarantee of victory over Japan. But the Kuomintang will not agree to it. The feeling of the Kuomintang was shown at the fifth plenary session of the Central Executive Committee, when a proposal to incorporate the Communists in the Party was rejected, a motion being passed that the Kuomintang nevertheless welcomed co-operation from any quarter.

The conspicuous extension of Communist influence has also given rise to a certain amount of discord. In 1939 their ascendancy in North-west China was formally recognized with the title of the Border Government, to which were transferred various districts hitherto administered from Chungking. But as the Communists' importance has grown, there has been some friction with other local authorities, once even a clash of arms between Communist and Government troops. At the moment of writing relations appear to be distinctly strained on the Lower Yangtze where, it is said, some of the 4th Route Army have been ordered to move from the south to the north bank, apparently against their will.

Naturally the Japanese make the utmost of such incidents. But it seems safe to say that they need not be taken too seriously. In so vast a country as China, and with at least 3,000,000 men under arms, it would not be surprising if there were occasional jangling among subordinate members on the fringe of forces representing divergent political views. This need not affect the relationship of the leaders. Both Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh have pledged their absolute loyalty to General Chiang Kai-shek, and they are not likely to go back on it. Whatever differences there are between the Kuomintang and the Communists on other

matters, they are wholly at one on the supreme necessity of resistance to Japan.¹

What may happen after the war is as yet a pure speculation. The present indications are that government will be conducted on two-party lines, and it is interesting to observe that Chinese thought begins to lean more and more towards the advantages of this system. One possibility that suggests itself is the formation of a United States or Federated States of China, a plan which was much favoured by Young China in 1919-20. One thing is certain, namely, that the peasant class, and their champions, will insist on their rights. After all, it is the millions of peasants' sons who have poured out their blood so ungrudgingly in China's defence. A good many old privileges will accordingly have to be scrapped, just as we expect to happen in England. In short, there will be 'a new order' in China, but of Chinese not Japanese making.

¹ Since the above was written, General Chiang Kai-shek has made a public statement, to the effect that the dispute with the 4th Route Army was purely a matter of military discipline, to which he had been reluctantly driven after prolonged controversy, and that it had no political significance whatever. No outside Power (obviously Russia) he added, had taken any umbrage at it; and to show that there was no bias in the arrest and court-martialling of some officers of the 4th Route Army, General Chiang recalled the executions for disobedience of other high Chinese officers, notably General Han Fu-chu, who could certainly not be accused of Communist leanings. A renewed offensive by the Japanese in Honan and Anhui in February is reported to have closed the dispute, both sections of the Chinese forces instantly combining against the common foe.

CHAPTER XVI

THE GOVERNMENT AT CHUNGKING

THINKING of Chungking in its unenlightened pre-war days, even more so before river steamers began to plough up the Gorges and the traveller was hauled over the rapids in a native houseboat, tugged by straining coolies on the banks, one can scarcely visualize it as a capital. So steep is the promontory to which the city clings above the River of the Golden Sands (as the Yangtze is here called), that the streets are flights of steps greasy with refuse and drippings from the water-carriers' buckets and closely beset by a maze of dark malodorous little shops, which nevertheless produce most beautiful work in jade, agate, amber, and ivory, gold ornaments inlaid with kingfishers' feathers, carved wine-cups, rich tapestries; besides all manner of strange medicines, 'midsummer root' (which deprives a man of speech), compounds of ox gall (to give him courage), and decoctions of mosquitoes' stomachs (to cure him of fever).

Yet within these unpromising surroundings the forethought of General Chiang and the zeal of his followers have created a capital which may truly be called the fortress of the hopes of liberty of the Far East.

It is defended from possible invasion by the impregnable Gorges, down which the Yangtze foams in long slanting rapids through chasms 2000 feet deep or more, a distance of 350 miles to Ichang; and to north and south by mountain ranges hardly less impassable than, and twice as far as, the road by the river. Except by aeroplane the Japanese cannot reach Chungking. That General Chiang had marked down Chungking and the well-protected territories beyond it as the ground where he meant to stand from the beginning of the war, is shown by the fact that the con-

struction of the Burma road was begun while Shanghai was still being defended.

The territory in undisputed possession of the Chinese Government is usually spoken of as South-west China. But, in fact, it includes all west and north-west as well—Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangsi (since it was evacuated by Japan), Szechuan, Sikong, Shensi, and Kansu. The area of these seven provinces alone is over 1,200,000 square miles, and to them must be added parts of Hunan, Kiangsi, and southern Shansi. This is proved by the large quantities of tungsten and antimony, chiefly found in Hunan and Kwangsi, which China has been able to export in payment of munitions.

Free China is well provided with mineral wealth. The coal reserves of Szechuan, Yunnan, and Kweichow are estimated at nearly 12,000 million tons of bituminous coal and about 850 million tons of anthracite. There is oil in Szechuan, though it has not yet been worked, iron ore, lead, and tin. The Chinese started steel foundries two years ago, and now claim that they are producing enough steel for their arsenals, but this sounds a little optimistic, especially as they are said to have one thousand arsenals dotted about all over the south-west, which, though they are all purposely kept small so that the bombing of even several would not greatly check production, must in all demand a large quantity of steel. In tungsten and antimony China is better provided than any country, and there are also great reserves of manganese in Kwangsi. There is gold in Yunnan in quantities worth mining.

Besides the wealth under the ground, 'free China produces tea, cotton, silk, cereals, wool, and the invaluable *tung*, or wood oil, in abundance. Szechuan, which is about as big as France, is indeed one of the most fertile areas in the world. The irrigation system of the great plain of Chêngtu, the capital of the province, has been admired by engineers from every country.

Yet, until the present war, the wealth of South-west China (to use the conventional term) had scarcely even been tapped. Excepting northern Central China, Szechuan has probably suffered more than any other part of the country

from the strife of rival warlords since the Revolution. It thus constituted a reservoir of undeveloped strength for the carrying on of the war, the development of which has meant sinews of war and work for tens of millions of refugees from Eastern China.

Indirectly, the war has thus proved a blessing indeed to the South-west, which, for the first time in history, must play an increasingly large part in China's fortunes. Its teeming multitudes have had too hard a struggle for each day's existence to be able to plan for the future, and there were few or none to fertilize their labours with the capital which now begins to be forthcoming. The average land-owner in the interior of China has always hitherto been satisfied with what he could get from, what may be called, the day-to-day labour of his peasants, and preferred to invest his surplus money in the towns, in shops, pawnshops, and banks, instead of applying it to agricultural development.

In this respect the coming of the Government to Szechuan has already made vast changes, with the promise of much more. When Hankow fell General Chiang issued a statement bidding his countrymen be of good cheer; all that had yet happened was but a preliminary to the real war that was about to come, as the resources of China were developed. How the Chinese got the masses of machinery they carried off from Nanking and Hankow up the Yangtze Gorges and far beyond—with no railways to help—is a mystery to all but Chinese. But the word 'portable' has a very wide meaning in a country where a tea-porter can walk all day carrying 200 pounds of tea on his shoulders, over mountain passes 8000 feet high from Szechuan into Tibet.¹

Industrial development is prosecuted by two main agencies, Government monopolies of the production of raw materials and co-operative units for manufactures. The

¹ And he never sits down till he reaches the end of the day's journey. The tea is packed on a wooden frame that rises high above his head, and he occasionally rests himself by leaning against a rock. The secret is presumably that the weight carried descends directly through the porter's spinal column. But China has forgotten more than the West knew of how to carry heavy loads, and a Chinese coolie can trot along comfortably under weights which a Westerner, who could break him with one hand, would be sorry to carry for a mile.

Government's side of the work, stimulated by the barter agreements made with Russia in 1938 and 1940, certainly seems to be achieving considerable success, particularly in the production of tea and wool. The semi-privately-owned China National Tea Corporation was recently taken over by the Government, and its programme aims at the formation of scores of new tea colonies. Already it is stated that Yunnan, a province not previously noted for its tea (as compared, say, with Hupch, Fukien, and Szechuan), is outstripping its rivals in tea production. New tea factories are being built on the most approved lines. And apart from Western and South-western China, the Corporation is able to tap parts of the eastern provinces, in spite of the Japanese invasion, Anhui, Fukien, and Chêkiang, the latter being particularly noted for its green tea. Russia is taking more and more tea from China, whose total export in 1940 was expected to be already worth \$150,000,000.

The wool trade is now monopolized by the Foreign Trade Commission. No figures of export are available, but it is stated that the north-western provinces of Kansu, Koko Nor, and Ninghsia (the latter in Inner Mongolia, but still unreached and, it may be believed, beyond reach by Japan), contain no fewer than 14,000,000 sheep, yielding excellent wool. Again Russia is the chief buyer. Formerly much of this wool went to Tientsin. But apart from the difficulties imposed by Japanese military interference (as described in Chapter XIV), the Foreign Trade Commission does all it can to stop supplies from going where they may conceivably benefit Japan.

If the latter is trying to wage economic warfare against free China, China is certainly responding in kind. So far back as in July, 1939, a Reuter message from Chungking reported that a ban had been put upon the import of all 'luxuries.' The list not only included foreign wines, cosmetics, toys, and musical instruments (alas, for young Miss China's piano, and her passionate desire to master the more difficult variations of Schubert's Impromptu in G), but cotton piece-goods, lumber, and paper. The immediate aim at that time was to strengthen exchange by reducing China's adverse trade balance, but the last three items

show clearly the desire to hit at Japan, as indeed a Chinese official spokesman frankly declared.

Since then China's economic blockade of Japan has been enlarged and stiffened 'with extremely satisfactory results,' according to a recent statement by Mr. Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economics. The export to Japan of all materials necessary either for munition-making or for the manufacture of her own exports is rigidly forbidden, 'with the result' (says Mr. Wong) 'that exports from China to Japan dropped from 116 million dollars in 1938 to 66 millions in 1939.' The figures for 1940 are not obtainable at the moment of writing.

At the same time the Chinese Government is doing its best to put a stop to smuggling, a very difficult matter in so big a country as China. Even at the principal ports, in theory tightly blockaded by Japan, it is an open secret that goods from abroad can be passed through by greasing the military palm. The owner of the palm, of course, does not appear openly, but a go-between is easily found, the goods thus passed making their way to all parts of China. But there is not the slightest doubt that Japan has been baulked of much of the trade she hoped to do with China, particularly in getting the coal, cotton, and iron she needs, in which respect the Chinese Government's efforts are ably seconded by the guerrillas' destructive activities.

Of the work of the co-operative units it is difficult to speak with certainty. According to the American 'Far Eastern Survey' there were, at the beginning of 1940, about 180,000 spindles and 900 looms in operation in free China, and the Government's three-year economic plan looks forward to the creation of 3500 textile co-operative societies, 2193 in chemical industries, 2184 in small-scale mining, 116 in mechanical industries, 108 in electrical engineering, and 1857 in enterprises producing daily necessities. Actually, at the beginning of 1940, there were 1300 co-operative units in free China, employing over 25,000 members. But, according to the 'Far Eastern Survey,' there has been far too much hasty improvisation, enthusiasm has outrun discretion, many units are quite unbusiness-like, and the whole system needs a thorough overhaul.

It would be strange if it did not, with everything in an undeveloped country starting from scratch, with millions of refugees for whom work had to be found, and with everyone burning with zeal to prove his activity in the country's behalf. It is a case of Galileo's '*Eppur si muove!*' even if the movement, in some respects, is rather dizzy and ill-directed. It is significant, as the China Association Report for 1939 points out, that there is now sufficient commercial activity at Kunming (the Chinese end of the Burma road) to justify the creation there of a British Chamber of Commerce.

Dr. W. W. Yen, the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow, does not claim too much when, writing in the *China Quarterly* at the beginning of the fourth year of the war, he says :

'The war has worked marvels in the development of the vast Chinese hinterlands, which would have taken decades to achieve had there been no war. Forced back upon her fundamental agrarian economy, China is daily developing new sources of strength. The Far West is becoming the centre of gravity of China's economic life. . . . In the race between China's reconstruction of the hinterland and Japan's consolidation of her gains in the occupied areas, China seems to be moving at a faster rate.'

No better symbol could be found of China's new spirit and determination than the Burma road. It may, indeed, be called one of the world's wonders. Even western engineers, provided with all the latest road-building apparatus, might be appalled at the prospect of having to carry a road through such country. The Chinese had nothing but human labour and such implements as probably were being used in the days of Confucius. Yet, begun in October, 1937, the road was already capable within fourteen months of carrying light motor traffic. Its total length from Lashio, the railway head in Burma, to Kunming, is 772 miles. Of these, the track from Lashio to the frontier measures 124 miles, which the Burmese Government has put into very fair condition. At the other end, from Kunming to Hsiakuan, a distance of 281 miles, a motor-road had been made two years before the war.

There remained, therefore, some 367 miles of road to be driven from Hsiakuan to the Burma frontier, across some of the most heart-breaking country in the world.

In western Yunnan the mountain ranges run north and south like a toast-rack. Two mighty rivers, the Salween and the Mekong, run through them between mountains 8000 feet high, with further ranges between, and on either side, of anything from 2000 feet to 4000 feet.

The scenery is superb, the mountains being clothed in forests of every sort of rare and beautiful tree, in which roam tigers, leopards, wild boar, deer, and innumerable birds,—a sportsman's paradise. But imagine having to drive a road over such heights and depths, for there is no way round, with the added difficulty of torrential rains from June to October, 'falling like ramrods,' and slashing the road-builders' puny efforts with crevasses and landslides.

To this fearsome task the Chinese applied the traditional long hoe of their ancestors, stone rollers drawn by oxen, and countless human muscles. Even women and little girls could be seen staggering along with stones or baskets of dirt on their heads. The old terrifying rope bridges over rivers were replaced by suspension bridges painfully carried up from the coast, in pieces.

To travel over the road was a hair-raising experience. The gradients were in places terrific ; there were awful hair-pin bends where the road was not more than 8 feet wide, with a drop of 2000 feet on the outside. Even at the beginning of 1940 it was said that, on an average, two lorries and three lives were lost on the road every day. But a great deal has been done in the past year, gradients made easier, hair-pin bends rounded out, the road widened, its surface improved and strengthened, culverts constructed to let off the torrents of water during the rainy season, and comfortable rest-houses for travellers. At the present time the road carries only about 7000 tons of cargo each way per month, but with the expected arrival of new lorries from America it is capable of, at least, three times that quantity. Transport costs are high, owing to the need of carrying petrol to Kunming for the return journey to Burma. But these costs are very much less than the value in foreign exchange to China of the exports that she can send out by a road which directly links with the sea.

Of course, as soon as the road was reopened last October,

the Japanese started bombing it, and within twenty-four hours claimed to have made it useless. But the Chinese flatly contradict this, and assert that no obstruction of more than a few hours has ever occurred. On the whole that seems possible enough. An army of coolies is ever at hand to repair damage ; and when it is recalled that the Japanese bombers never succeeded in hitting the much easier mark of the Shanghai-Nanking motor-road, nor in destroying any of the numerous bridges along it, and that they proved very poor marksmen at railways, it is possible to believe that traffic along the Burma road gets through pretty well.

The other main road out of China through Shensi and Kansu, eventually linking with the Russian Turk-Sib railway, is far less valuable commercially than the Burma road. From Chungking to the Turk-Sib is 2500 miles, with formidable mountain ranges to be crossed ; and the monthly traffic in both directions together has not yet exceeded 4000 tons. But this road, too, is being improved, and the volume of goods carried over it ought to be at least doubled. Moreover, it is very useful for the receipt of munitions from Russia. The Japanese have tried again and again to force their way over the Yellow River into Shensi in order to cut this road, but hitherto in vain.

Of other roads the one from Kunming to Chungking is in excellent condition, and a large network of roads has already been spread over the south-west. One new railway has been completed from Hengyang, on the middle part of the Canton-Hankow line, which free China still commands, to Kweilin and Liuchow, in Kwangsi, and another is in progress to link up Chungking with the provincial capital Chêngtu. The Chinese are anxious to supplement the Burma road with a railway, and they have begun making the necessary embankments for the track from Kunming. But the work has not yet gone far enough for the Burma Government to feel justified in extending their railway from Lashio to the frontier.

Aeroplanes play a big part in China's activities. There is a regular air-service linking Chungking with Hongkong ; with Rangoon ; and with Hami, in Sinkiang, where it

connects with the Russian aeroplanes to Moscow. Twice the Japanese have forced down aeroplanes between Hong-kong and Chungking, and machine-gunned them, killing several of the passengers ; once they thought Dr. Sun Fo, the son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, was on board. But the aeroplanes have continued to fly undauntedly.

In view of the shortage of petrol, China has pressed into service all the ancient forms of transport which had served her for centuries. Camels, mules, wheelbarrows, coolies with their bamboo carrying-poles, and the sturdy little Szechuanese ponies, move along the highways in endless streams. The cargo they carry is in the aggregate enormous. The movement is slow, but for many commodities that is immaterial ; and, for others, speed is less important than that the stream of supply should be kept moving uninterruptedly, and it is obvious that men and animals, able to scatter in all directions at a moment's notice, are a far less vulnerable target from the air than motor lorries or trains.

Of China's financial position there is no certain information. She is believed to have begun the war with gold deposits abroad worth about £30,000,000, besides an unknown but certainly considerable quantity of silver, which America has been buying from her at a specially favourable rate of exchange. Russia is understood to have given her credits of about £50,000,000 ; America, including last September's loan, the same. Great Britain's credits to China, including those announced last December, for commercial purchases and stabilization of exchange, aggregate £21,000,000. These amounts look small compared with our own colossal war bills, but the cheapness of labour in China gives them a very different value in dollars. Chinese in America and the South Seas regularly send large, though unknown, amounts to the Government, and help on the good cause by boycotting Japanese goods wherever they can.

At the beginning of the war China's national debt was roughly \$4,500,000,000 in Chinese currency. At the close of 1940 Dr. H. H. Kung, the Finance Minister, said that she had raised about \$4,800,000,000 more during

the war. The total national debt thus works out roughly at \$20 per head of population, which is less than a twentieth of what the Japanese have to carry. One thing clear is that the Chinese Government has managed not only to finance the war, but to find considerable sums for economic developments, and Dr. H. H. Kung, the Finance Minister, appears quite confident that it will be able to go on doing so.

Against this, the rise in costs of living in Chungking is a serious matter, bearing heavily on the masses of workers. Since the beginning of the war prices had increased, at the end of 1940, on an average by eight times, and there was no commensurate increase of wages. To make matters worse, the increase has been considerably greater in commodities produced locally than in imported goods, in spite of high transportation charges. Clearly there has been hoarding and profiteering. The immense influx of refugees must have caused considerable inconvenience in already thickly populated Szechuan, whose merchants have for long regarded themselves as living practically in another country; and they may well have decided to make 'the foreigners' pay for their admission. But in the interests of the whole community the Government ought to stop the hoarding decisively. Judging by the reports of a conference held at Chungking last December, with General Chiang Kai-shek presiding, it appears to be taking steps to do so.

The other most important question with which General Chiang has to grapple, is that of the relationships of Kuomintang and Communists, which has not been improved by the large extension of Communist influence in North-eastern and Central China, already described. A Reuter telegram from Chungking of 2 September, 1940, in connection with a visit by Mr. Chow En-lai, one of the chief Communist leaders, to confer with General Chiang on issues between the Government and Communists, said that,

'Contrary to reports that Left Wing leaders are occupying important posts in Chungking, there is not one Communist leader in an important post in the Government excepting possibly Mr. Chow En-lai, who is Vice-Minister of Political Affairs on the Board of the National Military Council. Furthermore, there are signs that fewer and fewer so-called Left Wing leaders are actively co-operating in the Government.'

The message then mentions two well-known Left Wingers who had lately given up their posts in Chungking, Mr. Kuo Ma-jo, an author and poet, who had been Director of the Publicity Department of the Political Affairs Board ; and Miss Chen Tze-chiu, also a well-known writer, who had been serving under Madame Chiang Kai-shek as head of the Cultural Affairs Department of the National Women's Supervisory Committee.

The issue between Kuomintang and Communists, which has been mentioned once or twice already in these pages, is of course merely the old one between vested interests and popular reforms, which was bound to arise in such a time of upheaval, especially as the young intelligentsia tends so strongly to move towards the Communists. That it will cause any serious breach in the United Front is inconceivable when that unity has stood so firmly and with so much world-wide admiration for three and a half years against overwhelming misfortune, and at the moment when luck is visibly turning in China's favour. But the controversy between Rights and Lefts none the less needs to be carefully watched.

There are several mitigating factors. The chief one is the personal prestige of General Chiang, his statesmanship, and the universal reverence in which he is held. Another, is the wide-scale offensive to which China looks forward in 1941, as the Japanese visibly try to reduce their commitments : the more fighting, the less talking there will be. Another is the creation (even before Hankow fell) of the People's Political Council, composed of two hundred members of all shades of opinion, which has clearly been growing in importance, to the great satisfaction of all thinking Chinese.

And, lastly, there is the popular enthusiasm for the war which runs through all classes. The Chinese know that their gallant resistance to their formidable foe has won them the unstinted admiration of all civilized peoples. They have learnt what their own strength, in union, can accomplish on many triumphant battlefields. Their courage and confidence, even under the most pitiless bombing, are seemingly unshakable. Chungking has suffered cruelly in

the past year from air-raids. Yet even while the ruins of their houses are still smoking, business men and shopkeepers put up booths and get to work again. While this chapter is being written, an account comes from Chungking of a new model settlement which is to be built on a part of the ruins of the new suburbs.

Striking testimony to the spirit of China was paid by none other than a Japanese officer, Colonel Hayao Mabuchi, chief of the Army Press Section, in an article in the Tokyo *Nichi Nichi* of 27 December, 1940, written just after his return from a year in China. He frankly told his countrymen that there was little hope of China's collapsing 'unless some radical change occurs in the world situation.'

'The China affair (wrote Colonel Mabuchi) is so complicated that it cannot be comprehended thoroughly by mere common sense. Japan is fighting the troops of Chiang Kai-shek on the soil of China, but the defeat of these troops will not bring a solution of the Sino-Japanese hostilities.

'Most of the Chinese collected under the banner of Chiang Kai-shek represent the cream of the Chinese people, with a flaming love of their country. Standing behind them are Great Britain, America, and other countries, which intend to maintain the old order of East Asia.

'Japan should recognize fully the strenuous efforts which the anti-Japanese camp in Chungking are making. If Japan has no real strength, any treaties she may conclude with other countries will be nothing more than pieces of waste paper.'

CHAPTER XVII

JAPAN'S QUEST FOR VICTORY

THE story of Japan's quest for victory in China may be summed up as one of ever-mounting Budgets, ever tightening military grip on national affairs, and continually changing Governments. The present administration is the fifth since the 'incident' began. Each new one has put in the front of its programme the successful conclusion of the war, which still remains as far off as ever.

In May, 1937, the Diet, still possessed of some power and all up in arms against the Army's designs upon its rights, had driven General Hayashi to resign, and Prince Konoye took office. Prince Konoye is an aristocrat *sang azur*, with a pedigree reaching back to the dawn of history. As a young man he had been a pupil of the late Prince Saionji, the great liberal-minded Elder Statesman, had travelled abroad not a little, sometimes on missions for Japan, and had been President of the House of Peers. He is generally looked on as a broad-minded man, an idealist, his detractors say somewhat of a dilettante. As he had never associated himself with any party, his call to office was interpreted as a hope that he might reconcile the claims of Army and Diet. On that the Army was to prove that it had its own ideas.

The invasion of China quietened the Diet and it accepted, in December, a Budget of yen 8,275,000,000, including yen 4,850,000,000 for the war, although it was about four times the previous year's Budget and involved borrowing yen 5,320,000,000, besides largely increased taxation.

But considerable protest was made against the National Mobilization Bill in February, 1938, which was designed to bring the whole economic forces of the country under the single control of the Government. The Diet agreed that the

Government must have special powers in war-time, but it argued that those powers were adequately provided in existing laws, and it objected strongly to a measure which, as by pressing a button, would bring the entire activities of the nation under bureaucratic control without Parliament's being consulted. The Government promised some concessions in form. But, as usual, the Army won, and the Bill became law.

The Army scored again in May when Mr. Hirota, the Foreign Minister, resigned in protest against the Army's taking control of the China Affairs Board, which he vainly insisted should properly belong to the Foreign Office, and General Ugaki succeeded him.

In the reshuffling of the Cabinet at this time, General Araki was made Minister of Education. Some people regarded this appointment as a joke; but the Army knew what it was doing. General Araki will be remembered as the fire-eater who had made speeches about Japan's Imperial destiny during the Manchurian crisis and the need of sweeping the white races from Asia. As Minister of Education he would have limitless power to 'teach the young idea to shoot' in any desired style.


At the Home Office, too, was another of much the same kidney, Admiral Suetsugu. Contrary to the usual tendency in the Japanese Navy, Admiral Suetsugu is anti-British and has no idea of bridling his tongue. He made large raids on the Proletarian Party, and drove all those who sympathized with it underground. He it was, too, who, before the end of 1938, raised the demand for 'national mobilization on a political basis,' which, in plain language, meant the dissolution of all parties in the State and government on totalitarian lines. This, in fact, has recently come to pass. But the time was too early for it yet, especially as Prince Konoye resigned the Premiership on 4 January, 1939, in disgust at having failed to persuade China to make peace.

Baron Hiranuma became Premier, an elderly bureaucrat and strong Nationalist, generally expected to prove a thorough Army man. He tried, however, to disarm criticism by dropping Admiral Suetsugu and persuading



PRINCE KONOZE

Premier of Japan and author of the "new political structure."



CHINA'S NEW SOLDIERS

Three and a half years of war have seen an almost inconceivable advance in the equipment, smartness and discipline of China's armies from the ill-trained, ill-equipped hordes with which she began the war.

Prince Konoye to remain with him as Minister without portfolio. But financial circles were very sad at the disappearance of Mr. Ikeda, a man of strong character and the last Minister of Finance worthy of the name that Japan has had.

Prince Konoye's valediction dwelt on 'the new phase' on which 'the China incident' had entered (for 'new' most of his hearers could read 'disconcerting'), and the urgent need 'to enhance the nation's confidence by formulating new policies.' They were not long in making their appearance.

Ever since Japan had concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in 1936, a small but determined faction, chiefly represented by Mr. Shiratori, the Ambassador in Rome, and General Oshima, Ambassador in Berlin, had been working for a military alliance with Germany. Hitler's successes in absorbing Austria, in the Munich settlement, and in seizing Czechoslovakia, brought this faction into the open, and during June and July the proposed alliance became the chief question in Japan.

Whether Baron Hiranuma would ultimately have given way will never be known. He made polite statements about German-Japanese sympathies and cultural affinities, but seemed unlikely to go further.

At the end of August, however, came the bombshell of Germany's pact with Russia. Not only did this piece of treachery—of which it need hardly be said no inkling had been given to Japan—release her most dreaded antagonist from all anxieties on his western frontier, but, what the Japanese felt still more, it was as great an insult to them as could well be offered. It was inevitable that Baron Hiranuma should resign. Popular feeling would, in any case, have demanded *harakiri* of a Cabinet under which such things could happen; and the Hiranuma Government had certainly been closely associated with a pro-German policy.

So, on 28 August, 1939, General Nobuyuki Abe succeeded Baron Hiranuma. General Abe is unique in being a full General without ever having seen active service. He was never a politician and had never held high office. He was,

however, respected, and was appointed as a 'safe' man, to mark time while the excitement over the Russo-German agreement simmered down.

Perhaps the only interesting feature of General Abe's short regime was a 'spiritual mobilization campaign,' designed to find out what the populace were thinking and to keep them tuned up to war pitch. This coincided with considerable public unrest due to scarcity of rice and charcoal¹ (the universal domestic fuel of Japan), another hugely increased Budget and increasing restrictions on life generally. The leaders of the campaign reported accordingly to the Cabinet, but were told that the people must tighten their belts and prepare for greater hardships.

This retort gave the Diet a final chance to regain public favour. Seven years of bureaucratic and Army administration had brought nothing but reductions in the standard of life; and when the new session opened on 26 December, the politicians agreed to sink party differences in common criticism of the Government. The vehemence of the attack startled everyone. *The Times* Tokyo correspondent said that it had

'made a deep impression because it was an unorganized and spontaneous movement expressing the sentiments of members fresh from contact with millions of voters . . . an impulsive expression of national discontent.

'From the political point of view the incident is a revolt against the system of non-party Cabinets headed by amateur statesmen, which Japan has followed since the Young Officers assassinated the last party Prime Minister in 1932. The politicians have at last found the courage to rebel.'

It was, in fact, a dying struggle, the last real display of force by the Diet before the arrival of the 'new political structure,' of which more presently. But the Army did not care to be associated with a Government so obviously unpopular in view of the state of the war in China. So, on 2 February, 1940, General Abe went and Admiral Yonai reigned in his stead, with Mr. Arita, a professional diplomat, as Foreign Minister.

¹ This scarcity still prevails at the time of writing. In December, 1940, 900,000 Japanese students were reported to have been told to spend their holidays in helping to make charcoal.

Admiral Yonai had been Minister of Marine in three Governments, and was admired as a very able sailor and for his own qualities. He promised to do his utmost to finish the 'China incident' and to alleviate conditions of life in Japan (two mutual incompatibilities, but no one seemed to see that), and, further, to improve Japan's foreign relationships.

It is to be remembered that the Japanese-American trade agreement, denounced by America in the previous July, had just expired, and Japan was very nervous of what America might do about it, the more so that Mr. Grew, the American Ambassador, on returning from home in November, had told the Japanese plainly and publicly that American sentiment was rising strongly against them. The Yonai Government did undoubtedly try to be more emollient both towards America and Great Britain. But, as it clung obstinately to the determined objective of 'a new order in East Asia,' the attempt was not much good.

But Japanese policy was soon to become inseparably linked with the war in Europe. The overrunning of Denmark and Norway by Germany, the smashing of Holland and Belgium, the appalling downfall of France, the apparently imminent defeat of Great Britain, brought out the advocates of an alliance with Germany (who had never admitted defeat but were only biding their time) in full cry against the Yonai 'appeasement' policy. On 17 July Admiral Yonai resigned and Prince Konoye again became Premier, with Mr. Matsuoka as Foreign Minister, the man who had led the Japanese delegation out of the League of Nations.

Before dealing with the final stage in the triumph of totalitarian rule in Japan, it may be convenient to glance at what that rule had already cost her.

The apparent ability of nations to carry on war without money is a commonplace. But when one considers the slender resources of Japan and how she depends on foreign countries for over 80 per cent of her raw materials (cotton, wool, coal, rubber, and metals being conspicuous) and semi-manufactured articles to be made up in her factories, the yearly increase in her Budgets and borrowings must be causing great anxiety to her business men, if to nobody else.

The situation is shown at a glance in the following table. The year 1936-37 has been taken for purposes of comparison as being the last that was entirely clear of the war's influence. The figures represent millions of yen.

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Ordinary Budget.</i>	<i>China War.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Borrowed.</i>
1936-37	2,272	—	—	680
1938-39	3,425	4,850	8,275	5,320
1939-40	3,694	4,850	8,544	5,450
1940-41	5,900	4,460	10,360	5,400
1941-42	6,863	4,460 (?)	11,323	—

At the moment of writing the sum required for the war is not known, but it is not expected to be less than last year's appropriation, and there are gloomy forebodings that the coming Budget will even exceed yen 12,000,000,000. The deficit on the Ordinary Budget leaves yen 2,000,000,000 to be covered by loans, apart from what will have to be borrowed for the war.

In March, 1939, the Navy announced a six-year programme of 'replenishment,' costing yen 1,693,000,000 for ships, aviation, and marine and land establishments. The Army, at the same time, announced a five-year plan, to cost yen 194,000,000—a total of yen 1,887,000,000; an average for the six years of yen 314,500,000.

Whether this sum is to be added to the Budget or is included in what the Army and Navy take is not clear. But considering that in 1936-37 the share of the Army and Navy was a little over half the year's expenditure and that it is now about 64 per cent, not counting the expenses of the war, the growth of the dictators' appetite in eating needs no comment.

Great stress has been laid in Japan on her increasingly favourable trade balance in the past two to three years. But this has only been achieved by increased exports to the 'yen-bloc' countries (Manchukuo and China), while her exports to the countries which provide the foreign exchange that she must obtain to pay for the raw materials she lacks has steadily decreased. Thus, in 1936, Japan's unfavourable trade balance was yen 130,000,000. In the last complete

figures available at the moment of writing—those for only the first seven months of 1940—her debit balance with the non-yen-bloc countries was yen 579,187,000 ; and this was nearly yen 109,000,000 more than in the year before.

With the yen bloc Japan's favourable balance rose from yen 576,568,000 in the first seven months of 1939 to yen 818,556,000 in 1940. But this is rather to Japan's disadvantage than otherwise, since her exports to the yen bloc are largely composed of articles made from raw materials which she has to purchase from the non-yen bloc. In this way we have the paradox that a favourable trade balance with China and Manchukuo actually helps to swell Japan's unfavourable balance.

All imports of raw materials not needed for military purposes have been severely restricted. But this obviously tells upon general production and to some extent upon the amount of employment, though this is less noticeable owing to the off-take of labour in munition factories. To increase the quantity of articles that can be exported, the Japanese public has been obliged to put up with numerous substitutes—staple-cloth instead of cotton, for example—and to do without many of the small conveniences of life.

Last October a complete overhaul of the national economy was announced with 'self-sufficiency in the yen bloc' as its motto. An official foreign trade supervisory organization was set up with the title of 'The Japan Federation of East Asia Import and Export Associations,' which will have charge of all trade in the yen bloc. All goods to be supplied within this circle must have a permit from this Federation, which also will fix import and export prices. It is noticeable that exports to the yen bloc are to be severely pruned. But Japan has undertaken large schemes of development in Manchoukuo—not to mention her plans for China—on which it will not be too easy to cut down.

The task before the Federation must prove extremely complicated, but that will in no way discourage the bureaucrats from trying to force it through. For such a scheme is not only the normal counterpart of totalitarian government that might be expected ; it is also an essential part

of Japan's new order in East Asia, which is particularly designed to free her from her present dependence on Western countries for the materials of her industries. After America's denunciation of her trade agreement with Japan, great energy was shown by Japanese business men in trying to open up new fields in the South American republics. At first the Government smiled approvingly. Recently it has begun to throw cold water, telling the merchants that Japan will not be able to import the things that the South Americans wish to sell, because she will get them from nearer at hand within her own economic bloc.

Two questions which excite much curiosity abroad are the amount of Japan's gold reserves and her capacity to carry the enormous loans annually issued. Her gold reserves are never published, but foreign bankers are able to form some idea of them by the known quantity of gold she sends abroad to balance her trade account. By their calculations the gold held by the Bank of Japan has fallen since 1936 from about 13,210,000 ounces to about 1,586,150, including the gold that Japan herself produces. This gold, obtained chiefly from Korea, used to be worth about £20,000,000 a year, but its production has certainly been increased, although not nearly to the point at which it would equal her shipments of gold.

From the table given above, it will be seen that loans authorized since the beginning of the 'incident' amount to yen 16,170,000,000, not including the loans for 1941, which have not yet been published. In the year of the invasion of Manchuria the national debt was only yen 6,000,000,000; but the *Oriental Economist* (a very sound and independent monthly magazine of Tokyo) spoke rather nervously of the possibility of its reaching yen 10,000,000,000. But by July, 1940, the debt totalled yen 24,301,679,000, and there is much more to come. Until a year ago the loans had been easily absorbed. The money mostly went to the armament manufacturers, who returned it to the banks and paid taxation on it, the money thus remaining in Japan.

The boldness with which Japan challenges Fate—she has been gambling fearlessly on her future ever since the war

with Russia—is shown by the fact that in addition to the costs of war and the Services' huge demands for replenishment, she has found large sums for Manchukuo. Internal development is a feature of the 1941-42 Budget, including a scheme of afforestation intended to supply Japan with timber fifty years hence.

But the Scilly Islanders' method of living by lending each other two shillings and taking in each other's washing cannot continue indefinitely, and by the autumn of 1940 there were ominous reports that the Bank of Japan contained a great deal more Government paper than other banks could take. Taxation has been trebled since the war began; prices of food, clothing, light, and fuel have risen officially by 49 per cent, but the actual prices which householders have to pay are above that.

The stoppage of various commodities from America and the difficulty of getting them from the British Empire are plainly causing more anxiety than is publicly admitted. The *Oriental Economist* in October, 1940, asserted that Japan had ample stocks of iron and steel to last till the resources of the countries under her control were developed. But in December the chairman and directors of the Japan Iron Company, the biggest organization of its kind in Japan, resigned office owing to the difficulty of carrying on under existing conditions. At the same time the cotton interests appointed a committee to advise on how to increase the cotton crops in North and South China. At the preliminary meeting the chairman said that the 'East Asia Mutual Prosperity Sphere,' in which he apparently included Indo-China, Thailand, and the Dutch East Indies, only produced a fifth of the cotton it needs.¹

Perhaps the most significant event, however, is the institution of a censorship at the end of 1940 on all news of Japan's economic and financial condition likely to give a

¹ Answering a question for the Government in the House of Representatives Budget Committee on 15 February, General Hoshina admitted that: "Japan's supplies of steel and petroleum are not wholly satisfactory," though he said that they were adequate "at present" for national defence.

General Hoshina added that supplies of steel showed a decrease while industry was readjusting itself to the method of production from pig iron, instead of the cheaper process hitherto used of making steel from scrap—the supply of which America has cut off.

defeatist impression, with penalties for offenders of as much as two years' imprisonment. As an indication of the Japanese people's growing uneasiness this says much.

Two events of the year 1940 may be mentioned, respectively an illustration and a symbol. On 4 February a veteran member of the Diet, Mr. Takao Saito, long known for his daring and incisive criticisms, boldly asked how long the China 'incident' was to last, what was meant by the 'new order in East Asia,' and what the Japanese people were getting for all their sacrifices. The military wrath was great. Mr. Saito was accused of showing contempt for Japan's 'holy war'; half his speech was struck out of the parliamentary records, and he himself had to resign from his party.

The other event is the death at the end of November of the aged Prince Saionji, the last of the great men who had made the glory of the Meiji Restoration seventy years before. For a long time, though regularly consulted on the appointment of every Premier, he had ceased to exercise any influence in affairs. Yet while he lived, his name meant something as that of the greatest of Japanese Liberals. He lived just long enough to see Liberalism completely trampled under the dictators' heels, the Diet reduced to a nonentity, and power concentrated in the hands of those least worthy to wield it.

From all that is known of Prince Konoye's character, it is hard to associate him with the actions of his Government since he succeeded Admiral Yonai as Premier on 17 July, 1940. Late in the year he was reported to be practising Zen Buddhism, which is said to develop tranquillity of spirit and indifference to mundane annoyances. Probably the Prince was finding the Army's annoyances very hard to bear. But he cannot be exonerated from responsibility for the 'new political structure,' which has virtually torn up the Constitution, and for the 'new foreign policy' which, by linking Japan with Germany and Italy, openly proclaims her belief in the doctrine that right counts for nothing compared with might.

Even Japanese writers find it difficult to understand exactly what the new political structure will mean. The

main features of the scheme produced by the drafting committee set up by Prince Konoye are a Supreme Executive Council with branches in every town and village 'to convey the will and ideas of those who govern to those who are governed.' There are a Supreme Economic Council and a Supreme Cultural Council which will bring under State control every form of national activity, from the mills of Osaka to the schoolboy's game of baseball. There is also an 'Imperial Rule Assistance Association,' which theoretically will assist the Emperor by informing him of what his people think. Prince Konoye lays great stress on the present inability of the public to make their wishes known except every four years or so at a general election. But whether the Imperial Rule Assistance Association will count for more in this way than the old Diet is doubtful.

The enthusiasm with which the Diet greeted the 'new political structure' is hard to explain, except on the theory that its members were so weary of things as they were that any change was better than none. All the parties hastened to dissolve themselves apparently under the impression that government was to be conducted on a one-party basis. But this is erroneous and has been expressly and officially disclaimed. In fact, the new structure is Fascism *minus* a personal dictator, which, as already explained, is abhorrent to the Japanese belief in their Emperor's divinity.

When the Diet reassembled on 26 December it was aptly described by *The Times* Tokyo correspondent as 'a leaderless aggregation of 341 elected persons.' No one can see how it fits into the new structure, and already hints have been given of a revision of the electoral law which will reduce the number of members. The correspondent just quoted says in his dispatch of 26 December :

'Two tendencies are working in this fermented situation. The Imperial rulers, with the assistance of officials, are trying to exercise much the same control over the House as a unitary party in a totalitarian State. On the other hand many, perhaps the majority, of the members want to preserve their traditional rights. Their confidence is not great, they know that the foes of parliamentary government are in the ascendant, and though they are in the mood to defend them-

selves they lack leaders, organization, and moral courage. Upon the conduct of the assembly, meeting in such unfavourable conditions, the future of representative government in Japan depends.'

The Konoye Government lost no time in making its sympathies clear. The treaty signed with the Axis on 27 September is not legitimately to be complained of. Whether it was judicious from Japan's point of view will be discussed in the next chapter. But she violated no pledge in signing it and was free to do so if she thought it to her advantage. What was inexcusable was the sudden arrests at the end of July of a number of British residents in Japan, together with a violently anti-British outburst in the Japanese Press, and a loud outcry against the 'British espionage network,' in which teachers, tourists, missionaries, and journalists were allegedly involved. Of the official inspiration of this demonstration there is no doubt.

The twelve British subjects arrested were all well-known men, of long residence in Japan, some of whom had for years past taken a prominent part in societies which strove to improve Anglo-Japanese relations. No formal charge was ever laid against them, for the simple reason that there was no ground for any. In place of espionage it was said that the arrested men had spread British propaganda, trying to persuade the Japanese that Great Britain would win the war, and that they had better throw in their lot with her. Even if this were true, it was no crime.

On the third day after the arrests the world was startled by the news that one of the prisoners, Mr. Melville J. Cox, Reuter's correspondent in Tokyo for thirteen years, had met his death while under interrogation by the *gendarmarie*. The Japanese version was that he had tried to escape by jumping out of the window. But this story met with little credence.

Japan's police and *gendarmarie* bear an evil repute. They are detested by the Japanese people. They have not hesitated to seize and beat up even members of the Diet. Protests have frequently been made in the Diet against their tyrannous and brutal ways, but without effect. Mrs. Cox, who was sent for after her husband's fall, was able

to establish that he had been confined in a noisome underground cell, too small for him to stand up in, with no furniture but a wooden bench, and alive with mosquitoes and vermin; and that he had received none of the comforts which she had brought to the prison for him. His terrible ravings between the time she was taken to him and his death left no doubt of what he must have suffered in the hands of the gendarmes.

An American correspondent, who was put through five hours of the 'third degree' for having sent a message throwing doubt on the police version of Cox's death, said afterwards that, at the end of it, he was mentally so bruised and crushed (though no physical violence was used) that his only thought was how to escape, and he signed an apology which otherwise he would not have dreamed of signing. He said he could easily imagine that after fifty-six hours of such usage Cox may have jumped out of the window in temporary loss of his senses.

It may be added that Cox was a very steady, conscientious journalist, who had joined in the movement for improved Anglo-Japanese relations and, having been for some twenty-five years in China and Japan, would never have dreamed of espionage even if he had had any personal inclination for it.

The other prisoners were kept in prison for some weeks and eventually sentenced to fines or further imprisonment, though in one or two instances with suspension of sentence.

This disgraceful episode may be traced partly to the anti-Anglomania¹ which has been rampant in Japanese military and bureaucratic circles all through the war, but still more to the German 'fifth column' in Japan. The Nazis have for many months been devoting special efforts to building up their influence in Japan. 'Goodwill' missions have been continually arriving; there is said to be a Nazi official in the Home Office; and Japanese papers are not allowed to print news displeasing to Germany, while Great

¹ A curious explanation of the mania was published recently. The Japanese pride, it was said, cannot bear to admit that the despised Chinese have proved so tough. Hence the explanation was invented that Great Britain has been helping China through thick and thin. The Japanese people are told that they are really fighting, not China, but Great Britain.

Britain and America are held up as the cause of all troubles in the Far East.

Yet other instances of the reactionaries' vehemence were the order given to the Japanese Christian Church to divest itself of all foreign connections and foreign money, and the wholesale purge of the Diplomatic and Foreign Office services which was ordered at the end of August. Numbers of experienced and valuable diplomats were recalled including even so distinguished a man as Mr. Horinouchi, the Ambassador in Washington. The liberal spirit which foreign service had not unnaturally stimulated among them was anathema to the extremists in Tokyo. As Mr. Ohashi, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, put it in a statement to the Press, the spirit of renovation must prevail, 'the whole Japanese race is united like a ball of fire, sweeping all before it—that is the character of the new regime.'

Altogether the Japanese Government was in a singularly obnoxious and arrogant frame of mind in the late summer of 1940.

What do the seventy millions of the Japanese people think of the new order? Ordinarily they are not given to thinking. For centuries they have toiled from dawn to dusk, and with unquestioning docility have accepted what fate their superiors imposed on them. But signs that they are far from happy and even begin to ask questions, are multiplying fast.

The great strength of Japan, a rice- and fish-eating country, has always been that she was almost wholly self-supporting in food. Now queues of women, never known before, are seen outside the provision shops. The 1939 rice harvest was below the normal; that of 1940 was expected to be 12 per cent below that, owing to the high cost of fertilizers and the lack of labour, men having been drawn off to the war or to the making of munitions.

There is plenty of money in circulation, owing to the wages earned by all engaged in war work, but nothing comparatively speaking to buy, owing to the concentration of manufacturers on exports and the limitation of imported raw materials. This, of course, has forced up prices while the increase of wages lags far behind.

What there is to buy is not worth buying. *Einsatz*, or as it is called in Japan *Sufu*, clothing and shoes with soles made of reclaimed rubber wear out in a few days. In every article of everyday use, food, drink, raiment, tobacco, etc. etc., inferiority prevails, and a steadily declining standard of the small comforts which Japanese people used to enjoy. Yet the preachers of the 'spiritual mobilization campaign' adjure the people to prove their patriotism by cutting down their consumption of rice, and assail a girl who appears in public in a gay dress as unpatriotic.

It may be said that we in England in the Four Years War endured privations enough and came through them in triumph. But apart from the fact that the normal standard of living in Japan is so utterly inferior to that of Great Britain that any lowering of it would seem impossible, there is the great difference that we knew what we were fighting for and could follow the progress of the war; the Japanese people know neither.

Their newspapers are rigidly controlled. They know nothing of the Chinese successes and of the Serbonian bog in which the Army has stuck; they are told only of victory after victory; and thus they are left to wonder how it is that a campaign, which was to be over in three months with unlimited loot and glory for Japan, is far gone in its fourth year, and still there is no prospect of its ending. And they know, although the newspapers do not speak of it, of the families in every street and village whose fathers and sons will never return.

It is deeply significant that in his New Year message to the nation, Prince Konoye spoke of 'people prone to doubt and criticize nowadays,' and of the necessity of stamping out defeatism. Never before has such an admission been made by a Japanese Premier or by any Minister.

But Prince Konoye could give his hearers no comfort. On the contrary, he told them that they 'must be prepared for the possibility of increased international pressure this year' and 'must be ready to face the nation's difficulty by submitting to unprecedented sacrifices.'

And to this the War Minister, Lieutenant-General Tojo, added that 'our future is beset with untold difficulties.

The Army requires all the people's support to discharge its colossal duty.'

Did it occur to any of the worthy General's hearers that, but for the Army, Japan might have been spared the present terrors of her future?

What a contrast with the dithyrambic exuberance of official speakers last September! And what a contrast, too, with General Chiang Kai-shek's New Year message to his countrymen, bidding them to be of good heart for '1941 will be the final and decisive year in which China will fulfil her destiny in her present struggle against Japanese aggression. China, peace-loving by nature, will contribute greatly in the future to world peace.'

CHAPTER XVIII

EASTERN AND WESTERN CONFLICTS FUSE

“**T**HERE is no European war. There is no Asiatic war. There is a world war.”

The truth of Dr. Quo Tai-chi's pregnant words, spoken a year ago, is obvious enough now to all. Yet the democracies might still be refusing to recognize the fact, but for Japan's own folly in directly associating herself in the European conflict. By so doing the Japanese dictators acted dead against the Meiji Emperor's warning that Japan must never involve herself in the quarrels of Europe ;¹ dead against the sentiment of the Japanese people, which fully endorsed the 'non-involvement' policy followed by General Abe and Admiral Yonai ; and they forced the democracies of Great Britain, America, Holland, and even at last, it would seem, the sorely beset Vichy Government to recognize that China's quarrel is also theirs.

In November, 1937, a faint effort in the direction of international action towards the Far East was made by the summoning of a conference under the Nine Power Treaty at Brussels, not, as the sequel showed, with any intention of forcible action, but with the hope of persuading Japan to submit her differences with China to the mediating influence of her partners in the Treaty. But as Japan flatly denied that she had violated the Treaty and refused to attend the conference, the latter got no further than to pass a resolution of disapproval of Japan's treaty-breaking, from which Italy ostentatiously dissociated herself.²

¹ Japan's entry into the Four Years War may seem contrary to this warning. But it must be remembered that Japan was then definitely bound by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, out of which she had got good value in her own war with Russia. The treaty with Germany and Italy was a pure gamble, which scarcely seems to have turned up trumps for her yet.

² The League of Nations, at whose meetings China's complaints were a standing dish until the outbreak of the second German War, appealed to its members to help China and not to help Japan. It never showed the faintest sign of action, of which in fact it was incapable.

From this time each Great Power managed its own difficulties with the rampant Japanese—or mismanaged them—by itself, with poor results. Great Britain was always the chief target for Japanese attack, for the evident reason that her prestige in China had been the greatest, her interests were the largest and most solidly dug in; and unless these could be uprooted or paralysed, Japan's hopes of making China her colony, like Manchuria, could not be realized. British Socialists and pacifists were eager that we should go to war with Japan. But as they had been chiefly responsible for the cutting down of British defence forces, particularly the Navy, to the point at which they were hardly sufficient for the defence of Great Britain, their pugnacity could not be gratified. Other means which might have been used to check Japan's assault on British rights in China have been mentioned in connexion with the blockade of Tientsin. But the Government 'enacted the role of the deaf adder which pushes one ear against the dust and stops the other with the end of its tail.'¹

Towards America, the source of so many valuable supplies, the Japanese were much more cautious than to Great Britain. The one thing they dreaded was co-operation between the two great democracies. Intermittent statements by Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, showed that he fully recognized the fundamental principles at stake in the Far East. But it was not until the autumn of 1939 that the American people began to be genuinely roused against Japan. In November, 1938, the United States addressed a vigorous Note to Tokyo reiterating its insistence on the 'open door' in China, and its refusal to recognize any changes brought about by violence. This Note was followed in January by one from Great Britain, which in masterly style exposed the hypocrisy of Japan's pretence that she 'seeks no territory and respects the sovereignty

¹ Even when the Japanese Army, in May, 1940, arrested Colonel Spear the British Military Attaché in China, in the Nankou Pass, north of Peking, and kept him prisoner for several weeks—an outrage even worse than the gunning of Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen. The latter might conceivably have been the action of irresponsible airmen mad with blood-lust. In respect of Colonel Spear the Japanese High Command and Government knew exactly what they were doing.

of China,' and made quite clear Great Britain's intention to stand on the terms of the Nine Power Treaty.

There is reason to believe that the British and American Notes were communicated to each other by the two Governments before being presented. This was the nearest approach to 'joint' as opposed to merely 'parallel' action by the two Powers until after Japan had signed her treaty with the Axis.

But in July, 1939, the United States gave signs of positive action by denouncing its trade agreement with Japan. The agreement has never been renewed, Washington evidently thinking that it would do Japan good to keep her on tenterhooks. At this time, in spite of Tokyo's anxiety to keep America in a good temper, American claims on Japan for rights violated and persons and property injured in China were said to number no fewer than six hundred.

In the relations between Russia and Japan it is difficult to read any coherence, though certain unalterable factors can always be borne in mind in considering them. Russia is the only Power which, by her geographical position, can directly threaten Japan. Vladivostok is less than 650 miles from Tokyo, no distance for modern bombers; and there appears good reason to believe that the Soviet's Army and Air Force in Siberia and the Maritime Provinces, assisted by submarines and gunboats at Vladivostok, is now very powerful. Nobody understands the heady intemperance of Japan's military patriots better than Russia; and there is enough of the Asiatic in her make-up for her to distrust Japan as thoroughly as Japan distrusts her.

Twice since 1937 there have been hostilities between Russia and Japan on a vastly larger scale than the innumerable border skirmishes between Manchuria and the Russian territories, which had become a commonplace in pre-war years. In July and August, 1938, there was serious fighting for a disputed hill named Changkufeng on the Manchurian border overlooking the Russian-owned Possiet Bay, and for a while there was a good deal of expectation that Russia was 'at last coming in on China's side.' But the quarrel was broken off on 9 August (it was believed that Japan

had appealed to Germany for help and had only been promised moral support), and a mixed commission was set up to delimit the border.

Both sides, of course, claimed to have got the best of the encounter. But there was little doubt on that score in the heavy fighting that broke out at Nomonhan, on the Manchu-Mongolian border in 1939, where the Russian tanks did deadly work. The Japanese admitted 17,000 casualties. It was said that when a truce was declared and the dead on either side were to be exchanged, the Japanese had none to hand over. But here, too, the quarrel was patched up.

Russian policy is the guessing game of the world. But it is not a very big guess to suggest that it is enough for her to see Japan wearing herself out in China. Russia has helped China greatly with munitions and advisers, and will go on doing so. At the turn of the year 1940-41 she signed two new barter agreements to supply the Chinese Government with munitions against tea and wool; and in the present conditions of Europe she is not likely to go to war with Japan while China can keep the latter busy.

It is scarcely surprising that in the German overthrow of Holland, Belgium, and France, and the imminent peril of Great Britain, Japan saw a golden opportunity to obtain a dominating position in the trade of Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, both apparently very much left in the air, and to extend her control, if not her empire, over them. If she had been wiser, there is little doubt that the Indo-China Government would have been very glad to conclude a mutually beneficial trade agreement with her. Nearly all Indo-China trade had been done with France and other countries which, being now in German occupation, came under the British blockade.

But the prevailing temper in Tokyo was far too overweening to know the uses of moderation. In quick succession it compelled the French to close the railway to Kunming, to submit to Japanese supervisors being sent to see that the line really was closed, and to allow Japanese troops to be landed and air bases to be established in the north of the colony. Admiral Decoux, the Governor, would have refused this last ignominy, but Germany put pressure upon

Vichy, and the French Ambassador in Tokyo signed the surrender over Admiral Decoux's head.

Even thus compliance did not come quickly enough for some of the hot-heads, and a Major Ando marched in from Kwangsi and slaughtered the French garrison at Langson, while aeroplanes dropped bombs on Haiphong, although the agreement admitting the Japanese to Indo-China had actually been signed.

For this typical piece of 'Young Officer' buccaneering, Tokyo did make some amends by compensation for the people killed in Haiphong. But its bullying behaviour, coupled with the fact that Great Britain found herself obliged temporarily to close the Burma road, and the arrogant tone in which Japanese officials and Press spoke of the Dutch East Indies almost as if they were already part of the Japanese Empire, caused the alarm to be sounded all through Southern Asia. What ought still more to have warned the Japanese, the United States Government issued a statement of strong disapproval of their conduct in Indo-China.

In their approaches to the Dutch East Indies the Japanese dictators had the sense to send a commercial, not a military, envoy, Mr. Kobayashi, Minister of Commerce. But the Dutch Government were not deceived. They welcomed Mr. Kobayashi politely and, with appropriate humour, conducted his ship into harbour with a strong escort of destroyers and aeroplanes.

Already it had been reported all over the Far East, on 17 August, that the Dutch East Indies had put themselves on a war footing; partial military law was enforced, reserve officers were called up for intensive military training, and volunteers patrolled Batavia and other towns on the alert for 'fifth columnists' and parachute troops.

According to the American *Far Eastern Survey* the Dutch East Indies' defences are far from negligible. Although official figures are lacking, they are believed to include one battleship, three cruisers, eight destroyers, eighteen submarines, forty-two torpedo-boats, Vickers tanks and anti-aircraft guns, a respectable air force, and excellent military air bases and airfields hidden in the jungle. Since the

Four Years War there has been compulsory military service for all Hollanders in the islands between the ages of eighteen and thirty-two, and there is also a standing army of 60,000 Indonesians.

Mr. Kobayashi succeeded in obtaining an agreement with the local oil companies, by which the latter raised the amount of crude oil and oil products shipped to Japan to 1,800,000 tons a year. But he does not appear to have got much else and, at the end of October, he returned to Tokyo to report. In December another envoy, Mr. Kenkichi Yoshizawa, an ex-Foreign Minister, was sent to Batavia to take up the negotiations, which, it was stated in Tokyo, 'had been hanging fire.' The determination of the Dutch East Indies Government to confine the discussions strictly to economic affairs and to rule out all politics may supply the explanation.

Nevertheless, up to the conclusion of the tripartite treaty with the Axis on 28 September, by which Japan recognized Germany's and Italy's hegemony in Europe and they recognized hers in East Asia, things seemed to be going well with Japan. She had established a firm footing in Indo-China, where she expected to recoup herself for her losses in China. She had visions of inveigling Thailand into a quarrel with Indo-China which might furnish her with an excuse for advancing into Thailand as a further stage in designs upon Singapore. And China, with both roads to the sea closed, appeared isolated and without hope of help. It is by no means improbable that Japan's apparently rosy future at this time had more than a little to do with the crushing treaty which the soldiers imposed upon Wang Ching-wei, their Nanking puppet, in November. At least, it is difficult to believe that any body of men, holding the highest positions in their country, could have concocted a document so perfectly framed to defeat their own aims in China, unless drunk with pride and over-confidence.

One has to take the whole concatenation of events in the autumn of 1940 to realize the perplexities with which Japan found herself faced at the end of the year.

America instantly took up the challenge to herself

implicit in the tripartite treaty, cut off all supplies to Japan of scrap iron, steel, and aviation spirit, and commandeered all machine tools contracted for by foreign countries (a very serious matter for Japan). She announced a loan of £25,000,000 to China and unlimited aid to Great Britain. She elected President Roosevelt for a third term, which has struck a chill into all Japan. And further, to show the Japanese dictators that she was prepared for anything they might do, she advised all her nationals in the Far East to return home. This, in particular, so alarmed the Japanese people that Mr. Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, found himself obliged to issue a statement that he could not conceive why America had taken such a step, since he had positively declared that the treaty with the Axis made no whit of difference to the position in the Far East. If Mr. Matsuoka believes that, he would, as the Duke of Wellington said on a famous occasion, believe anything.

Meanwhile the expected German invasion of England failed to come off. The mass attacks of the Luftwaffe were signally defeated. The Royal Air Force showed that it could not only defend Great Britain, but could hit back at Germany with vicious effect; and while the Greeks trounced the Italians in Albania, the British smashed them in North Africa. So far from being intimidated by the tripartite pact, Great Britain reopened the Burma road and advanced credits to China of £10,000,000. She also poured aeroplanes and thousands of troops into Singapore, and appointed Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham Commander-in-Chief in the Far East.

Russia's reactions to the Wang Ching-wei treaty and the conspicuous aiming of its third article against herself, have been described in Chapter XIV. In the previous five or six years numerous abortive attempts had been made by joint commissions to settle the many hoary differences between Russia and Japan. In October, 1940, a new Ambassador, General Tatekawa, supposed to be popular with the Russians, was sent to Moscow. He announced his intention to start negotiations *de novo* and his confidence in success. To these expectations the Wang Ching-wei treaty appears to have dealt a fatal blow. Up to the end of 1940,

at least, General Tatekawa had made no progress whatever. It seems pretty clear that Russia now is not in the least afraid of Japan.

Nearer home, too, things have not gone 'according to plan' for Japan.

In November China celebrated the reopening of the Burma road by inflicting a heavy defeat on the Japanese forces in the Han River valley.

Thailand, after some weeks of promising affrays with Indo-China troops along the border line in the Mekong River valley, has announced that the territorial dispute between herself and Indo-China is to be settled diplomatically,¹ and this has been confirmed by Admiral Decoux. For several years past Japan has been paying assiduous court to Thailand. But it is more than likely that the lesson of the Japanese invasion of China (and of Indo-China no less) has not been lost on the Thais. In a Christmas interview given to Reuter's correspondent in Bangkok, Luang Pibul Songram, the Thailand Prime Minister, emphasized the warmth of his country's appreciation of British friendship. He added that Thailand 'would study Japan's "new order for East Asia" carefully as she has trade and other relations with Japan; but her first concern will always remain an independent existence'—a resolve which could meet with no respect in the Japanese 'new order.'

Even the Vichy Government has stiffened its back a little and has cancelled the permission given to aeroplanes of the Japanese Hanoi-Bangkok line to call *en route* (it is, in fact, many miles off the route) at Saigon. The reason given is danger to the aeroplanes from the frontier fighting. But the Japanese Press are probably right enough in seeing a political motive.

¹ Since this announcement was made early in January, Thailand and Indo-China have accepted Japan's mediation, for which it is generally expected she will demand a high price. This news was immediately followed by menacing reports of Japan's aggressive designs in Southern Asia. But the instant and vigorous reactions of Great Britain, America, Australia and the Dutch East in putting themselves in a position for vigorous defence, and the timely arrival of a huge force of Australian troops at Singapore, caused a remarkable change in the Japanese tone. In the Far Eastern 'Battle of Nerves' it was a case of 'the horse blew first.' The dismay of the Japanese at having their bluff called, for the second time in six months, was conspicuous.

What has given Japan more concern than anything else is the re-election of President Roosevelt. 'The *Yomiuri Shinbun*, one of the biggest Tokyo dailies, described it as having 'completely barred the way for a solution of Japanese-American friendship,' while the *Kokumin Shinbun*, which frequently speaks for the military, called it a 'victory for the war party.'

'America under Roosevelt has been challenging us (the *Kokumin* continues). Japan has met this attitude with a policy of peace and non-resistance, but the continuation of such a policy is no longer required or possible.'

'The Japanese are more incapable than any nation on earth of seeing things from any point of view except their own. It is quite proper for them to exclude all ships except their own from trading on the Yangtze on the fiction of 'military necessity'; but it is an unwarrantable outrage when a British cruiser stops the *Asama Maru* and takes off nine German engineers bound for Berlin. It is perfectly permissible to blockade Tientsin and strip English subjects naked at the barriers. But when Japanese passengers are stopped at Bermuda and deprived of the excessive foreign exchange they are carrying to Germany, it is an act of brigandage. It is a meritorious fulfilment of Imperial destiny for Japan to strike hands with the sworn enemies of democratic freedom. But when the democracies combine in self-defence, they are guilty of inexcusable aggression against Japan's 'holy' designs for the welfare of mankind.

It is in the light of these curious inconsistencies that one must read Mr. Matsuoka's anguished appeals to the United States not to plunge the world in a war that will bring down civilization in ruins. As revelations both of Japanese fears and Japanese mentality these utterances of Mr. Matsuoka's are so interesting that some quotations must be given.

At a farewell luncheon on 12 December to Admiral Nomura, the new Ambassador to Washington, at which Mr. Grew, the American Ambassador in Tokyo, was present, Mr. Matsuoka said :

"I beseech my American friends to think twice, thrice, nay ten hundred or ten thousand times before taking a leap that may prove fatal to all humanity.

"Japan is not waging an Imperialist war of greed and aggression in China. It is not a war of conquest or covetous ambitions. We are engaged in a moral crusade.

"We are endeavouring to initiate an era of enduring peace and unlimited prosperity in Greater East Asia, where we firmly believe we have a great mission as a civilizing and stabilizing force.

"We shut the door nowhere and to no one. Any nation that desires to take a hand in this great task is welcome.

"But we will not be induced to deflect from our settled course, whatever the pressure or whoever the detractor.

"Japan has no desire whatsoever to antagonize America.

"We only desire to be left alone to carry on our constructive work unhindered, and to see the trouble in China and the war in Europe brought speedily to an end without adding more participants, particularly such a powerful one as America."

In a New Year's Day broadcast Mr. Matsuoka attempted to justify Japan's foreign policy as follows :

"International life, both in peace and war, used to be characterized by relentless exploitation, the preying of the strong upon the weak ; and the power of gold, accumulated as the result of exploitation, has long been monopolized by a few greedy nations.

"The Old Order, based almost entirely upon such a state of affairs, stifled the majority of the peoples of the world, and therefore they demanded through peaceful means the right to existence.

"But a cruel few refused to listen, leading to the present catastrophe, in which the oppressed majority of nations have no other recourse than to use force in realizing their just desires.

"The construction of the New Order, however, cannot be achieved by the mere destruction of the old one. The ultimate objective of the New Order is to realize an international life in which a common existence shall be achieved in prosperity and mutual profit.

"This must be brought about by teaching humankind to abandon the exploitation of the weak by the strong.

"'Hakkoichiu,' or universal brotherhood, the ideal which inspired the founding of the Japanese Empire, clearly indicates the path to be followed. Viewed from this standpoint, the violent destruction now going on in the East and the West is only a herald of the magnificent and epoch-making constructive work to come."

If Mr. Matsuoka were asked how much of the spirit of

'universal brotherhood' the Japanese military dictators have shown to the masses of their own people, let alone to those of China, he would probably be shocked at the impiety of the question. But it is clear that argument is useless. The Japanese dictators belong to another world and speak another language than ours.

It is probable that what Japan really fears is, not that she will be drawn into war with America, but that by the latter's powerful aid Great Britain will emerge triumphant in Europe. If that should happen, it would be useless for Mr. Matsuoka or anyone else to talk about Japan's not being induced 'to deflect from her settled course whatever the pressure.' Japan already realizes—although she is incapable of seeing how much she herself is to blame for it—that the long-dreaded co-operation between America and Great Britain is now a fact. There is not the slightest doubt that if Great Britain succeeds in smashing Hitlerism, Japan will be given her marching orders out of China, and she will be powerless to disobey.

There remains the very interesting question of what Japan would do if America actually came into the war against Germany. Theoretically the tripartite treaty obliges Japan immediately to make war on America. But there are signs that she may have her own method of interpreting this obligation.

It is noteworthy that whereas Ribbentrop spoke of the treaty, when it was signed, as 'an alliance,' the Japanese have always avoided using that word. A Foreign Office spokesman said emphatically, in a statement to foreign journalists in Tokyo, that the treaty had 'not delivered Japan's destiny into Hitler's keeping.'

Still more remarkable was a statement made by Mr. Matsuoka in an interview given to the foreign journalists shortly before Christmas. He said that 'Japan would certainly have to fight if the United States went to war with Germany,' but in answer to further questions, he qualified this by saying :

" This would have to be determined in the light of Article 3 of the Pact (by which Japan contracts to assist the Axis if

any nation not in the war at the time of its signing should become involved).

"The signatories of the Pact would be called on to consult together as to whether the case came under the provisions of Article 3. I hope such an eventuality will never occur."

As a final straw to show which way the wind, at any rate of Japanese public feeling, blows, the *Singapore Herald*, a Japanese-owned paper, commented on the Italian debacle in North Africa that 'if the Italian war effort is irreparably damaged, the tripartite pact may well become a dead letter and a new British understanding with Japan may be developed.'

The morality of dictators is their own. The mentality of people who can violently take Manchuria from China, and can then invade China with unsurpassed ruthlessness, set up puppet Governments and administer the invaded territory as if it were their own, and can still vociferate that they have not violated the Nine-Power Treaty, would not be at a loss to interpret the Treaty with the Axis to suit themselves. Japan certainly does not forget that Germany doubled-crossed her in concluding her pact with Russia, and there is no reason to think that she would hesitate to do the like by Germany.

The future is on the knees of the gods, and the fates of East and West alike are bound up in the titanic struggle between Great Britain and the German powers of darkness. To the Chinese that has long been apparent, and it is known that General Chiang Kai-shek's great aim is to keep the war with Japan in full blast until Great Britain wins. For that reason it is possible that he may delay his promised counter-offensive a while longer, although China has started the year 1941 in good heart, with a trained army of 3,000,000 men (these figures have been admitted by Japan) and, they say, ample stores of munitions, both foreign and home-made. General Chiang knows that the Japanese can still deal mighty blows, he is too good a leader to go off at half-cock, and China's resources, still only half-developed, are far greater than Japan's.

Yet there are other possibilities to be considered. The downfall of Germany undoubtedly means the downfall of

Japan. The downfall of Great Britain does not necessarily mean that of China. A country of over 400,000,000 people, aflame with new ideas and the determination to be free, cannot be converted into the colonized slaves of 70,000,000 people. And it is highly improbable that Hitler would assist Japan in endeavouring to shut out the rest of the world from China as she has shut them out of Manchuria, Formosa, Korea, and the South Sea Islands. A few months ago foreign observers could see no end to the Sino-Japanese War but a stalemate. Now they are not so sure, as China's strength increases and Japan plainly begins to feel the strain. It is conceivable that Japan may be the first of the Axis Powers to crack, and that history will date the beginning of the downfall of that evil trinity from the heroic stand made by those apparently hopelessly out-matched gallants, China and Greece.

Of the future of Japan no one, however well he knows her, would care to prophesy. Political assassination is confined to 'patriots' of the 'Young Officer' and Black Dragon stamp. It is not used by Japanese Liberals; and it is difficult to visualize a revolution in modern Japan. On the other hand, there can be no freedom for the Japanese people, no prosperous life for them, no friendly co-operation with other nations in the building of a real new order, until the power of the military junta, the curse of Japan and of all who deal with her, has been broken. But when it is, it must not be forgotten that, as pointed out in an earlier chapter, Japan has genuine and just grievances that must be redressed. Columns have been written in British newspapers on Great Britain's 'war aims,' an obviously impossible question to answer. But at least one of them should be a serious endeavour to obliterate the grievance of some nations that the world is divided into the 'have's' and 'have-not's.'


And what of China? It is needless to dwell on the importance of giving her all possible help, so that she may continue to keep Japan too fully occupied to start on new adventures elsewhere. That is crude common sense, which ought to have been recognized long ago. But the West owes more to China than that.

It is in debt to her for the faint, irresolute help it has been giving her ever since Manchuria was invaded. It is in debt to her for hundreds of helpless villages, thriving cities, and great seats of learning wantonly destroyed by Japanese bombs. It is in debt to her for all the past century in which it has been injecting into her veins the virus of its own restlessness, with little care for what maladies it might breed and but little effort (and that confined to private missionary agencies) for supplying her with the necessary cultural antidote. How often in the past thirty years have not British statesmen declared that 'we seek nothing in China but trade,' with the best intentions, and without the faintest conception how insulting their words may sound to a people of China's high intellectual habits?

And when we talk of war aims, it is apposite to consider whether China may not have something to teach us. In the mere matter of constitutional form she is not yet a democracy. But if that much quoted word means anything that will bring the world after its present upheaval to a better state of life for all mankind, it must mean more than ballot boxes, bureaucrats, liberty degenerating into licence, lack of discipline, party tyranny, and the hideous gulf between rich and poor, which have hitherto been the most conspicuous manifestations of democratic practice.

That deeper meaning has surely been inherent in the Chinese conception of life for 2600 years. They may not always have practised it; in fact, they have not; but they have never lost sight of it altogether, and in recent years their faith in it has been revived in new forms with burning effect.

Confucius knew nothing of republics. He would have said that forms of government are immaterial compared with the quality of the men administering them. But when he defined the four cardinal virtues—*Li*, *I*, *Lien*, *Ch'ih*, which may be interpreted courtesy and good manners, justice and uprightness, frugality and integrity, modesty and self-respect, he surely traced the whole pattern of harmonious life for peoples and Governments alike.



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